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THE CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION OF RUSSIAN-GERMANS
FROM RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN TO GERMANY:
A CASE STUDY IN MIGRATION GEOGRAPHY
Jacquelin K. Tylzynski, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1998
Since the collapse of communism in Central Europe and the former Soviet
Union in the late 1980's/early 1990's over two million ethnic Germans have migrated
to Germany (predominantly from Russia and Kazakhstan). Ethnic Germans are
descendants of Germans who migrated to Central Europe and to Russia centuries ago
who are returning to their historic roots since they have been allowed to leave. The
reason ethnic Germans are migrating to Germany stems from a strange law written
into West Germany's post-World War II constitution (in 1949) that promised ethnic
Germans and their descendants the "right to return" to Germany; however, the
majority of them were kept from emigrating until the Soviet Union collapsed. The
ethnic German issue has become highly controversial in Germany. Straddled with the
problems of Reunification, many Germans now feel the "right to return" for ethnic
Germans is no longer practical.
This thesis analyzes the available literature and uses a variety of statistics,
cartographic techniques and specially collected data to show the political, economic
and social impact on Germany, and to some extent on Russia and Kazakhstan, caused
by this migration.
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CHAPTER!
INTRODUCTION
One of the biggest problems for the German government, and one of the most
controversial issues in the country since Reunification, is the immigration of ethnic
Germans (Aussiedler) arriving in Germany from Central Europe and the former
Soviet Union. Ethnic Germans are descendants of German farmers and craftspeople
who migrated to Central Europe and to Russia centuries ago who are returning to
their historic roots since they have been allowed to leave. Since 1988, over two
million ethnic Germans have migrated to Germany (predominantly from the former
Soviet Union) and hundreds of thousands more are on the way (Info-Dienst 1996).
The migration of ethnic Germans is observed in Western Europe as part of the East
West migration trend occurring since the collapse of communism in Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980's and early 1990's, but simultaneously,
this specific migration is unique because it is considered solely a "late consequence of
World War II (Miinz and Ulrich 1995, 8; Dietz 1994, 13)."
The reason the migration of ethnic Germans is considered a "late consequence
of World War II" sterns from a strange law included in West Germany's post-war
constitution in 1949. Following World War II, under the auspice of the three West
German occupation forces (the United States, Great Britain and France), a board of
governors was chosen from each West German state to author a new constitution for
1
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the Federal Republic of Germany (FRD). Formally promulgated on May 23, 1949,
the "Basic Law" (Grundgesetz) as the constitution was to be named, included a
provision entitled Article 116 (Kappler 1993, 4). The sole purpose of Article 116 was
to extend the right to German citizenship to all persons who "between January 30,
1933 and May 8, 1945, were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial or
religious grounds, and to their descendants." "Such persons", the Basic Law says,
"may be granted German citizenship anew upon application (Focus On ...1995, 1-2)."
(Article 116 has been exercised primarily by ethnic Germans from Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union but the law also enables other persons to return to
Germany, such as German Jews forced to leave in 1933.)
Another law entitled the "Federal Expellee Law" (Bundesvertriebenengesetz),
enacted in 1953, legally defines who is eligible for citizenship as an ethnic German.
The Federal Expellee Law categorizes ethnic Germans arriving in Germany under
Article 116 as belonging to one of two main groups. The first group is ethnic
Germans and their descendants migrating from territory in Central Europe that was
lost by Germany during World War II such as in certain parts of modem-day Poland
(Figure 1 ).

This group is considered to be of German "nationality"

(Staatsangehorige) because they did not willingly give up their German citizenship
(die Situation der Deutschen ... 1996).

In the final days of World War II and

immediately following the war millions of Germans, or German-speaking people,
whose ancestors migrated to Central Europe as early as the twelfth century either fled
or were expelled from their homelands, including East Prussia, Pomerania, East

..,

3

Baltic Sea

PO�AND
West

BELARUS

) 0
I .s;
I -..J

( §

<.>
Iif

I

UKRAINE
MOLDOVA@)
(BESSARABIA)

HUNGARY

W

German Territory - 1937

ROMANIA�

� *German-speaking Settlements

100

200

Kilometers

BULGARIA
*Not drawn to scale

Figure 1. German Territory and German Settlements in Central Europe - 1937.
Source:

Die Geteilte Heimat 1994; deZayas 1994; Stumpp 1962

Brandenburg, Silesia, Bohemia, Bessarabia (Moldova), Romania and Yugoslavia
(deZayas 1994; Info-Dienst 1996). "Partly as a result ofthe Potsdam Conference of
July-August 1945 and partly out ofrevenge for the atrocities committed by the Nazis
during World War II, around 13 million Germans were driven from their 700-year
old homelands (deZayas 1994, 15)."

Another two million perished during the
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expulsion process, many of whom were murdered by Soviet soldiers and pro-Soviet
militias in Central Europe (deZayas 1994, 15).
When the expulsions officially ended m 1950 there were still around two
million Germans, or German-speaking people, living in Central Europe.

Some

refused to leave their homes that had been in their families for centuries and thought
they could ride out the storm of hostilities taking place against Germans. Others,
especially physicians, veterinarians, chemists, skilled farmers and others with
vocational skills were not forced to leave their homes, but those who chose to stay, or
were kept from leaving for one reason or another, were forcefully relocated within
their countries in Central Europe where they were persecuted and discriminated
against for decades after the war because of their German ethnicity (deZayas 1994).
Consequently, the authors of West Germany's post-War constitution extended them
the right to citizenship under Article 116, and kept the law in place, to ensure that if
more expulsions were to occur, ethnic Germans still living in Central Europe would
have a place to go. From the 1950's to the late 1980's some managed to flee to West
Germany, but the Cold War prevented most of them from leaving (Focus On ... 1995,
1 ).
The second group of ethnic Germans entitled to citizenship under Article 116,
and the topic of this thesis, is Russian-Germans. Unlike ethnic Germans arriving in
Germany from Central Europe, Russian-Germans are not considered to be of German
"nationality (die Situation der Deutschen... 1996)." Russian-Germans, defmed by
German law as being only of German "ethnicity" (Volkzugehorige), willingly gave up

their German citizenship centuries ago when their ancestors migrated to Russia. 1 Yet,
Article 116 of Germany's constitution also extends the right to citizenship to this
group of people. This immediately raises several questions. First, who are these
people and why did their ancestors give up their German citizenship to live in Russia?
Secondly, why would Germany grant the right to citizenship in 1949 to people whose
ancestors left Germany centuries ago? Further, if Germany's constitution promised
them the right to citizenship in 1949, why is the immigration of Russian-Germans
causing so much controversy in the country today? Finally, how many Russian
Germans still live in the former Soviet Union and what is the new Russian
government's policy regarding its ethnic German population?
Statement of Purpose and Research Objectives
The contemporary migration of Russian-Germans is one of the most important
movements of people in the current decade, posing many challenges to the German
and Russian governments and to millions of Russian-Germans themselves.

The

research presented in this thesis analyzes the available literature and uses a variety of
statistics, cartographic techniques, and specially collected data which were not
available before to English-speaking readers to show how a peculiar law written in
West Germany in 1949 triggered the mass migration of this obscure ethnic minority
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and to show the political, economic, and social
impact on Germany, and to some extent on Russia, caused by this migration.
This thesis will analyze the recent migratory movement of Russian-Germans
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to Germany as an example of an international "migration stream" with certain
attributes as initially identified by E. G. Ravenstein in his Laws of Migration (1885,
1889).2 The migration of Russian-Germans will also be analyzed within the well
known theoretical framework defined by Everett Lee in A Theory of Migration
(1966). Lee argues that all migrations have certain characteristics such as "push and
pull factors", "intervening obstacles", and "personal choices" that can influence
migration (Lee 1966, 49-50; Lewis 1982, 100-102). 3
Thus, focusing on "migration streams", "push-pull factors", etc. this thesis
will: (a) Trace the historical background of Russian-Germans from 1763 to the end of
the Soviet era; (b) discuss "push factors" contributing to the migration of Russian
Germans to Germany beginning in the late 1980's; (c) compare the number of ethnic
Germans who have migrated to Germany since 1989/90 and their countries of origin
with the migration stream and countries of origin prior to the collapse of communism
in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union; (d) discuss factors "pulling" Russian
Germans to Germany; (e) discuss recent amendments to Germany's constitution as a
result of this migration; (f) discuss the surge in xenophobia and violence against
"foreigners" in Germany as a result of the population dynamics occurring in Germany
following Reunification; (g) discuss the 1989 Soviet census and explain its
inaccuracies regarding the undercount of Russian-Germans; (h) look at the
possibilities and difficulties of integration of ethnic Germans in Germany; and (i)
discuss the affects of an experimental arrangement made between the Russian and
German governments in the early 1990's in an effort to keep Russian-Germans in the
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former Soviet Union.
Justification of Research
The migration of Russian-Germans is important for several reasons. First, the
new Germany is emerging as a strong and powerful nation and will probably become
the leader in the European Union (deZayas 1994). It is important, therefore, that we
have an understanding of the German people, their geography, their social problems,
and their history. Secondly, the migration of Russian-Germans is significant because
it means the loss of millions of people for the former Soviet Union. The migration of
Russian-Germans is also important because it has given the German and Russian
governments (former adversaries) the opportunity to work together in trying to find
solutions to the Russian-German migratory problem.
Further, Germany needs to be recognized for its humanitarian effort and
concern for millions of Russian-Germans. The German government, which has often
been accused of being nationalistic for granting Russian-Germans the right to German
citizenship, insists it does not encourage the immigrants to come to Germany but the
right to citizenship under Article 116 stimulated the migration none-the-less. In this
writer's opinion, however, it is not so much because of German nationalism that the
country opened its doors to Russian-German immigrants by way of Article 116.
Rather, it is because the German government, for reasons that will be shown in
subsequent chapters, feels obligated, perhaps out of guilt, to assist Russian-Germans
who want to leave the former Soviet Union.
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Finally, it can be expected that the migration of Russian-Germans to Germany
will continue for several more years causing further political and economic impact
both in Germany and in the immigrants' countries of origin in the former Soviet
Union.

Analysis of this movement should make a contribution to the field of

migration geography.
Study Approach and Organization
This thesis is composed of six chapters. The Introductory Chapter provides an
overview of the topic and lists the research objectives. Chapter II traces the historical
background of Russian-Germans to the end of the Soviet era.
Chapter III discusses the critical events that led to the collapse of communism
in the former Soviet Union and Central Europe that stimulated the exodus of ethnic
Germans to Germany.

Chapter III also discusses "pull factors" regarding the

migration of ethnic Germans to Germany, and analyzes census data to compare the
number of ethnic Germans and their countries of origin arriving in Germany since the
late 1980's with the number of ethnic Germans and countries of origin prior to the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Chapter III also discusses the inaccuracies of the 1989
Soviet census concerning the number of Russian-Germans in the Soviet Union, the
shift in public opinion in Germany toward the immigrants, and discusses subsequent
amendments to Article 116 in an effort to slow the migration.
Chapter IV describes the immigration process and the role of Germany's state
and local governments in assisting ethnic German immigrants.

Chapter IV also

discusses integration possibilities and difficulties and addresses issues such as
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settlement patterns, employment potential, the language barrier, and cultural
differences of ethnic Germans.
Chapter V looks at the concept of a "divided homeland" for Russian-Germans
(die Geteilte Heimat 1994). This chapter also evaluates the 1996 estimate by the
German government of the number of Russian-Germans still in the former Soviet
Union and compares the results to the 1989 Soviet census.

Chapter VI, the

concluding chapter, provides a summary and conclusion of the research findings.
Data Collection Strategy
Census data obtained from the German government at both the federal and
state levels were used in the analyses to characterize the migratory movement and
demographic factors of Russian-Germans. Legal documents and other government
publications pertaining strictly to ethnic Germans have also been cited throughout
Chapters II through V, as well as written correspondences, short-wave radio
broadcast commentaries, and United Nations reports on current migration trends in
the Commonwealth oflndependent States (CIS). Many books and periodical articles
in both German and English were also used in the analyses.
1

Some Central European ethnic Germans are also defined as being of German "ethnicity' rather than
of German "nationality." Included in this group are German-speaking people whose ancestors settled
in certain regions of Central Europe, such as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, that were once part of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to World War I.
2

Ravenstein (1885, 1889) actually used the phrase "migration current'' but this has been substituted
with the phrase "migration stream" in modem literature (Lee 1966). Ravenstein concluded that
"migration streams" occur "along well defined routes toward highly specific destinations", partly
because of the flow of positive information about the destination from those who have already settled
there. The flow of positive information about the destination serves to "recruit" new migrants at the
"place of origin (Lee 1966; 54-55)."
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3

"The role of "push-pull" factors, as initially defined by Herberle (1938) is to try to identify and
measure the negative (push) and positive (pull) factors of both the receiving country and the country of
origin of the immigrant (Lee 1966, 49; Akerman 1978, 289). When, for example, positive factors for
migration to a certain area are perceived by the potential migrant as outweighing the negative factors,
and/or the negative factors for staying in the country of origin outweigh the positive factors, the person
may decide to migrate. However, Lee, among others, argued that Herberle's theory is "an
oversimplification of the realities of life" and that there are also "intervening obstacles", such as legal
restrictions, cost, etc. that might prevent the potential migrant from leaving. In addition to
"intervening obstacles" there might also be "personal factors" preventing a person from migrating such
as old-age, illness, etc (Lee 1966, 50; Lewis 1982, 101).

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RUSSIAN-GERMANS
(1763- 1987)
New Beginnings
The history of Russian-Germans began when, at the invitation of Catherine
the Great in 1763, thousands of Germans left their homeland for a new and, what was
hoped, better life in Russia. Catherine, a German princess who became Empress of
Russia (1762-1796) when her husband, Peter III, was dethroned and later murdered,
wanted to develop the frontier in southern Russia. She also wanted to introduce
western technology in Russia; a country which at the time was still in a primitive state
compared with those in Western Europe. She particularly admired Germany's skilled
agriculturalists and craftsmen and thought they would be a good influence on the
Russian peasant class (Long 1988).
Catherine was not the first of the Russian aristocracy who thought Germans
would be good for Russia. Some Germans migrated to the Baltics as early as the
twelfth century. Many became wealthy landowners and merchants. They remained
in the minority but they influenced the Baltics both in culture and in law (Giesinger
1993). In the sixteenth century the Baltics were invaded by Poland, Sweden, and
later by Russia. Peter the Great (1689-1725) realized that in order for his country to
become a European nation it was necessary to have a commercial link with the West.
11
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He needed the Baltic States, located on the Baltic Sea, for transportation to the West
so he declared war on the Swedes and invaded the Baltic provinces. The war lasted
21 years but finally in 1721 Peter prevailed, and as early as 1703, apparently
convinced Russia would win the war, had proceeded to build the new Russian capital,
St. Petersburg, at the mouth of the Neva River.

Baltic Germans managed to keep

control of their positions in government and social status after the war because Peter
admired them and needed their help to modernize Russia (Giesinger 1993). Many
Baltic Germans assimilated into Russian society and became part of the nobility
(deZayas 1994). Ivan the Terrible (1522-1584), like his successors, had also been
convinced that Russians could learn from the Germans and invited some Germans to
Moscow although they were kept in enclaves, segregated from the general population,
because the Russians were suspicious of their German guests (Giesinger 1993).
The majority of the German settlers did not begin migrating to Russia
however until 1763 when Catherine issued a manifesto and sent agents all over
Western Europe, but primarily to Germany, to entice people to resettle in Russia.
They were promised free tracts of fertile land rich in minerals and easily accessible to
trade routes. Merchants, craftsmen and professionals were told there would be many
opportunities for them as well. People were also told they would be able to settle
anywhere there was empty land, be given interest-free loans for ten years, that no
customs duties would be levied on property brought into Russia, and they were
promised freedom of religion, freedom from military service, and freedom to leave
Russia anytime they wanted (Giesinger 1993; Long 1988).
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Catherine's offer was hard to refuse. Germany had recently been involved in
a series of wars and the country was left in a shambles.

Their lands had been

"trampled on" by German and foreign armies (Giesinger 1993, 11). Their sons had
been sent off to fight in wars they did not understand, manufacturing and trade had
been cut off because of the war, they suffered religious persecution, and struggled to
pay the high taxes imposed on them by feudal landlords. Many took advantage of
Catherine's manifesto.

From 1764-1767 seven thousand German families, or

approximately 25,000-27,000 people made the difficult journey to Russia to what
they thought was going to be a "virgin paradise (Giesinger 1993, 11)."
The Trans-Volga Steppe
What the settlers found was not a paradise, but a wild :frontier. The Trans
Volga steppe, located in southern Russia, was a buffer zone between Russia and the
nomadic Kalmyk and Kirghiz tribes (Mongols) that roamed the region (Figure 2).
For years the steppe had been used as a place to send undesirables; backward peasant
villages dotted the landscape (Giesinger 1993).
The climate was a harsh continental climate similar to that found in America's
prairie states with daily and seasonal temperature extremes. The region was subject
to blizzards in the winter and severe droughts that could sometimes last for years.
Although agents had promised that houses would be ready upon the settlers' arrival,
they found there were no houses waiting for them or any lumber with which to build.
There were shortages ofjust about every other essential promised too, including farm

14

Figure 2. The Trans-Volga Steppe (n.d.).
Source:

The German Russians (Stumpp 1993). Used with permission of the
American Historical Society of Germans from Russia.

implements (Long 1988). The newcomers had to carve dugouts out of the clay soil to
find shelter from the harsh elements until thatched-roofed houses made from log
could be built which often took up to two or three years because the logs had to be
hauled upriver from other areas then dragged by horses to the settlement areas
(Giesinger 1993).
The settlers found their Russian hosts had not been truthful in other matters
either. Merchants, craftsmen and professionals who had migrated to the Volga region
had been told they would be able to establish their trade in Russia, but once they
arrived they were told they too would have to farm. Those who refused to cooperate
were beaten into submission (Long 1988).
The settlers were often robbed by Gypsies and subjected to frequent attacks by
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nomadic tribes and sometimes carried off by their captors never to be seen again
(Beratz 1991; Giesinger 1993).

Often newly established villages were almost

completely destroyed in the raids (Sinner 1989). Nevertheless, they accepted their
circumstances and decided to make the best of it.
The first German villages were established in Saratov and Samara Provinces,
separated by the Volga River (Figure 3). Saratov was on the "mountainous side" of
the river, a region richer in minerals and with better soils than the "meadow side" in
Samara Province (Long 1988, 6). The settlers grew wheat and raised livestock.
Within four years of the arrival of the first settlers in the Volga region, 103
German villages had been established. Villages were linear in design with the church
in the center between the Oberdorf (upper village) and the Unterdorf (lower village)
(Long 1988, 13). An observer of one of the German villages on the Volga steppe
wrote (some years later) that he was amazed that in the short time the Germans had
been there, they had built stone churches, an inn, distillery, candle factory, soap
factory, tobacco factory, pharmacy, flour mill and had piped-in water in every house.
He also noted the villages were, unlike Russian peasant villages in the area, "clean
and tidy", and that the Germans were "law abiding, family oriented, industrious and
humble (Long 1988, 63)."
German migration to the Volga ended by 1768. "The population increased
naturally from that point on, doubling about every 25-30 years (Long 1988, 11)." As
a result of the rapid population increase, serious land shortages ensued and the settlers
were forced to spread out more into the fringes of the Lower Volga where land was
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Figure 3. Volga German Settlements- 1763-1860.
Source:

Karte der ehernaligen und heutigen siedlungsgebiete der Deutschen in der
Sowjetunion (Stumpp 1962).

not as good.
Although migration to the Volga steppe ended m 1768, German migration
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continued into other pockets of the Russian Empire. In the sixteenth century, the
Mennonites, a small, left wing religious group that originated in the Netherlands,
migrated across Germany where it picked up many converts and eventually settled in
Prussia (part of modern-day Poland). Most were agriculturists renown for their skills.
But in the late 1700's, relations between the religious sect and King Frederick
William III of Prussia began to deteriorate. Catherine, eager to accept these hard
working people, invited them to resettle in Russia. They settled in various parts of
the country; a few went to the Volga region (Giesinger 1993, 29).
In the meantime, Napoleon's armies had been trampling back and forth across
Germany to fight the Prussians, Austrians, and the Russians compelling many
Germans once again to want to leave Germany. From 1801-1825 several thousand
more German families headed to the Black Sea region, Bessarabia, Volhynia, and the
Southern Caucasus. Most of these people had also been invited by Catherine and
later by Alexander I, to populate the vast territory Russia had recently won from the
Turks in the Crimean War. Others were invited by wealthy landowners who had
already become established in these regions (Giesinger 1993).

Another German

settlement was established when some Volga Germans and Black Sea Germans
migrated to southwest Siberia in the late 1800's to farm there (Figure 4).
Policy Changes Following the Crimean War Degrade Russian-Germans
Although the settlers were initially coerced and lied to by the Russian
government to persuade them to migrate to Russia, it can be said they were generally
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treated favorably after their arrival, at least for a while. Russian-Germans had
autonomy and were considered by many to be privileged and spoiled. In 1763, the
government

established

the

"Guardianship

Council

for

Foreigners"

(Vormundschaftskanzlei or Tutelkanzleifur Auslander) in St. Petersburg to "look after
the colonization program (Giesinger 1993, 48; Long 1988, 16)." The Council set up
an office in Saratov officially known as the "Saratov Office for the Guardianship of
Foreigners", but was referred to by local citizens as the Kontora (Giesinger 1993, 48).
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The Kontora was a special administrative system that acted as a liaison between the
settlers in the Volga region and the Guardianship Council in St. Petersburg.
Grievances could be aired through the Kontora who oversaw the settlers and acted as
a sort of protector. However, in 1871, following the Crimean War, government
policy shifted to one of indifference toward Russian-Germans, and later to one of
open hostility. Originally the new policy was directed at the Russian peasantry and
the "socioeconomic backwardness of the Russian state" but it affected Russian
Germans as well (Long 1988, 16). The ultimate goal of the reform was to have
"complete amalgamation of the colonists with the peasantry in all areas; social
position, administration, and government (Long 1988, 16)."

Russian-Germans

considered the new policy directive degrading, as they had never suffered the status
of the peasant class. The Kontora was ordered abolished leaving the settlers no way
to voice their complaints.

The government also mandated that all further

correspondence with the government be written in Russian, and although Russian
Germans had been promised they would have freedom from military service, military
conscription of Russian-Germans suddenly became law (Long 1988). Heavy taxes
were also imposed on the settlers in violation of Catherine's manifesto.
Because of cultural diffusion and isolation a strange dialect began to emerge
in the German settlement areas. "Kolonistendeutsch" ( colonists German) was a
mixture of Russian and German words and phonetics, but it was only a spoken
dialect, not written (Long 1988, 50). Russians ridiculed them and said their language
was a "hybrid" and wanted them to adopt Russian but the settlers were determined to
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keep up their traditions as they had been promised they could (Long 1988, 50). In
defiance, they continued to use the German language in schools, religion and
festivals, but by 1917 most Germans living in Saratov and other towns had become
Russified much to the satisfaction of the Russian government.
The Churches' Role in the German Settlements
The settlers had complete freedom of religion until World War I, but in 1896
the government ordered they "could not exert a harmful influence on the Orthodox
population in the neighborhood (Stumpp 1993, 104)." The 1897 official Russian
census reported that 76% of the German settlers were Lutheran, 13.5% Roman
Catholic, 3.7% Mennonite, 3.6% Reformed, 1.9% other Christian faiths and 1.3%
Jews and other non-Christians (Stumpp 1993, 20).
Permits were required to build churches and all churches had to be built
entirely with private funds.

Russia's tsar, Nickolaus I, was concerned with the

establishment

church

of "orderly

relationships"

(hierarchies

within

each

denomination), so he set up the "Ordinance for the Evangelical Church of Russia" (a
blanket term for Lutheran, Reformed, Baptists and Separatists) and another ordinance
for the Roman Catholic Church. Until the Bolshevik Revolution, the settlers were
subjected to the church, which in tum was subjected to the tsarist government
(Stumpp 1993, 98).
Baltic Germans, as well as Germans in Volhynia, the Black Sea region and the
Caucasus were of the Evangelical faith. Volga Germans were mostly Evangelical and
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Roman Catholic. Mennonites settled mainly in the Black Sea region and later in
West Siberia.
In 1897, 80% of the Russian people were illiterate but there were hardly any
illiterate persons in the German settlements (Stumpp 1993). The churches raised
enough money from their congregations to establish schools of higher learning where
both the German and Russian languages were taught. Farmers donated land to be
used for modem agricultural training and sons of farmers from all over Russia arrived
at the school in Halbstadt (West Siberia) established in 1907 to learn German
agricultural practices.
German churches m St. Petersburg and Moscow established universities
where Germans, as well as Russian aristocrats, would send their sons to be educated
(Stumpp 1993).

The settlers, with no state subsidies, also built many schools,

hospitals and orphanages (Figure 5).
Agricultural Development in the German Settlements
Droughts were common in Russia, particularly on the steppe, but in the good
years the settlers grew wheat, rye and potatoes; later they also grew barley, millet,
sunflowers, melons and pumpkins (Long 1988). Mennonites introduced tobacco to
the region to be used as a cash crop.

The tobacco was hauled in the winter (when

prices were high) by sleigh to Saratov and sometimes as far away as Moscow.
Tobacco was also traded with Kirghiz nomads for hides, felt, lard, blankets,
saddles,etc. The nomads liked the tobacco's strength and its "stinking odor (Beratz
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Figure 5. German Hospital in Odessa (n.d.).
Source: The German Russians (Stumpp 1993). Used with permission of the
American Historical Society of Germans from Russia.
1991,167)."
Between 1860-1917 the Volga area changed from being a grain exporter to a
flour exporter. Saratov became the "Minneapolis of the Lower Volga" and Volga
Germans the "Pillsburys of the flour milling industry (Long 1988, 103)." In between
drought and famine years, some Volga Germans made fortunes. Black Sea Germans
also experienced enormous economic boom during this time (Stumpp 1993;
Baumeister 1991) (Figures 6-8).
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Figure 6. Steam-driven Flour Mill in Zarizyn (n.d.). In early German settlements
windmills were used to ground grain (to make into wheat flour) but later
every large village had its own steam-driven mill. The mills were used
by Germans as well as by their Russian neighbors.
Source:

The German Russians (Stumpp 1993). Used with permission of the
American Historical Society of Germans from Russia.

Rise of German Nationalism: Russian-Germans Treated With Contempt
Between 1890-1894 relations between Russia and Germany deteriorated.
Bismarck's establishment of the German Empire and subsequent rise of German
nationalism caused Russian-Germans to become targets of condemnation by the
Russian press.

They were labeled as "a dangerous, subversive element" and an

"unproductive, parasitic, economic drain who deserved no better treatment than
Russian peasants (Long 1988, 57)." The German government, on the other hand,
considered them to be Russian and was not in the least interested in their well being.
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Figure 7. Fall Market on the Don (n.d.). As agriculture became modernized,
industries sprung up in the larger German villages to produce farm
equipment for local communities, but handicrafts were also important.
Local farmers came to the market villages, such as the one shown in
the photograph, to buy and sell handmade items such as rakes, pitchforks,
and other farm implements.
Source:

The German Russians (Stumpp 1993). Used with permission of the
American Historical Society of Germans from Russia.
Actually, the settlers did not pose any threat to Russia. Having no elite to

represent or lead them, most were oblivious to the attacks launched at them by the
Russian press. They were German only in language and religion. They continued to
live peaceably among their non-German neighbors but their prosperity in Russia
increasingly became a curse as many in "panslavic circles" began to view the German
settlers with ill-will, envy and hatred and viciously stirred up rumors that the settlers
might use their economic success to betray the Russian government (Stumpp 1993,
28-29; Baumeister 1991). It was during this time that some German settlers decided
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Figure 8. Town ofKatharinenstadt in the Volga ASSR (n.d.). There were no German
cities in Russia but the German influence was strongly present as in the
town ofKatharinenstadt.
Source:

The German Russians (Stumpp 1993). Used with permission ofthe
American Historical Society of Germans from Russia.

to leave Russia and join other Germans who had settled in the New World.
Thousands of Russian-Germans came to America to farm. Others went to Canada,
South America and elsewhere (Sallet 1974).
World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution: Consequences for Russian-Germans
Ethnic Germans who chose to stay in Russia were shocked by news of war
between Russia and Germany. They did not want to fight against their bloodbrothers
in Germany but when war broke out they remained loyal to the tsarist government
and many Russian-Germans inducted into the military died for their adopted
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homeland. Russian-German civilians also tried to show their loyalty. They provided
food and raised horses for the Russian army, and cared for wounded soldiers in their
hospitals (Stumpp 1993). In spite of efforts to prove their loyalty, the Russians were
suspicious of them.

The government abolished the settlers' right to freedom of

assembly; the German language was no longer permitted in schools and German
teachers were replaced with Russians. The publication of German newspapers was
also forbidden (Giesinger 1993).
When the war did not go well for Russia the situation for the German settlers
worsened. Falsely accused of being "spies and saboteurs", "Russian-German soldiers
were pulled out of units on the western front and sent to the Caucasus to fight against
the Turks (Giesinger 1993, 250)." Further, the "Liquidation Laws" of February and
December, 1915 required that Russian-Germans living in Russia's western border
areas were to be deported and their lands expropriated and given to Russian soldiers
after the war as a reward for their service (Stumpp 1993, 141). More than 200,000
Russian-Germans from the province ofVolhynia were loaded onto trains and shipped
to Siberia, Kazakhstan and to Central Asia under the most inhumane conditions.
Nearly half of them died along the way (Stumpp 1993, 141).
The government's motive for deporting the settlers to the east was not that
Russian-Germans were guilty of being spies, but because the country needed skilled
laborers in the east. Since the mid-1880's, when Russia became the colonial power in
Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the government had tried to expand sedentary
agriculture for wheat and cotton growing on the vast steppe but met with resistance

from nomadic herdsmen in the region who, the Russians found, were not easy to
control (Olcott 1995). The Russian government also wanted to exploit the great
mineral wealth of Kazakhstan and Central Asia and needed laborers to work in
mining and other industries being established there. German settlers had already
proved their worthiness in other parts of the Russian Empire so the government
conveniently used the war as an excuse to deport them to where they could provide
the necessary labor for Russian expansion in the region (Stumpp 1993; Olcott 1995).
As with those from Volhynia, Volga Germans were also to be deported but the
Russian Revolution began before the directive could be carried out (Giesinger 1993;
Stumpp 1993).
Communism and Russian-Germans
Following the Revolution, the new Bolshevik government did not rescind the
deportation law directed at the German settlers but did not act on it either. At the
urgent pleading of Volga Germans, however, the law was temporarily suspended and
they were spared being deported, at least for the time being. The law was also
relaxed regarding German settlers from Volhnyia and some returned to their ravaged
villages after the war (Stumpp 1993).
Russia lost territory in Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as a result of
World War I. Poland's borders were pushed to the east. Baltic Germans were no
longer Russian subjects and in 1918 declared their independence, but during World
War II they lost their independence when Russia retook Estonia and Latvia by
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agreements between Hitler and Stalin.

Around 86,000 Baltic Germans were

transferred to Germany or its territories. Bessarabia was another border region Russia
had lost.

Consequently, another 79,000 German settlers were transferred from

Russian citizenship to Romanian, at least until World War II (Giesinger 1993, 301).
Communists took over local governments in the German settlements in 1917
and ordered the settlers to grow grain to feed the Red Army. "All villages, Russian
and German, went hungry and were left without even enough grain for replanting
(Giesinger 1993, 260)." The settlers began to resist and uprisings were common. In
1921-22 another drought brought even greater misfortune to Russian-Germans. In
earlier times the settlers had been able to store grain to protect themselves but now all
grain had been requisitioned by the government. After all the farm animals were
eaten, as well as dogs, cats and mice, the mass starvation began. "Between 150,000
to 200,000 Russian-Germans starved to death (Stumpp 1993, 142)."
The German government became very concerned about Russian-Germans
who were demanding to leave the Soviet Union. Russian-German settlers in the
United States and elsewhere also began to voice their concern about relatives and
friends living in the Soviet Union, and the Russian-German plight finally got the
attention of the world press. As a token gesture by the Soviets around 5,000 German
settlers were allowed to leave the Soviet Union after many thousands marched to
Moscow and demanded to be set free; those left behind were sent to slave labor
camps in the east as a warning to other settlers who might try to leave.
In an effort to restore order after the Revolution and the great famine, in 1923

29
the communist's party chief, Vladimir Lenin, announced his New Economic Policy
(NEP) granting each farmer 15 hectares (36 acres) ofland (Stumpp 1993, 142). Also
in the early 1920's the Soviet Union, which considered itself a union of nations,
began its policy ofgranting ethnic minority groups their own (or shared) autonomous
regions within the Soviet Union (Lydolph 1990). At the time of the Revolution the
Bolsheviks promised minorities the right of national self-determination as part of
their campaign strategy.

Lenin knew it was crucial to follow through with the

promise in order to keep the Soviet Union's many ethnic minorities content.

Each

minority, including the ethnic German minority, was granted a certain status which,
according to Marxist doctrine, was supposed to be based on the economic value ofthe
land they occupied (Lydolph 1990).
The complex system of government in the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) was initially comprised of four Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR's)
which included the Russian Federated SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Belarussian SSR
and the Transcaucasian SSR. Within the four republics sub-divisions were formed to
give recognition to minority groups (Lydolph 1990, 26-27) (Figure 9).
Boundaries drawn within the SSR's giving political recognition to important
minority nationality groups were named "Autonomous Republics" (ASSR's). Two
other political sub-divisions, called "Oblasts" and "Krays" were also laid out for
administrative purposes. Oblasts had no significant nationality group but Krays could
be subdivided into "Autonomous Oblasts" which were also, as with Autonomous
Republics, based on nationality.

Another subdivision within a Kray was an
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Figure 9. Administrative System of the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics.
Source:

Adapted from Geography of the U.S.S.R. (Lydolph 1990). Used with
permission.

"Autonomous Okrug" which is similar to an Indian reservation. Further, all Oblasts,
Krays and ASSR's were subdivided into a number of "Rayons (Lydolph 1990, 2627)."
Lenin granted the Russian-German settlement in the Volga region
"Autonomous Republic" status, the second highest status for an ethnic minority. In
1918, Lenin appointed Ernst Reuter, a former prisoner of war, as commissary of the
Volga republic. Reuter named the republic "The Work Commune of the Territory of
the Volga Germans" (renamed the "Autonomous Republic of the Volga Germans" in
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1924) (Kltiter 1993; Richter-Eberl 1992, 172). Although Lenin was himself of
German descent (his mother was a German) (Treasure 1991), critics suggest the real
reason the Soviets set up the "model German communist state" was in the hopes that
it would impress Germans in Germany and help the Communist movement in
Germany to bring about a revolution there (Giesinger 1993, 279).
The Volga Republic, geographically located at 14° 30' to 17° 30' east
longitude and 49° 30' to 52° 00' north latitude, was approximately 250 km2 (Richter
Eberl 1992, 172). The Republic was divided into a number of cantons (districts). Not
all villages within the Autonomous Republic were German communities.

Some

villages were occupied by Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars and others but most of the
Republic was occupied by German settlers (Richter-Eberl 1992). The German
settlement in Altay Kray in West Siberia was granted "Rayon" status in 1927
(Deutscher Nationaler Rayon im Altaj-Gebiet in der Russischen Foderation 1994).
In other parts of the Soviet Union, German settlements were given the status
of "Autonomous Oblasts" (national districts) which by then existed in the Black Sea
region, in (part of) Volhynia, the Caucasus, Georgia, Azerbaidzhan, Samara, the cis
Ural Region, and throughout Central Asia. Within these districts Germans had the
right to use the German language in schools, courts and in business (Giesinger 1993,
283).
Barely had Soviet citizens recuperated from the war, the famine and the
Bolshevik Revolution when Lenin died and the ruthless Joseph Stalin came to power.
Stalin wanted to make agriculture more productive so he could move more of the
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population from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector and thought this could
be accomplished quickly by the collectivization of agriculture. In 1929 Stalin began
his first "Five Year Plan" to collectivize the agricultural sector (12.9% of all
agricultural land was to be collectivized within five years) (Olcott 1995).
Landowners, including those living in autonomous regions such as the Volga
Republic, were forced to sign a petition to be accepted into the kolkhozes (collective
farms) and forfeit their own property. Prosperous farmers (kulaks) naturally resisted
the order so Stalin mercilessly decided to liquidate them. "The "cheryni voron"
(prisoner van) known as the "Black Maria" would drive into villages at night and
round up landowners and "haul them into banishment from which they never returned
(Bachmann 1983, 4; Stumpp 1993, 142)."

Countless numbers of kulaks were

murdered; others were sent to Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia to work as slave
laborers on collective farms.
Between November 1929 and March 1930, the massive collectivization of
farms in Kazakhstan and Central Asia also took place. At the same time, Stalin was
still trying to force nomadic Muslims into permanent settlements in the eastern
territories but his plan was thoughtless and disorganized. Stalin did not consider that
he was breaking nomadic traditions that had been carried on for centuries. He also
did not consider the lack of water on the steppe, nor could the Soviets provide enough
supplies to the region. As a result, Stalin's plan failed and nearly three million Soviet
citizens living in the region starved to death (Edwards 1993, 29).
Stalin was persistent however and from 1929 to the outbreak of World War II
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the Soviets continued to enforce the collectivization of farms in Kazakhstan. The
government also used forced labor for mineral extraction and to build an industrial
sector in the republics, which would later be turned into war industries for the
Soviets. Slave laborers, including many Russian-Germans, were also used to build
canals to divert water from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers to irrigate land for
cotton growing.
World War II: Soviets "Liquidate" Russian-German Villages
With the rise of Hitler in the 1930's, Russian-Germans once again became
scapegoats for the Soviets and found themselves "completely cut off from the outside
world." Correspondence with relatives in Germany was considered "traitorous", as
were connections with foreign organizations such as churches.

Radios were

confiscated and German newspaper publication was forbidden (Giesinger 1993, 299).
Then, in 1939, Hitler and Stalin "suddenly became friends" and signed a non
aggression pact. A secret clause of the treaty of September 28, 1939 "provided for a
large-scale population exchange between Germany and the Soviet Union (Giesinger
1993, 300)." All ethnic Germans living in areas that were to be annexed to Russia
were to be permitted to resettle in Germany or German-controlled territory.

In

exchange, Ukrainians, and White Russians (Belarussians), living in German-occupied
Poland were allowed to return to Russia or its territories if they desired.
Baltic Germans and Germans living in Polish Volhynia, and Bessarabian
Germans found their homelands had now been returned to Russia. Once they were
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granted permission to leave under the agreement between Hitler and Stalin many fled
to Germany. Other ethnic Germans from Lithuania and central Poland also went to
Germany.
Hitler Invades Russia: Russian-Germans and Other Minorities Deported to the East
Relations between Germany and Russia deteriorated rapidly when conflicts
between Hitler and Stalin over territory in the Baltics could not be resolved.
Consequently, in June of 1941 Hitler ordered his troops across the Russian border.
By September, the Soviets issued a decree which declared that "all Russian-Germans
in the Volga area were diversionists and spies, concealing enemies of the Soviet
people (Giesinger 1993, 305)."

The German minority was not the only ethnic group

to be accused of treason. In all, eight ethnic "nations" living in European Russia
(west of the Urals), including the Karachai, Kalmyks, Chechens, lngush, Balkars,
Crimean Tatars, Meskhetians and Volga Germans along with other smaller groups
were "collectively branded, despite an almost total lack of evidence, as traitors and
collaborators (CIS conference on refugees and migrants 1996, 6; Lewis and Rowland
1979)."

The Soviets decided to deport all eight nations "for the purpose of

resettlement" to "much arable land" in West Siberia, Kazakhstan and the Central
Asian Republics (Giesinger 1993, 305). Village leaders were quickly deposed and
replaced with Soviet police agents (Giesinger 1993).
The Soviets were concerned that these particular minorities might collaborate
with the Nazis, but the government had another motive for the deportations in 1941-
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42 (just like they had an ulterior motive for deporting settlers from Volhynia during
World War I).

The reason was that by November, 1941, 40% of the Soviet

population, 38% of the total land used to grow grain, and 38% of the cattle had fallen
into Nazi hands (Olcott 1995, 188). The Soviets had been putting extreme pressure
on Kazakhstan, located far behind enemy lines, to produce more food but Kazakhstan
lacked the manpower to do this because 450,000 Kazakh men had been inducted into
the Soviet military (Olcott 1995, 188). Some men were left to run the kolkhozes but
the majority of workers were women and children. Consequently, in 1941 1,420,000
people were forced from their homes, including the entire Volga German "nation" of
366,000 people (CIS conference on refugees and migrants 1996, 6). In 1942 another
334,000 Russian-Germans were forced from their homes and deported to the east to
provide surplus labor on kolkhozes, in factories, etc. (Giesinger 1993; Olcott 1995)
(Figure 10).
Soviet agents surrounded villages to prevent escapes and sent agents to every
house to register suspected minorities for deportation. Some families were given only
minutes to pack clothing and food. "They were transported in cattle cars, with no
sanitary facilities and little food or water on journeys that lasted sometimes for
months (Giesinger 1993, 306)."

Many deportations were carried out during the

winter month when temperatures reached -20 ° C in West Siberia and parts of
Kazakhstan (CIS conference on refugees and migrants 1996, 6). Tens of thousands
died along the way, their bodies thrown from the train. "Those that survived found
appallingly primitive conditions when they arrived at their destinations (Giesinger
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Figure 10. Deportations of Ethnic Germans- 1941-1942.
Source:

Die Geteilte Heirnat (von Moor 1994).

1993, 306)." They were dumped alongside the railroad tracks, often several miles
from the nearest villages.

Some managed to walk to local villages where other

settlers would give them shelter but many had to dig underground shelters, when
possible, to protect themselves from the elements (Giesinger 1993).

Straying from

their designated areas meant 15-20 years in a gulag (slave labor camp) if they were
caught (CIS conference on refugees and migrants 1996,7).
Russian-Germans also found they would no longer be able to live as families.
All men between the ages of 18-65 were sent to certain camps while their families
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were sent to others. Young children were often placed in foster homes or left to take
care of themselves.
In the meantime, the Nazis continued to advance into Russian territory. The
turning point in the war occurred in 1943 when a German and Romanian army of
120,900 men surrendered to the Russians in Stalingrad. "By the spring of 1944 the
German invasion ended and a counter-invasion of Germany in the fall of 1944
began." Russian-Germans living in occupied territory in Russia (occupied by the
Nazis), mostly around Volhynia and the Black Sea region, sensed danger as the
Soviet troops approached. "They took off en masse for the west (Giesinger 1993,
311)."
Soviet Counter-Invasion of the Reich: The Ethnic Cleansing
of Central European Germans
By late fall of 1944, Soviet troops had invaded Hitler's Reich "from the north,
south, and the east (Giesinger 1993, 312)." Russian-Germans living in border areas
tried to escape by fleeing westward, "propelled by sheer terror (Ziemke 1996, 425)."
Many refugees in the Baltics were trapped and thousands perished as Russian fighters
attacked refugee caravans with machine-gun fire as they tried to reach the Baltic port
for evacuation to safety (deZayas 1994). At the same time, ethnic Germans from
Central Europe were also trying to escape to the west.
As revenge for the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Soviets showed
no mercy to ethnic Germans as they swept through Central Europe.

The Soviets

cannot be blamed entirely for what happened to ethnic Germans, however. The Nazis

were also to blame because they failed to evacuate the ethnic German population as
the Soviet troops advanced into Central Europe (deZayas 1994).
The Soviet infantry scoured villages determined to destroy anyone and
anything "German." The settlers' houses were looted and burned, their livestock
butchered, their churches, cemeteries and historic records destroyed. Many ethnic
Germans captured by the Soviets were murdered often in the most brutal ways.
Thousands were shot then doused with fuel and burned beyond recognition. Others
were flattened as Soviet tanks rolled over refugee caravans in the streets. Some
people were found literally tom in half, their bodies having been tied with ropes
between two vehicles that pulled their legs in opposite directions. Others had been
bashed in the skull with rifle butts or stabbed through the head with bayonets
(deZayas 1994).
Many women survivors of the Soviet counter-invasion have testified they
were gang-raped, sometimes as often as sixty to seventy times a day for several days,
and repeatedly beaten by the Soviet infantry, then left for dead. Some of these
women had to be institutionalized after the war; others remain emotionally and
physically scarred for life. Thousands of women and young girls did not survive this
terrifying ordeal at all. Often, after gang-raping ethnic German women, some Soviet
soldiers found particular pleasure in cutting off their victims' breasts and crucifying
their naked bodies to barn doors (deZayas 1994).
The United States, Great Britain and France knew about the ethnic cleansing
of Germans that took place in Central Europe in the final days of the war and
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immediately after World War II but, because the allies needed Stalin to help them win
the war, failed to do anything about it. Besides, no one had much sympathy for
anyone "German" in 1944-45. Millions of people lost their lives as a result of World
War II and Hitler's genocidal policies (deZayas 1994). European Jews lost 70% of
their population and Gypsies lost 75-80% (Crowe and Kolsti 1992, 25, 44). Further,
not all ethnic Germans were innocent. Some, especially village leaders in Central
Europe, were 'junior partners in Hitler's Aryan master race (deZayas 1994, 9)." But
the majority of ethnic Germans, like millions of other people in Europe, were victims
of the war, and when the settlers were finally forced to make a decision, their choices,
between Hitler and Stalin, were rather limited.

Further, more than one-half of those

living in the shatter belt of Central Europe were women and children who had no say
in political matters (deZayas 1994).
Russian-Germans who lived in border areas of the Soviet Union occupied by
the Nazis earlier in the war also had limited options. Most Russian-Germans in the
Soviet Union had already been uprooted from their homes and shipped to
concentration camps in the east as early as 1941. To avoid the same fate, those living
on Russia's western border had no recourse but to try to flee to Germany when the
Soviet counter-invasion began.
Russian-German Escapees Redeported to the Soviet Union
Some Russian-Germans did manage to escape and were living in Germany
when Soviet troops penetrated the Reich in 1944-45 but their freedom was short-
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lived. "There were several million Soviet citizens living in Germany, not only
Germans, but members of all nationalities of the Soviet Union."

Some were

volunteer workers, some were prisoners of war or had been forced to come as slave
laborers. When the war ended, the Soviets insisted that all Soviet citizens, including
Russian-Germans, come home.

"Soviet commissars scoured Germany for their

nationals (Giesinger 1993, 313)." Around 100,000 of the 350,000 Russian-Germans
who had escaped to Germany eluded the Soviets by obtaining false identity papers,
but the other 250,000 were not so fortunate (Stumpp 1993, 143). They were collected
by the Soviets and shipped off to Russia, many tom from their families in Germany
who had "managed to escape the Soviet dragnet (Giesinger 1993, 314)." They were
told they would be returned to their villages in Russia but were shipped to Siberia and
Kazakhstan instead. Only 180,000 reached their destination, the rest died along the
way (Stumpp 1993, 143).
The fact that some Russian-Germans had actually been living in Germany in
1944-45 but were forced back to the Soviet Union has remained an issue with the
German government and is a key reason why the country has remained steadfast in its
commitment to assist Russian-Germans who want to leave the former Soviet Union.
(Some Central European ethnic German civilians captured by the Soviets during the
war were also deported (to the Ural region of the Soviet Union) to work as slave
laborers but, unlike Russian-Germans, most Central European ethnic Germans were
expelled from the Soviet Union in 1949-50.)
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Amnesty for Russian-Germans
Actually there was worldwide concern about the fate of the estimated one
million Russian-Germans who had remained in or had been redeported to the Soviet
Union during World War II.

For many years after the war the Soviets ignored all

requests for information about Russian-Germans.

"Official statistical and

geographical literature made no mention ofGermans in the USSR. Their old colonies
in European Russia had been wiped off the map, even their one-time existence was
never mentioned. Their history had been expunged from the record (Giesinger 1993,
314)." The seven other deported "nations" (the Chechens, Kalmyks, etc.) suffered the
same fate. In all, between 1936 and 1952 (during the Stalin era) a total of3.1 million
Soviet citizens living in European Russia were uprooted from their homes and
deported to the east, 1.3 million of whom were Russian-Germans (CIS conference on
refugees and migrants 1996, 6).
Upon Stalin's death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev became the new party leader
ofthe Communist regime. More humane that the ruthless Stalin, in 1955 Khrushchev
finally pardoned German soldiers still imprisoned in Russia and allowed them to
return to Germany. The German government continued to clamor for the release of
Russian-German civilians deported to the Soviet Union in 1945, claiming they had
been granted German citizenship during the war and that the grant had been ratified in
1955 by the Bundestag (parliament). As German citizens they should be permitted to
leave the Soviet Union.

The Soviets countered by saying they did not deport

Germans but had merely repatriated Soviet citizens (Giesinger 1993). Finally, in
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1955, the Soviets issued two decrees. The first granted amnesty to Soviet citizens
who collaborated with occupation forces during the war. The second decree ordered
that the eight minority "nations" deported in 1941 from European Russia, be released
from slave labor camps and allowed freedom of movement within the Soviet Union.
Russian-Germans were among those released but only with certain conditions. First,
those who were granted German citizenship during the war were only allowed to
leave the camps if they agreed to exchange their German citizenship papers for Soviet
documents. Secondly, they had to sign a pledge never to return to their native
villages. The amnestied also had to forfeit any claim to the property that had been
taken from them (Stumpp 1993).
Thousands of letters from the Soviet Union to Germany collected and
analyzed by the Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Rufi/and, a Russian-German
historical organization in Stuttgart, determined that the majority of Russian-Germans
were found living in Kazakhstan, the Central Asian Republics, and in southwest
Siberia. When Russian-Germans were freed from slave labor camps and given the
freedom to migrate within the Soviet Union, a north to south migration began as
many set out to join their families and friends in the warmer climates of Kazakhstan
and Central Asia (Stumpp 1993).
Anxious to leave the Soviet Union, most of those who had been granted
German citizenship during World War II but redeported to Russia began demanding
emigration visas. During the summer of 1958, 4,122 individuals were finally allowed
to leave the USSR (Info-Dienst 1996). This was only a token act by the Soviets

43
though as 109,842 requests for emigration rights had been made (Giesinger 1993,
322).
As another token gesture, in 1957-58, the Soviets once again allowed German
to be taught in schools. A German weekly newspaper, Neues Leben (New Life),
published by the Soviets in Moscow first appeared in 1956 and German radio
broadcasts could be heard over short wave via Radio Moscow; however, both were
just "Soviet propaganda organs that encouraged German cultural activity but little
else (Giesinger 1993, 329)."
In 1959 the Soviets took a census which included the number of Germans still
in the USSR. It showed there were 1,619,000 citizens who claimed German ethnicity
(Giesinger 1993, 323).

(A 1989 census showed their number had increased to

2,038,000 (Die Situation der Deutschen ... 1996, 9).
Not until August 1964 did the Soviet government issue its "rehabilitation
decree" stating that Volga Germans had been treated unfairly during the war, and that
charges against them made by Stalin that they had been disloyal were unfounded
(Stumpp 1993, 41). The decree also stated that because Russian-Germans had been
resettled, the republics to which they were sent, such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,
for example, were supposed to provide assistance to the German people living in their
republics in their economic and cultural development ''with regard to their national
peculiarities and interests." This was not possible, however, because the Soviets
would not allow them to live in "homogenous" German villages (Stumpp 1993, 41).
To discourage resettlement in the former Volga Republic, the Soviets even bulldozed
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some of the old Volga German villages. Nevertheless, once they were given freedom
of movement, some Russian-Germans returned to the Volga region but remained in
"small islands in a great sea of Russians and Ukrainians (Kloberdanz 1995, 5)."
In 1974, Adam Giesinger, author of From Catherine to Khrushchev: The
Story ofRussia's Germans wrote the following regarding Russian-Germans:
Although internal travel is not restricted and even visits abroad are
permitted under certain conditions, there is a very tight restriction on
emigration from the Soviet Union." "Soviet citizens are rarely
permitted to leave. The desire to leave Russia is especially strong in
the older generation who have not forgotten their sufferings of the
Stalin era. They do not trust the regime, even in its present more
benevolent guise, and are not happy about the prospects they see for
their children in Russia. They realize that the loss of language, culture
and religion is almost inevitable under the conditions in which they
now live. If the doors were opened, they would undoubtedly leave
Russia by the thousands and go where they were assured of cultural
and religious freedom (Giesinger 1993, 325).
In the late 1980's, as the Soviet Union began to crumble and the doors were finally
opened, Russian-Germans did indeed begin to leave and have continued to leave
since that time, but not by the thousands as Giesinger had predicted, but by the
hundreds of thousands.

CHAPTER III
"ODE TO JOY AND FREEDOM" (1987-)
On the Road Again
It was not until 1987 that the doors of the Soviet Union were finally opened
allowing Soviet citizens to freely emigrate. From 1945 to the late 1980's, emigration
from the Soviet Union was discouraged except for a brief period during the Brezhnev
era in the 1970's when emigration policies were relaxed slightly. Emigration tapered
off again in the early 1980's until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 upon
the death of Konstantin Chernenko.

Shortly after Gorbachev took office, he

announced his new policies of Glastnost (openness) and Perestroika (reconstruction)
which paved the way to economic and political reform, but consequently also led to
the unintended collapse of the Soviet Union.
There were two critical events that occurred in 1986 that caused Gorbachev's
reform movement to go haywire. The first was the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in
April of 1986. Although the Chernobyl incident was the worst environmental disaster
in the history of the world, the Soviets tried to downplay the incident. In fact, the
disaster was not even reported in the Soviet media until two days after it occurred.
The first reports about Chernobyl came out of the West and when the seriousness of
the disaster became apparent, the Soviets were harshly criticized in the Western press.
45
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Of greater consequence was that the Chernobyl disaster compelled the media within
the Soviet Union to also criticize the Soviet government (Brown 1994). From that
time forward, dissidence in the Soviet Union snowballed.
Another important event occurred in 1986 that would also contribute to the
collapse of the Soviet Union was when rioting broke out among Kazakh citizens in
Alma-Ata, after a Kazakh national was replaced by a Russian as the First Secretary of
the Communist Party in Kazakhstan (Brown 1994). This incident, along with the
Chernobyl disaster, influenced minorities in other Soviet republics to also openly
express their grievances.
By 1987 the Soviet Union was in chaos and "long suppressed" inter-ethnic
problems began to surface all over the Soviet Union (Brown 1994, 129). Gorbachev
tried to subdue the growing discontent by relaxing the government's strict travel and
emigration policies. Further, on November 1987 during a speech celebrating the
anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Gorbachev admitted that Stalin's guilt was
"immense and unpardonable (Brown 1994, 131)."

He also stated that the

rehabilitation of Stalin's victims that had ended in the late-1960's would begin again
and that a commission would be set up to hear unresolved cases of repression. But
rather than pacify Soviet citizens, Gorbachev opened a Pandora's box giving ethnic
minorities, including Russian-Germans who had suffered greatly under Stalin's
regime, the green light on the road to self-determination.
Land disputes erupted between ethnic groups all over the Republics, the result
of Stalin's "tinkering" with their borders in earlier decades (CIS conference on

refugees and migrants 1996, 4). Tensions flared into conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, and civil wars broke out in the Caucasus and Tajikistan. By 1988, the
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians had also begun to assert their rights of "national
self-determination" and aired their grievances about being forced into the Soviet
Union during World War II (Brown 1994, 134).
Russian-Germans also became more assertive. They demanded the immediate
re-establishment of their homeland in the Volga region and, exercising their new right
to emigrate, threatened to leave the Soviet Union if their demands were not met. The
Soviets were willing to negotiate with Russian-Germans over the gradual re
establishment of their homeland, but were not about to be pressured into immediately
re-establishing the former Volga Republic.

Defiantly, some Russian-Germans

returned to the region anyhow. Local citizens (mostly Russians and Ukrainians who
had moved into the Volga Republic when Russian-Germans were deported to the east
during World War II) were not happy to see the Germans come back to the region and
held demonstrations against their return. Tensions escalated between the groups and,
deciding they had had enough, Russian-Germans began to leave Russia in vast
numbers. At the same time, Russian-Germans living in Kazakhstan and Central Asia
also began to leave because of ethnic conflict and nationalist movements in the
republics.
The Wall Came Tumbling Down
Meanwhile, events were also unfolding rapidly in the Soviet satellite countries
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of Central Europe, particularly in the German Democratic Republic (DDR) (East
Germany) that would also trigger the migration of ethnic Germans.

By 1989,

democratic revolutions were already taking place in Poland and Hungary. Then in
May 1989, Hungary defiantly opened its borders with Austria allowing East Germans
a corridor through which they could flee to the West. Many more East Germans,
seizing the opportunity, drove to Prague where they entered the West German
embassy and refused to leave until they too were given permission to go to the West.
The East German government responded by calling those leaving the DDR "scum and
ingrates (Pond 1993, 98)." It did not stop East Germans from leaving though and by
October 1989, around 100,000 Ossies had fled for the West.
At a time when Gorbachev envisioned a "common European home", Erick
Honecker, the hard-line leader of the DDR was calling for the strengthening of the
Warsaw Pact and insisted the Wall would still be standing in 50 or 100 years time
(Pond 1992, 98).

Nevertheless, East Germans continued to voice their dissent.

Rather than celebrating the forty-year anniversary of the DDR on October 9 as was
planned for them by East Germany's leaders, demonstrators turned out by the
thousands to protest against it.
Realizing his government was near ruin, the ill and aging Honecker finally
resigned on November 8 in an attempt to save the DDR from total collapse. The new
secretary general, Egon Krenz, promised the people immediate change but East
Germans did not take him seriously. Then, in a desperate attempt to appease the
growing number of demonstrators, Gtinter Schabowski, party secretary in the district
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of East Berlin, announced during the evening news on November 9, 1989 that travel
restrictions were to be lifted. For the first time since the Berlin Wall was raised on
August 13, 1961, East Berliners could now travel freely to the West. Permits for
travel were to be given upon request (Schubert 1990).
Confused by what they had just heard on the news, tens of thousands of East
Berliners began to appear at the Wall (Figure 11). By 1 :40 AM, November 10, many
East Germans started to pour over the border into West Berlin as border guards just
stood by watching (Schubert 1990). West Berliners were also gathering at the Wall,
jubilantly welcoming those who came across the border to gaze at what they had been
forbidden to see for the past twenty-eight years. Brandenburg Gate, considered the
"gateway to the city" (although officially still sealed oft) became the site of a huge
party; the city was "charged with energy (Schubert 1990)." By 4:00 AM the Wall
began to crumble as people began to hammer away at it. Then, on December 22,
1989 as reporters from all over the world stood by, the Brandenburg Gate was finally
reopened signifying the beginning of a unified Germany. In celebration of this
historic event, Leonard Bernstein was invited to conduct Beethoven's Ninth
Symphony "Ode to Joy" (to which Bernstein added the words "and Freedom"), at the
Berlin Philharmonic on New Years Eve (Pond 1993). 1

Finally, and without a

struggle, the Reunification that West German leaders had advocated for decades had
come to pass, and East and West Germans woke up in 1990 to find they had gone
from being a people divided by a wall between two ideologies to being Eins Volk
(one people) again for the first time since the end of World War II (Figure 12).
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Figure 12. Berlin Wall (1995). Small section of the Berlin Wall left standing at
"Checkpoint Charlie" (in the American sector) as a memorial to those who
died trying to escape East Berlin during the communist era.
Source:

Personal photograph.
The Hangover
Most Germans were estactic to have a unified Germany and emotions ran

high, but it did not take long for the euphoria to wear off as West Germans were
sobered by reports in the media as to what the cost of national unity would be for the
new Germany.

West Germans had enjoyed the benefits of the country's

Wirtschaftswunder ( economic miracle) for decades with one of the highest standards
of living in the world. Suddenly they had 16.5 million East German citizens at their
doorstep who, still sore about being sold out to the Soviets following World War II,
expected immediate reciprocity.

The Bundesministerium (Federal Ministry)
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announced it was going to spend DM 115 billion per year over the next four years to
reconstruct East Germany (Jones 1994). The money was to come from budget cuts
and from borrowing on the international markets and not from raising taxes, but as it
turned out, taxes were raised and after four years the reconstruction of East Germany
was far from finished (Figures 13-14). It is now thought that another DM 150 billion

Figure 13. Construction in East Berlin (1995). Everywhere in East Berlin today there
is evidence of the massive restructuring of the city to bring it up to par
with West Berlin.
Source:

Personal photograph.
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Figure 14. Construction Zone in Former ''No Man's Land (1995)." Development of a
huge office complex and condominiums in what was once "no man's
land" between East and West Berlin near "Checkpoint Charlie." Note that
the windows of the building on the far left (in former East Berlin) have
been filled in with bricks and cement. This was done to all buildings near
the Wall in East Berlin to prevent people from jumping out of windows to
escape into West Berlin during the communist era.
Source:

Personal photograph.

per year to at least the end of the millenium will be needed before East Germany is up
to par with the West German states (Heilemann and Reincike 1995). (Much of the
appropriated funds go toward unemployment compensation and for pension benefits
(Eastern Growth 1996, 9).)
Even for a country as affluent as Germany, the amount of money needed to
rebuild East Germany is staggering, especially considering Germany is a small
country only slightly larger than the state of Montana that already had a population of
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over 63 million people prior to Reunification and now exceeds 80 million. Germany
is Western Europe's third most densely populated country following Belgium and
Holland (Kappler 1993). As Germany's economy nose-dived with rising taxes and 8
percent of the West German GNP going toward the reconstruction of East Germany,
many Wessies began to resent their poor relations from the East. Chancellor Helmut
Kohl did nothing to relieve the people's Angst when he warned of further tax
increases and called on all Germans to "make a mighty effort to prevent the country
from falling into economic crisis (Jones 1994,161)."
Germany's Liberal Asylum Law Further Complicate Matters
Integrating 16.5 million East Germans into the economy was not the only
problem for the new Germany. When it became apparent that the Wall was going to
fall, Germany's leaders also began to worry about the possibility the country would
be flooded with asylum seekers and refugees from all over Eastern Europe.
Germany's geographic proximity to Eastern Europe and its economic affluence
naturally made it attractive for those seeking a better life. More importantly, Article
16 of Germany's Basic Law (not to be confused with Article 116), also adopted in
1949, contains the most liberal asylum laws in the world (Geipel 1993; Ardaugh
1991). Written to make up for and to avoid the mistakes of Germany's past, Article
16 states simply that "persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right to
asylum, that is, if they are recognized by the authorities as truly in need of asylum
(Foreigners.. . 1994, 1)."
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Thus, as Germany's leaders had feared, Article 16 increasingly became "a
floodgate for uncontrolled immigration" as thousands of asylum seekers and refugees
began to arrive in Germany from all over Central and Eastern Europe
(Foreigners ...1994, 2). In fact, from 1991 to the end of 1993, Germany took in over
1 million asylum seekers, more than all other countries in the European Union
combined (Info-Dienst Oct. 1994) (see Appendix A). At the same time, Germany had
to brace itself for yet another group of immigrants as tens of thousands of ethnic
Germans began to arrive every month from Central Europe and the former Soviet
Union.
Relaxed Emigration Policies in Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union
Encourage Ethnic Germans to Take Advantage
of Germany's "Right to Return"
While Article 16 of Germany's Basic Law involves asylum seekers and
refugees not of German descent, Article 116, as was mentioned in Chapter One, was
written by the founders of Germany's constitution out of concern for former German
nationals and ethnic Germans remaining in Central Europe and the former Soviet
Union following World War IL
Although Germany's policy has never been to encourage them to immigrate to
Germany, a steady stream of ethnic Germans arrived from the 1950's to 1986, the
annual number of which depended on emigration policies in their countries of origin.
Immediately following World War II, Germany experienced a tidal wave of ethnic
German immigration as millions were forcefully expelled from Poland, Romania,
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Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia (deZayas 1994; Info-Dienst 1996) (Table
1 ). Then, from 1950 to 1969, immigration of ethnic Germans to Germany tapered off
to 659,738 (an average of 32,987 per year), the majority of whom were arriving from
Poland. Only 3% arrived in Germany from the Soviet Union.
Table 1
Ethnic German Expellees Arriving in Germany - 1945 - 1950
State, Province or Territory Expelled From

Ethnic Germans

From Territory that belonged to Germany before 1937

6,980,000
290,000

From Free State Danzig
From Czechoslovakia

3,000,000

From Poland

690,000

From Yugoslavia

300,000

From Romania

250,000

From Hungary

210,000

From the Soviet Union

100,000*

From other countries

930,000
Total

12,750,000

*lncludes only ethnic Germans from Volhnyia (in part of East Poland) that was annexed by the Soviets
during World War I). By lawful definition expellees from Volhnyia are not part of this group.

Source: Die deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen (Reichling, Gerhard). See Bundesministerium fiir Aussiedlerfragen 1996).
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Between 1970 and 1986 another 681,702 ethnic Germans (an average of
40,100 per year) resettled in Germany (mainly from Poland and Romania). Because
of improved relations in the 1970's between Germany and the Soviet Union
emigration restrictions in the USSR were eased slightly (Jones 1994). As a result, the
number of ethnic Germans arriving in Germany from the Soviet Union during this
time increased to around 10% of the total arrivals.
As communism began to crumble in the late 1980's, the number of ethnic
Germans arriving in Germany, particularly from the USSR, began to rise
significantly. In 1987, 78,523 new arrivals (still mainly from Poland) resettled in
Germany, but a substantial 14,488 arrived that year from the Soviet Union as
compared with only 753 in 1986 (Info-Dienst July 1995).
Seen as a sign of the times, Germany began to brace itself as conditions
continued to worsen in the Soviet Union and Central Europe, but nothing could have
prepared the country for what was to come. From 1988 to the end of 1991 another
1,198,796 ethnic Germans arrived in Germany, the largest number of arrivals since
the end of World War II. Migration finally peaked in 1990 when the total number of
ethnic Germans arriving in Germany that year alone reached an alarming 397,073
(Info-Dienst 1995) (Figure 15).
The Ethnic Germans Admissions Act
Most alarming to Germany was that while ethnic Germans were supposed to
enter the country with their visa applications pre-approved, many (particularly Polish-
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Germans) evaded the immigration law by entering the country as tourists, or entering
illegally, then applying for citizenship. Unless new arrivals have family or friends in
Germany that they can stay with, the settlers are sent to one of the many
Obergangswohnheime (transitional shelters) located around the country until they
become acclimated and find jobs and a place to live. Those that arrive with their
papers in order spend about one to two years in the shelters but for those who arrive
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illegally, the stay in the shelters is much longer because it takes a great deal oftime to
investigate their claims, especially since there is such a huge backlog of cases
pending (Jones and Wild 1992). Meanwhile, the German government has to provide
for them, which is very expensive.
In order to deter ethnic Germans from entering illegally or entering under the
guise of tourists with no intentions of returning to their homelands, the government
quickly took measures to slow the migration. The new law entitled the "Ethnic
Germans Admissions Act" (Aussiedleraufnahmegesetz) came into effect on July 1,
1990 (Dietz 1994). The law requires that all immigrants remain in their countries of
origin while their applications are being processed. As a result ofthe Ethnic Germans
Admissions Act, migration to Germany dropped from 397,000 in 1990 to 221,000 in
1991 (Info-Dienst July 1995). (In 1992, Germany placed a ceiling on the number of
new arrivals that could enter the country each year at 220,000 (Munz and Ulrich
1995).)
Germany Tries to Persuade Russian-Germans to Stay in the Soviet Union
Also distressing to Germany in the early 1990's was that more and more of
those arriving were coming from the former Soviet Union. Prior to the collapse of
communism, most ethnic Germans that had migrated to Germany came from
territories that had belonged to Germany prior to World War II such as those in
Poland, or from other German-speaking parts of Central Europe such as in Romania,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary; many of those settlers, particularly the older
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generation, could speak German and had some familiarity with Germany.

Most

Russian-Germans, on the other hand, arrive with barely any knowledge of the
German language, and are not familiar with Germany and the ways of the West,
putting even greater stress on state and local authorities in charge of integrating them
into Germany society.
In an effort to slow the exodus of Russian-Germans, the German government
sent representatives to Moscow who tried to pressure the Russian government (or
then still Soviet government) into re-establishing the Volga Republic.

Russian

Germans themselves had already been pressuring the Russian government into re
establishing the Republic, but the Russians, as was previously mentioned, rejected the
their claim. The German government then intervened, "arguing in legal terms about
the concept of rehabilitation (Kliiter 1993, 427)." The German diplomacy was a
disaster. All they succeeded in doing was to elevate nationalistic feelings in the
Russians who were still licking their wounds, so to speak, over the loss of East
Germany and the subsequent Reunification of Germany, Russia's former adversary
(Kliiter 1993).
The Germans then offered to provide financial assistance and cultural
activities for Russian-Germans living in the Soviet Union in the hopes that some of
them would stay there if their lives were improved. The Soviets accepted the offer
but in spite of the transfusion of millions of Deutschmarks to the would-be emigrants,
Russian-Germans continued to exercise their right to return under Article 116 and
quit the Soviet Union at a rate of around 12,000 a month (Info-Dienst 1996).
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Germanomania
As Germany's economy continued to worsen, both East and West Germans
began to resent the growing number of ethnic Germans entering the country. Not
only were ethnic Germans made scapegoats, but asylum seekers who were exercising
their right to asylum (under Article 16) also became targets. Tensions began to
escalate in the early 1990's and the number of violent crimes against ethnic Germans
and asylum seekers began to rise substantially. Prior to Reunification, there were less
than 200 attacks by right-wing extremists, skinheads or xenophobic groups. In 1991,
the number rose to 1,493. By 1992, 2,285 violent acts were reported "triggering
international criticism of Germany's handling of the situation (Kappler 1993, 367)."
According to the German government, there were several factors contributing
to the increase in violence. One reason was that the growing number of ethnic
Germans and asylum seekers claiming political persecution angered the population
who were aware that many immigrants were not coming to Germany to escape
political persecution, but were just trying to improve their economic situation. East
Germans in particular resented the immigrants because they felt the money Germany
was spending to help ethnic Germans and asylum seekers should have been going to
them instead.

East Germans were also more prone to commit acts of violence

because, the government says, ''they had higher unemployment, a lack of experience
with democracy and a mingling with other cultures (Kappler 1993, 367)." Further,
police in East Germany lacked the experience and the equipment to deal with
demonstration matters; ''they also had friends and family who were unemployed and

were generally less assertive in dealing with racial violence as they were in the West
(Geipel 1993, 57)." (Police in both East and West Germany have been accused of
police brutality against foreigners, but according to the German government, only a
handful of officers pose a problem (Federal Republic ... 1995; With Sensitivity ...
1995).)
Always hungry for votes, some politicians began to use the asylum issue and
the ethnic German issue as campaign ammunition. The Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) (part of Kohl's coalition party - the party currently in power), although
tolerant of ethnic Germans, has traditionally been opposed to Germany's asylum law
(Article 16) claiming that the law is far too liberal. In the late 1980's and early
1990's, when hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers began to arrive in Germany,
the CDU became even more concerned because they felt the other EU member states
were not taking in their fair share of Eastern Europeans seeking asylum. The Social
Democratic Party (SPD), in opposition to the CDU, accused the CDU of scapegoating
asylum seekers by blaming them for all of Germany's problems. The SPD went on a
campaign to gain sympathy for asylum seekers but the campaign failed to win votes
and when the number of violent crimes continued to increase, the SPD dropped their
campaign that Germany keep its liberal asylum laws and aligned itself with the CDU
on the asylum issue (Fisher 1995). But while the CDU was more concerned with the
number of asylum seekers coming to Germany, the SPD party, headed by Oskar
Lafontaine, began to criticize the country's policy toward ethnic Germans and has
repeatedly called for limitations on the number of ethnic Germans that should be
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allowed to enter Germany. The SPD has since been gaining the support of the
populace, particularly in areas of the country where large numbers of ethnic Germans
have settled. According to one public opinion poll conducted in Germany in 1996,
over 70 percent of the population now support Lafontaine's line (Blood Disorder
1996).

!us Sanguinis vs. !us Soli
One reason Lafontaine has found support in his campaign against ethnic
Germans is that while ethnic Germans are granted automatic citizenship upon request,
asylum seekers and long-time Turkish residents (who originally came to Germany as
"guest workers" but ended up staying permanently) and their descendants are not
accorded this same privilege. While it is not impossible for guest workers, asylum
seekers and other foreigners to become German citizens, the process is much more
complicated, time-consuming and expensive.
Under German law, nationality is determined by "ius sanguinis" (the law of
parentage) which stipulates that for those born in Germany a child must have at least
one parent who is a German citizen to be considered a German (German
Citizenship ... 1995). (The law of parentage also applies to ethnic Germans and their
descendants arriving in Germany even though they were not born in Germany.) !us

sanguinis is not unique to Germany; in fact, it is used most widely internationally.2
For persons who do not qualify for German citizenship under ius sanguinis,
there are other requirements for naturalization.

Under current law, foreigners

between the ages of 16 and 23 have a claim to naturalization if they have lived in
Germany for eight years, have attended school in Germany for six years, give up their
previous citizenship and have not been convicted of a felony (German Citizenship
1995). Foreigners who have resided legally in Germany for 15 years, such as many
of Germany's Turkish guest workers, also have a claim to naturalization if they give
up their previous citizenship, and have not been convicted of a felony. In addition,
until recently, each person had to pay administrative fees of DM 5,000 for the
naturalization process, but this fee has now been lowered to DM 500 (Ardaugh 1991).
One must also prove a guaranteed income and cannot be receiving social security or
unemployment benefits in order to qualify for naturalization. Although the majority
of foreigners fulfill these requirements, most of them never apply for citizenship.
According to the German government, the greatest obstacle is that foreigners have to
give up their citizenship from their countries of origin when applying for
naturalization, and many are not willing to do this (German Citizenship ... 1995).
Lafontaine has been able to capitalize on the ethnic German question by
arguing that while the government grants citizenship to ethnic Germans (particularly
Russian-Germans) who arrive in Germany "barely able to say Guten Morgen" and
"head straight for the dole queue", Turkish residents and other foreigners who have
lived and worked in Germany for years, speak perfect German, and have children
born on German soil usually never become German citizens (Blood Disorder 1996,
49). The ethnic German question continues to be the topic of much heated debate
among the two political parties.

Lafontaine and his allies in the SPD (the SPD is
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split on this issue) accuse the CDU of being nationalistic because the CDU wants to
let ethnic Germans in. In retaliation, the CDU accuses Lafontaine and his allies in the
SPD of being nationalistic because they want to keep ethnic Germans out.
Entitlements for Ethnic Germans
Another reason ethnic German immigration to Germany has become
controversial involves a number of government assistance programs the immigrants
receive.

At the end of World War II, as was mentioned earlier, millions of ethnic

German expellees arrived in Germany, most of whom came from agricultural and
industrial regions of Central Europe. At the same time, industrial production was
down to 27 percent of its pre-war volume in Germany because of the dismantling of
Germany's industries by the allies in 1944-45 (deZayas 1994). As a result, Germany
was economically crippled and faced with millions of unemployed and hungry
people. For humanitarian reasons, the United States sent tons of food but it was not
enough to help the country recover; Germany needed an "economic miracle (deZayas
1994, 126)."
In 1947, Secretary of State, George C. Marshall announced the US plan to
reconstruct post-war Europe. Most of the money was intended to go to Great Britain,
France and Italy, but Germany was also to receive US funding. One goal of the
Marshall Plan for Germany was to have "rapid economic recovery" by the injection
of $1 .4 billion for reconstruction ( deZayas 1994, 126).

The second goal was to

integrate the millions of ethnic German expellees arriving in Germany. Around one
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million ethnic Germans were invited to resettle in the United States during the 1950's.
Others went to Canada and Australia. But not all of them wanted to leave Germany
permanently. Ethnic Germans, many of whom had useful agricultural and technical
skills, were willing to work hard to help rebuild the war-tom country in exchange for
a new start in Germany.
They lived in hastily erected temporary shelters (Vbergangswohnheime)
constructed of plywood with no windows or indoor plumbing. Holes were filled with
pieces of cardboard to keep the rain out. Some shelters were furnished with beds but
they had to be shared with others. Most expellees arriving in Germany had no warm
clothing, shoes or blankets; all that they owned was in their rucksacks they arrived
with in Germany. Tuberculosis and other diseases were ramped in the shelters and
human suffering was immeasurable (deZayas 1994).
The immigrants worked hard to help rebuild Germany, in spite of their
miserable conditions, and by the mid-1950's the country was already experiencing the
beginning of the Wirtschaftswunder. In 1953, the parliament enacted the Federal
Expellee Law (Bundesvertriebenengesetz) which describes who is eligible for
citizenship as an ethnic German under Article 116 and defines their rights (Haberland
1994, 115; Lehmann 1995, 103).

Shortly thereafter, the government began to

introduce a series of entitlements under the Federal Expellee Law to help other ethnic
German arrivals become established in Germany.
Until the collapse of communism and the subsequent Reunification of
Germany when an average of only 40,000 ethnic Germans resettled in Germany

annually, the country welcomed the immigrants because they provided necessary
labor during Germany's economic boom period and no one complained about the
financial assistance the immigrants receive. But in the late 1980's and early 1990's
when hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans arrived in Germany each year,
Lafontaine and his allies found support among taxpayers who began to question the
government's entitlement policies for ethnic Germans.

Many Germans were

especially angry that they should have to pay to resettle the Ruf]l,anddeutsche
(Russian-Germans) whose ancestors had migrated to Russia 200 years ago; people
who, many Germans feel, should no longer be considered "German." Further, many
Germans felt the immigration of ethnic Germans was no longer necessary because the
country had just inherited 16.5 million East Germans who could provide labor in
Germany.
From 1990 through 1996 the federal government spent DM 35.2 billion on
entitlements for ethnic Germans under the Expellee Law, although because of budget
cuts in recent years, the amount spent in 1996 was half of what it was in 1990 (Info
Dienst, 1996; Hilfen fiir Spataussiedler aus den Bundeshaushalt 1996) (Figure 16).
Most costly is money allocated for adaptation and language training which cost the
government around DM 1.45 billion in 1996 alone. Other entitlements have included
resettlement compensation for possessions the immigrants had to leave behind in their
countries of origin, and a lump sum compensation (DM 6,000) for those born before
January 1, 1946, and DM 4,000 if born between December 31, 1945 and April 1,
1956 (Wegweiser fiir Spataussiedler 1994, 24). There are also guaranteed cash funds
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Figure 16. Federal Assistance for the Integration of Ethnic Germans.
Source:

Hilfen fiir Spataussiedler aus dem Bundeshaushalt (1996)

(Wohngeld) to help ethnic Germans get established in Germany and to offset their
living expenses until they find jobs.

Families receive monthly Kindergeld

(allowances) for their children to age 16 (DM 200 for the first and second child and
DM 300 for three children, etc.), and there are many other benefits including
university scholarships, heath care, and pension plans for the elderly, to name just a
few (Hessischer Wegweiser fiir Spataussiedler 1996). Because ethnic Germans are
considered displaced, the government also assists them in locating their relatives (DM
68 million in 1996). In addition, the federal government also allocates around DM
150 million per year for direct assistance for Russian-Germans still living in the
former Soviet Union3 (Table 2).
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Table 2
Federal Assistance for Ethnic Germans - In (thousands) DM

1995

1996

Travel to Germany

120,000

113,000

Cost for Initial Reception in Germany

104,000

109,000

1,400,000

1,450,000

Resettlement Compensation

495,000

400,000

Prisoner of War/Prisoner Compensation

278,000

237,000

Integration of Russian-Germans

200,000

202,500

Relief for German Minority in the CIS

143,500

150,000

Guaranteed Funds for Education and Training

240,000

240,000

Welfare Trust for Expellees

41,000

38,000

Integration of Young Ethnic Germans

60,000

60,000

Social Services for the Integration of Ethnic Germans

16,900

16,530

University/Scientific Programs

16,500

16,000

Health Care/Reimbursement for Illness

32,000

30,000

Search for Relatives

65,749

68,808

197,902

119,651

3,410,551

3,250,489

Entitlements under the 1953 Federal Expellee Law

Adaptation/Language Training

Other
Total (Thousands) DM

Source: Hilfen fiir Aussiedler aus dem Bundeshaushalt 1996 and 1997
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The 1989 Soviet Census
Not only were German citizens angry that they should have to pay to resettle
hundreds of thousands of Russian-Germans who had already landed in Germany, but
when it was reported there were possibly millions more Russian-Germans than was
previously thought, German citizens became outraged. According to the 1989 Soviet
census there were 2,038,603 ethnic Germans living in the Soviet Union, but by the
early 1990's, it became apparent that the census had been grossly undercounted
(Table 3). In 1992, it was reported that there were an estimated one to two million
Soviet citizens, over and above the 2,038,603 counted in the census, who could have
claimed German ethnicity in 1989. "The number is always rising", the government
states, as more and more "come to their nationality (Die Situation der
Deutschen ... 1996, 9)."
The reason the census was so inaccurate 1s, because of widespread
discrimination between 1941-1965 against anyone "German" living in the Soviet
Union, many people, particularly those of mixed-nationality marriages, registered
their children as non-German (Kltiter 1993). Further, as was previously mentioned,
Article 116 extends citizenship to ethnic Germans "and their descendants (Foreigners
in Germany 1994, 2)."

Consequently, when the Soviet Union finally opened its

doors, hundreds-of-thousands of people of German descent suddenly saw the
opportunity to leave the Soviet Union by claiming or reclaiming ethnic German status
for themselves and their children (Info-Dienst April 1996).
Apparently this is not the first time Germany has discovered citizens it did not
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Table 3
Ethnic Germans Living in the Former Soviet Union
(According to the 1989 Soviet Census)
Countries of Origin

Census

Kazakhstan

957,518

Russian Federation

842,295

Kirgyzia

101,309

Uzbekistan

39,809

Ukraine

37,849

Tadzhikistan

32,671

Moldova

7,335

Turkmenistan

4,434

Latvia

3,783

Belarus

3,517

Estonia

3,466

Lithuania

2,058

Georgia

1,546

Azerbaijan

748

Armenia

265
Total

Source: Verein fiir das Deutschtum im Ausland 1996

2,038,603
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know it had. In the late 1980's, during negotiations between Poland and Germany,
Poland insisted there were no more Germans living in Poland, but several hundreds
of-thousands of them were found living in Silesia (a former German territory). Most
of them immigrated to Germany in the late 1980's and early 1990's which accounts
for the 564,567 Polish-Germans arriving in Germany during this time (Info-Dienst
Aug.

1996).

"This embarrassing disclosure had its roots in the policies of the

communist leaders of the late 1940's who, after expelling most ethnic Germans to the
West, proclaimed that those who remained were 'Germanized Poles." "It was not
until forty years later they finally dared to assert their true identity (Korbonski 1992,
257)."
The 1992 Post-War Settlement Act
In light of the census undercount, and under extreme pressure by the
opposition party, in December 1992, the federal government finally amended the
forty year old Federal Expellee Law, announcing that the return of ethnic Germans is
simply a "late consequence of World War II" and that the law no longer makes sense
(Die Situation der Deutschen ... 1996; Munz and Ulrich 1995, 8)." The amendment,
called the Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz (Post-war Settlement Act) mandates that
those arriving after December 31, 1992 must have been born prior to January 1, 1993
and must be a descendant of an ethnic German in order to qualify for the status of

"Spataussiedler" (late returnee) (Bundesgesetzblatt 1993; Haberland 1994).)
Although the new law has been effective in slowing the overall migration of ethnic
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Germans, the percentage arriving from the Soviet Union has continued to rise.
Between 1992 and the end of 1996, another 1,067,693 ethnic Germans arrived in
Germany, 94% of whom emigrated from the former Soviet Union (predominantly
from Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation) (Info-Dienst 1996) (Table 4).
Table 4
Ethnic Germans Arriving in Germany From the Former Soviet Union - 1992-1996

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

6

22

83

42

16

52

39

53

44

25

Belarus

175

176

136

227

186

Estonia

446

283

366

363

337

Georgia

283

514

155

165

127

114,382

113,288

121,517 117,148

92,125

12,618

12,373

10,847

8,858

7,467

Latvia

334

266

267

360

248

Lithuania

200

166.

243

230

302

Moldova

950

1,139

965

748

447

55,875

67,365

68,397

71,685

63,311

3,305

4,801

2,804

1,834

870

304

322

485

587

463

Country of Origin
Armenia
Azerbaijan

Kazakhstan
Kirgyzia

Russian Federation
Tadikistan
Turkmenistan
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Table 4 - Continued

Country ofOrigin

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Ukraine

2,700

2,711

3,139

3,650

3,460

Uzbekistan

3,946

3,882

3,757

3,468

2,797

Arrivals from SU

195,576

207,347

213,214 209,409

172,181

Total Arrivals

230,565

218,888

222,591 217,898

177,751

Percent from SU

85%

95%

96%

96%

97%

Total Arrivals 1992-1996 - 1,067,963 -Average of94% from the Soviet Union

Source: Info-Dienst 1996; Jahresstatistik Aussiedler 1996
The government's policy toward Russian-Germans since 1993 is that they are
still German citizens as long as the law says they are (Ein Schlechter... 1996).
Although the German government would prefer Russian-Germans to stay where they
are, it has given its assurance to those still living in the former Soviet Union that "das

Tor bleibt offen" (the door remains open) for those born before January 1, 1993 and
that there is no fixed date as to when they can come, but for economic reasons
Germany cannot take them all at once (Info-Dienst April 1996, 8; Kinkel 1996, 2). 4
1

The text for Beethoven's Ninth Symphony was actually put to words by Johann Christoph Friedrich
von Schiller ( 1759-1805) in his hymn "An die Freude" ("Ode to Joy'').
2

The United States, Canada and Australia use "ius soh" (the law of birthplace) to determine
citizenship.
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3

The DM 35.2 billion is money spent on entitlements by the federal government. This figure does not
include money spent by state and local governments to integrate ethnic Germans. From infonnation
obtained from some of the state governments in Germany, it appears the DM 35.2 billion figure is
roughly half of what the total cost has been thus far to integrate ethnic Germans since 1990.
4

In 1993 Gennany also modified Article 16 making it more difficult for non-Gennan asylum seekers
to enter the country, particularly those who are entering the country solely for economic reasons. See
Appendix B for further information.
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CHAPTER IV
THE INTEGRATION OF ETHNIC GERMANS
To Be or Not To Be
All ethnic German immigrants (Aussiedler) are registered, processed, and
allocated

to

the

sixteen

states

by

the

Federal

Administration

Office

(Bundesverwaltungsamt) which is under the control of the Federal Ministry
(Bundesministerium) in Bonn. The department within the Federal Administration
designed specifically to handle ethnic German questions is the Office for Ethnic
German Inquiries (der Bundesregierung fiir Aussiedlerfragen) which has been under
the direction of Dr. Horst Waffenschmidt since its creation in 1989. Ethnic Germans
arriving after the 1992 Post-War Settlement Act (the quota law and law that says they
must have been born before January 1, 1993 to qualify for entry and receive
entitlements) are called Spataussiedler ("late settlers") but will be referred to here
simply as ethnic Germans. 1
As was mentioned in Chapter I, the Home Office categorizes ethnic Germans
as being of German "nationality"(Staatsangehorige) or of German "ethnicity"
(Volkzugehorige) (Haberland 1994, 115; Die Situation der Deutschen in den
Staaten ... 1996, 10). Those who claim to be of German nationality, such as many of
those migrating from former German territories in Central Europe, must show proof
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of German nationality, such as birth, marriage, or death certificates. Ethnicity, on the
other hand, is based on the applicant's recognition as an ethnic German in his/her
country of origin. Often because so many ethnic Germans hid their true ethnicity, as
in the case of those in the former Soviet Union and Poland, "ethnic markers" such as
speech and upbringing are considered, but these people are also usually required to
offer some sort of documentary proof of ancestry (Jones and Wild 1992; Malchow
1993).
The Home Office also classifies ethnic Germans as belonging to one of three
groups. The first group is comprised of those who are determined to emigrate from
their countries of origin because they have located their families in Germany and are
anxious to join them.

The second group is those who are still undecided about

leaving. Some ethnic Germans remain optimistic about future developments in their
countries of origin and would prefer to stay if they are given the assurance that their
future will be secure there. The third group includes those who want to stay in their
countries of origin simply because they belong to mixed-nationality marriages, have
assimilated into their spouses ethnic community and, consequently, have no desire to
leave.
The German government concentrates its efforts on ethnic Germans who want
to immigrate to Germany as soon as possible; and concentrates on those who would
stay in their countries of origin if permanent homelands can be secured for them (Die
Situation der Deutschen... 1996). The remainder of this chapter will focus on ethnic
Germans belonging to the first group: Those emigrating to Germany and their
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integration possibilities and difficulties, and evaluation of government policies
regarding their immigration to Germany.
It should be noted here that the German government often lumps ethnic
Germans together as one group under the blanket term Aussiedler when counting
them for statistical purposes. For example, in data obtained from the German federal
government regarding the number of ethnic Germans arriving in Germany annually
by age group, the data reflect only the total number of ethnic Germans in each age
group; the numbers are not broken down by the countries of origin from where the
immigrants came.

Consequently, in some instances it is not possible to separate

Russian-Germans from Polish-Germans, etc. when analyzing statistical data regarding
ethnic German immigrants. Therefore, the term "ethnic German" will often be used
throughout Chapter IV. The term "Russian-German", "Polish-German", etc. will be
used only when referring strictly to a specific group of ethnic Germans. It can be
assumed however, that because the overwhelming majority of ethnic Germans
arriving in Germany since the late 1980's is Russian-German, the term "ethnic
German" still applies mainly to Russian-Germans.
The Immigration Process
For ethnic Germans who wish to immigrate to Germany, the process begins
by filling out a 20-page application (over 50 pages prior to 1993) to establish their
German ethnicity. The application is then presented to one of the German consulate
offices in Central Europe or the former Soviet Union which forwards the application

to the Home Office in Germany for processing. Once application is made to the
embassy, the immigrants must wait for the day when they are granted visas to leave
which could take years because there are presently hundreds-of-thousands of cases
pending (Jach 1996).
Family Planning
There are other pull factors at work besides Article 116 and all its amenities
drawing ethnic Germans to Germany. Often, when the older generation (usually the
caretakers of old family records) decides to immigrate to Germany, they take the
family documents with them. This leaves the younger generation with no proof of
German ethnicity should they decide to immigrate later, which more or less forces
them to leave when their elders leave. Also, because the convoluted application form
requires detailed information about ancestors, relatives, and in-laws, often entire
families need to get involved. Critics suggest these factors serve to propagate the
whole "exile idea" and explain why entire families leave together as opposed to
leaving as individuals (Jones and Wild 1992).
First Reception in Germany
The German government pays for the immigrants' airfare to Germany
(totaling DM 113 million in 1996) (Hilfen fiir Spataussiedler 1996).

In the earlier

days, the government paid for overweight baggage and for household items to be
shipped to Germany as well, but because of budget cuts in recent years, the
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immigrants are no longer reimbursed for these expenses. (Ethnic Germans from
Central Europe often arrive by train or car.)
After their arrival in Germany, ethnic Germans have traditionally been
required

to

register

at

one

of

the

federal

reception

centers

(Erstaufnahmeeinrichtungen) in the West German cities of Friedland or Bramsche
(near Onsabriick) or the newer reception centers at Hamm, Empfingen, Rastatt or
Dranse (Info-Dienst 1996; Bundesverwaltungsamt 1998) (Figure 17). After the initial
formalities of being registered, x-rayed for Tuberculosis, etc., and given language
testing,

ethnic

Germans

are

then

sent

to

a

state

reception

center

(Landesaufnahmestellen) based on a quota system and on availability. (All sixteen
states now have reception centers.) After a short stay in a state reception center, the
immigrants then settle in a transitional shelter (Ubergangswohnheim) (UWH) (unless
they have relatives or friends with whom they can live) until they find jobs and settle
in their own apartments or houses. Around 88% end up going to the shelters (Dietz
1994, 94).
From the late 1980's to the rnid-1990's, as more and more ethnic Germans
arrived in Germany, the transitional shelters were quickly filled to capacity and
authorities became "hard-pressed" to find shelter for them, especially since the
government was also scrambling to provide emergency shelter for hundreds-of
thousands of non-German asylum seekers and refugees arriving at the same time
(Jones 1994). The reception centers were so overcrowded it took ten days just to go
through the registration process (Malcow 1993). Often army barracks, deserted
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warehouses, former breweries, etc. had to be used to house new arrivals.

So

desperate was the city of Hamburg to find shelter for all its new arrivals, the city even
housed some immigrants on a ship in the harbor (Jones 1994).
Although the government has done its best to provide adequate
accommodations for all the new arrivals, psychologists who visited some of the
shelters say conditions are clearly unsuitable and insufficient (although the shelters of
today are much improved over the shelters ethnic German expellees had to live in
after World War II) (Cropley 1994). Often up to six families have to share one room
no bigger than 10 2 meters, sleep two to a bed, and share kitchen and bathroom
facilities with other families. The families are frequently from different countries,
which further adds to the confusion. It was noted by the psychologists that when, for
example, Russian-Germans are housed with Romanian-Germans, the families become
territorial and tend to look out for their own. Although they are superficially nice to
one another, they do not council each other or pass along information. It was also
noted that Romanian-Germans will often take up the largest share of the room and
that they "far and wide grieve over their preferences; eating and drinking all
advantages (Cropley 1994, 97) (writer's translation)."

It was also observed that

families quarrel amongst themselves, often over why they came to Germany in the
first place, and quarrel with other families in the shelters over petty matters such as
using the bathroom, etc. Further, because there is no privacy in the shelters, children
and the chronically ill have no chance of getting any rest, nor do students have any
chance to study.
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In the past, the immigrants were allowed to chose a shelter to settle in, usually
to be near relatives and friends already living in Germany, but by 1989 some shelters
were so overcrowded the situation had reached the crisis stage. Ironically, in many
instances, the immigrants had opportunities to go to other, less crowded shelters, but
refused to do so because they did not want to leave their families and friends.
The government reacted to the housing problem by imposing a new regulation
to better distribute new arrivals.

In accordance with the "Place of Residence

Allocation Law" (Wohnortezuweif]ungsgesetz) effective July 1, 1989, all new arrivals
must settle in an assigned shelter for two years (unless they move to private
residences) rather than go to one of their own choosing as in the past. Those who do
not abide by the law lose all government assistance (Malchow 1993). (Although the
government does still try to place them according to their wishes whenever possible.)
The government also responded to the housing problem in the early 1990's by
allocating DM 750 million to the states to build 30,000 new dwellings to be used
strictly to house ethnic Germans (for the first seven years after construction) to
"reduce their geographic concentration in some of the more crowded areas (Jones and
Wild 1992, 10)."
Many ethnic Germans have also been allocated by the week or by the month
to an Ausweichunterkiinft (AU).

These are often former homes, pensions, and

guesthouses, mostly in smaller towns and villages, which were organized by the
government to accept the overflow from shelters in the larger cities. Those who have
gone to shelters in smaller towns and villages say life is better there. They say the
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cities are too hectic and fast-paced and people have no time to help, but people in
villages are often more friendly (Schafer 1995).
The State Role in Assisting Ethnic Germans
The states have the task of sending ethnic Germans to the cities and
communities in their states "according to the law, their wishes, family bindings,
accommodation facilities, etc. (Nordrhein-Westfalen Landstelle fur Aussiedler 1996)
(writer's translation). To accommodate new arrivals, the states publish monthly
bulletins which include exhaustive lists of all the UWH and AU in their states
including the names of the managers, addresses and phone numbers of each shelter,
and the total capacity (total number of beds) and the number of beds available in each
shelter. The number of beds in a shelter varies greatly. While some shelters house
600 or more occupants, others may have a capacity of just ten or twelve beds.
Most shelters are usually filled to capacity but the situation varies from month
to month. In Bayern, for instance, there are 452 shelters (UWH and AU) with a total
capacity of 43,005 beds. In the month of April 1996, for example, of the 43,005 bed
capacity, 3,890 were available that month. According to the Bayern State Ministry
for Employment and Social Order, the federal government spent nearly DM 1.3
billion between 1991 and 1996 to administer and allocate ethnic Germans, to build
new shelters, and to provide for the immigrants living in provisional lodgings in
Germany (Bayerisches Staatministerium fur Arbeit and Sozialordnung 1996) (writer's
translation).
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Guidebooks for Ethnic Germans
Relatives and friends who have arrived earlier are the most important helpers
and the main information source to new arrivals about such things as access to
institutions, laws governing ethnic Germans, and the necessary first steps after
arriving in Germany. Whoever has such contacts can soon be much better informed
than those who must rely on governmental information channels which are
overburdened with requests for assistance (Baumeister 1991 ).

To help ethnic

Germans get oriented to their new country both the federal and the state governments
distribute guidebooks to new arrivals. The Wegweiser fur Aussiedler (Guidebook for
Ethnic Germans) published by the federal government, instructs the immigrants on
how to go about registering for the various government assistance programs they are
entitled to such as receiving Wohngeld (reimbursement for living expenses),
Kindergeld (allowances for children), Renten, (old-age pensions), etc. The federal
guidebook also advises new arrivals on a variety of tasks they will need to do soon
after getting settled in their transitional shelters such as obtaining a valid
identification (or a driver's license) and passports. Because ethnic Germans usually
become German citizens, young men over the age of 18 are instructed to register for
military service, but not until they have lived in Germany for two years.
The state-published guidebooks, written in German on one page and Russian
on the corresponding page, are similar to the federal guidebooks in that they also
provide information about how to go about signing up for the various entitlements,
but state guidebooks also provide information about local services available to the
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immigrants such as daycare, sports programs, etc. One state-published guidebook
entitled the Hessischer Wegweiser fur Spiitaussiedlerennen und Spiitaussiedler
(Hessen Guidebook for Ethnic Germans) informs ethnic Germans that they can get
answers to all their questions or concerns from the Hessen Ministry, and that other
organizations such as churches and the German Red Cross also provide services for
ethnic Germans and can help them find shelters to stay in if there are no UWH
available (Figure 18). If they find the UWH in their area filled to capacity, they must
find other shelter (such as in an AU or a private shelter) and then apply in writing.
They will be given a room in a UWH as soon as one is available.
The Hessen book also reminds the immigrants that the economic system in
Germany is different from the systems in their countries of origin. The German
economic system, the book says, is based on competition, so when ethnic Germans go
shopping for goods or services they must compare various offers before making a
decision, especially when buying merchandise. If a shopper finds one store is more
expensive than another, he/she should "calmly and quietly depart the shop
(Hessischer Wegweiser :fiir Spataussiedlerennen 1996, 18) (writer's translation)."
The guidebook also warns that rashes and infections are common in the UWH, and
that there have been outbreaks of Tuberculosis in the shelters, so if one has any of the
symptoms noted, he/she should get to a doctor as soon as possible as there is
medicine available to treat the diseases.
Wage earners are advised to register, within one week, with the local
employment agency and to enroll in a Sprachkurse (German language course), if they
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HESSISCHER WEGWEISER
FUR SPATAUSSIEOLEAINNEN UNO
SPAlAUSSIEDLEA

•.Jfi:t.

Hesslsches Ministerium fur
...--� Umwelt, Energie, Jugend, Famille
�.':: und Gesundheit

Figure 18. Guidebook for Ethnic Germans Arriving in Germany (1996). The guide
book is given to ethnic Germans arriving in Hessen by the State Ministry.
The photo implies that the family dog can also come to Germany. When
asked if this is so, a representative at the Hessen Ministry said the dog
was included only as a "friendly graphic element." "A Russian-German
dog must stay at home and may not as a Spataussiedler travel to
Germany ...it is better if the immigrants find a nice [German] dog that can
help them get oriented to their new country (writer's translation)."
Source:

Used with permission of the Hessisches Ministerium fiir Umwelt, Energie,
Jungend, Familie und Gesundheit.
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need to, which is available free through employment agencies.

Finally, ethnic

Germans are reminded that, by law, once admitted to a UWH or AU, they are
required to pay for the room (paid for out of their Wohngeld).

How much is

determined by the manager and if not paid in a timely manner, the tenant can lose
his/her room.

They are also reminded that, as the name implies, living in a

transitional shelter is not meant to be a permanent stay and to stay for longer than a
year is not good, so they should find an apartment as soon as possible. Of course the
immigrants would like nothing better than to move to their own residences and get on
with their lives, but for a variety of reasons many ethnic Germans have not integrated
well into Germany's economy. Consequently, some end up living in the shelters for
years.
The Settlement Pattern of Ethnic Germans: A Major Obstacle to Integration
The German government considers the spatial distribution of ethnic Germans
to be one of the major obstacles to the economic and social integration of the
immigrants. Figure 19 indicates that nearly 49% of all ethnic Germans have settled in
just three West German states, with Nordrhein-Westfalen leading at 21.93%,
followed by Bayern at 14.57%, and Baden-Wilrttemberg with 12.13%. The total
percentage of ethnic Germans who have settled in West German states is 79.45%,
while only 20.55% have settled in the eastern states (the former DDR) with Sachsen
leading at 6.07% (Info-Dienst Aug. 1996).
There are several factors contributing to the uneven distribution of the ethnic
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Figure 19. Distribution of Ethnic Germans in Germany's Sixteen States.
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Germans. First, because they have traditionally been allocated to reception centers in
certain West German cities upon arrival (such as those shown in Figure 17), it is only
natural some would settle permanently in these areas.
Secondly, after leaving the shelters, new arrivals tend to go where other ethnic

I
I
I

Germans have settled before them, or what is described as "chain migration" in
migration theory (Ravenstein 1885, 1889). 2 Because ethnic Germans, like all German
citizens, are guaranteed freedom of movement under Article 11.1 of Germany's
constitution, they are free to settle wherever they choose. Ethnic Germans like to stay
in close contact with relatives and friends from their countries of origin and prefer to
live in tightly-knit communities rather than to be separated from each other and
spread all over the country. This is partly a holdover from having been separated
from each other during, or following, World War II.
An earlier study by two British geographers indicates that Russian-Germans
have settled predominantly in Nordrhein-Westfalen, Niedersachsen, Rheinland-Pfalz,
and Baden-Wiirttemberg. Romanian-Germans are strongly represented in southern
Bayern and Baden-Wiirttemberg, while Polish-Germans have settled mainly in
northern Germany, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Hessen (Jones and Wild 1992). A more
current look at statistics shows this pattern is still occurring but with some notable
differences. First, as indicated in Figure 20, ethnic Germans arriving in 1995, for
example, in all of Germany's sixteen states are overwhelmingly from the former
Soviet Union. From 1989 through the end of 1991 Russian-Germans made up only
16 to 66% of the total arrivals. By 1995, Russian-Germans made up 96% of the total
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Figure 20. Ethnic Germans Arriving in Germany by Nationality - 1995.
Info-Dienst 1996
Source:
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arrivals in Germany.
Secondly, Figure 20 indicates that a substantial number of ethnic Germans are
now settling in the East German states.

From 1988 through 1989, prior to

Reunification, all of the 579,728 immigrants that arrived in Germany during that
time, of course, settled in West Germany. In 1990, (following Reunification) when
another 397,073 more ethnic Germans arrived, only 597 of them settled in the former
DDR (mostly in East Berlin) (Bevolkerung 1993).

From 1991 through 1996, the

number of ethnic Germans settling in the five eastern states has slowly increased but
only because they have been pressured by the government to settle there.

For

example, Sachsen-Anhalt, located in central Germany, only received 119 ethnic
Germans in 1991. By 1992 the number of ethnic Germans who settled in Sachsen
Anhalt increased to 8,667 and in 1995 reached 8,751 (Bevolkerung 1993; Info-Dienst
Aug. 1996). Likewise, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, another eastern state, received
331 ethnic Germans in 1991, 1,111 in 1992 and by 1994 received 8,183 (Statistisches
Landesamt Mecklen-Vorpommern 1996; Info-Dienst Aug. 1996).
The example of Nordrhein-Westfalen is used to show the distribution of
ethnic Germans (of all nationalities) arriving in that state between 1989 and the end of
1995. Figure 21 shows the majority has settled in large urban-industrial cities such as
Koln, Essen and Dortmund. Another part of Nordrhein-Westfalen that has received
many ethnic Germans is the area between Dilsseldorf and Wuppertal, in the well
known Ruhr conurbation, one of the world's largest industrial regions.
The uneven distribution of ethnic Germans, and their impact on the German
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economy, can also be looked at in terms of the increase in the number of building
permits issued to build subsidized rental and privately-owned housing units for ethnic
Germans in each of Germany's sixteen states. According to the German government,
the number of building permits issued in West Germany in 1988 was around 209,000
but by the end of 1995 had increased to 639,000 (459,000 in the West German states
and 180,000 in the eastern states (Figure 22).

Many of the building permits issued

between 1991 and the end of 1995 were for the reconstruction of the East German
But of the 587,000 building permits issued in 1994, for example, 163,021

states.

were for additional subsidized housing units to shelter ethnic Germans. 3

(The

breakdown of housing permits issued in 1995 and 1996 were not yet available at the
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Figure 22. Impact of Ethnic German Immigration on the Housing Market in
Germany.
Source:

Info-Dienst 1996
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time of this writing.) Nordrhein-Westfalen, the state to receive more ethnic Germans
than any other state in West Germany, granted permits for an additional 16,652 units
in 1994; Baden-Wilrttemberg added another 8,392 units, and Niedersachsen built an
additional 8,814 units. The former East German state (with the exception of East
Berlin) with the highest number of building permits issued in 1994 for subsidized
housing is Sachsen with 2,838 (Info-Dienst 1996) (Figure 23).
Not all of the building permits issued in 1994 for subsidized housing were for
rental units. In addition to the 163,021 permits issued in 1994 to build rental units,
another 152,669 permits were granted to build (subsidized) privately owned, single
family houses or condominiums for ethnic German immigrants (Figure 24). The two
western states granting the most permits to build privately-owned houses or
condominiums are Nordrhein-Westfalen (9,158 units) and Baden-Wilrttemberg
(13,002 units), while the only eastern state to grant a substantial number of permits
was Sachsen with 10,333 (Info-Dienst 1996).
Religion does not play a role in why ethnic Germans choose to live in certain
areas. Of the 217,898 ethnic Germans (96% from the former Soviet Union) who
arrived in Germany in 1995, for example, 121,471 are of the Evangelical (Lutheran,
Baptist and Reformed) faith, 42,766 are Roman Catholic and 53,637 belong to other
religions.

(No one registered as having no religious affiliation, and 26 persons

registered as being non-believers.)
Figure 25 indicates that a substantial number of ethnic Germans of the
Evangelical faith have settled in southern Germany, such as in Bayern, which is
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traditionally Catholic, while some Catholics arriving m 1995 settled in northern
Germany, such as Nordrhein-Westfalen,

Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) and

Schleswig-Holstein which are traditionally Protestant regions. There is no simple
explanation for this pattern but prior to World War II Germany was comprised of four
major ethnic groups (the Franks, Saxons, Swabians and Bavarians) each with its own
tradition and dialect, and each group found within a specific region of the country.
Since World War II these ethnic regions are "no longer identical to the present sixteen
German states", most of which were formed after World War II by the occupying
forces (Kappler 1993, 14).

Some ethnic German expellees who arrived in West

Germany immediately following the war tended to return to their ancestral regions,
but the massive flow of immigrants since World War II, along with the ease of
mobility and the attraction to industrial cities in search of work, have "blurred" these
ethnic boundaries causing the cultural (and religious) make-up of Germany to be
much more complex and intricate than it once was (Kappler 1993).
Another reason religion is not much of a factor in why ethnic Germans choose
to live in particular areas is that religion is not a high priority in the lives of many
young ethnic Germans, especially those from the former Soviet Union from where the
majority of ethnic Germans have migrated in recent years. Because the Soviet Union
was an atheist state, anti-religious propaganda tactics were used in schools as early as
Kindergarten. The older generation tried to keep religion alive in the family by
practicing their faith privately in small private groups but were apparently ineffective
in making Believers out of many of the young people. A survey conducted in 1992 in
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Germany showed that only 51.9% of Russian-Germans under 39 years old said they
believe in God as compared to 96.6% of those over 60 years old (Dietz 1994, 105)
(writer's translation). Ironically, even though many young Russian-Germans do not
believe in God, almost all register themselves with the authorities as belonging to a
particular religion. They also go to church occasionally, especially on religious
holidays such as Christmas and Easter. The reason is that the immigrants believe
going to church will help speed their integration into German society (Dietz 1994).
From a demographic standpoint, ethnic German migration is good for
Germany, or at least it will be in the long-term, because the country's general
population has been decreasing since the early 1970's (Miinz and Ulrich 1995; Knapp
1992).

The age profile of ethnic Germans shows the majority of the immigrants

arriving in Germany are young people (Figure 26). In 1995, for instance, 34.34% of
the 217,898 arrivals that year were under 18 years old. Those between ages 18-25
made up 10.76% of the total and another 33.87% were between the ages of 25-45.
The profile shows that only 13.92% were between the ages of 45-65 and a mere
7.11% of those arriving in 1995 were 65 years old or older.
In comparison to the general population, Figure 27 indicates that ethnic
Germans arriving in Germany in 1995 have 4.4% more in the working-age bracket
(41.2%) as compared with the general population (36.8%). But the graph also shows
that while ethnic Germans in the under 20 age bracket make up 37.8% of the total,
only 20.8% of the general population fall in this category. Also good news for
Germany is that only 21% of ethnic Germans are found in the over 45 age bracket as
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Figure 26. Age Profile of Ethnic Germans Arriving in Germany- 1992-1995.
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compared to 42.4% of the general population. On the downside, newcomers arriving
in Germany are increasingly older (Gugel 1994).

Although the trend is not that

notable now (showing only fractions of percents), the number of older ethnic
Germans coming to Germany will continue to rise, especially since those born after
December 31, 1992 will no longer be eligible for entitlements.
Young ethnic German families arriving in Germany are especially welcomed
in the east German states because since Reunification much of the young east German
population has migrated to the west German states. Simultaneously, the birth rate has
sunk dramatically in the east, so that in many areas there is a drastic aging of the
population (Spataussiedler... 1996). But most ethnic Germans are not keen on settling
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in the east. First, as was previously mentioned, they do not want to be isolated from
their families and friends living in established communities in the western states.
Secondly, living conditions in the east are not as good as they are in the west.
Another important reason is because, as was discussed in Chapter III, there have been
thousands ofreported cases of racial violence committed against ethnic Germans and
asylum seekers in the east German states which has made many potential settlers
suspicious of living there; but the situation is slowly improving. For instance, the
minister of Brandenburg (one ofGermany's eastern states) recently welcomed the 20
thousandth ethnic German to the state. Cause for celebration was that the young man
and his family specifically requested they be allowed to settle in this eastern state.
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"With flowers and handshakes" the minister welcomed Andres Miller, his wife and
their three children who had just recently arrived from Kazakhstan (Spataussiedler. ..
1996) (writer's translation). The reason the immigrants requested residence in
Brandenburg is because Miller has a sister already living there.
Brandenburg's minister says the state is happy to receive the young family
and would like to see many more come. The eastern states have been working hard to
dispel prejudice against ethnic Germans and believe they are getting the situation
under control. To entice more young ethnic Germans to the state of Brandenburg the
government has recently begun a model building project in the city of Wiinsdorf.
Brandenburg's minister boasts that the city has many prototypes of seventeenth
century Huguenot architecture.4 Some of these buildings, which were used to house
the Russian army during the Cold War days, could be developed by "self-propelled"
immigrants if they decide to settle there (Spataussiedler ... 1996, 2).
The Language Barrier
In addition to the uneven distribution of ethnic Germans, another reason the
immigrants have not integrated well into Germany's economy is that many ethnic
Germans have no knowledge of the German language when they arrive in Germany.
This is particularly true of Russian-Germans.

Under the Soviet system, which

considered itself a union of nations, ethnic minorities were supposed to be able to
retain their cultural identity, of which language is a crucial part (Kliiter 1993).
(Catherine's Manifesto of 1763 had also guaranteed this right to ethnic Germans.)
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But, when Hitler's army invaded Russia in 1941, Stalin revoked the right for RussianGermans to use the German language, forcing them to use Russian instead. It was not
until after Stalin's death in 1953 that the German language was once again permitted.
According to a regulation issued in 1957 by the Ministry of National Education of the
USSR, German children were supposed to be given two hours of German language
training in school each week, in theory at least. "In practice, there was always a lack
of German-speaking teachers and a shortage of textbooks." Instead, German children
were forced to watch films about "bad Germans" and were ridiculed by other students
who called them "Faschisten" (fascists) (Stumpp 1993, 147).
The older generation who grew up speaking German in the pre-World War II
days continued to speak their language in their private lives among family and
friends, but gradually each succeeding generation "profited less" from hearing their
elders speak German and as a result, German became the "Grof]elternsprache"
("grandparent language") (Dietz 1994, 22) (writer's translation). By 1959, only 74%
could speak German and by 1989 the number decreased to 49%. Of this 49%, it
should be noted, not all can speak high (proper) German.

Because of cultural

isolation, the German language spoken in the former Soviet Union has evolved
differently than it has in Germany over the past 200 years. Many Russian-Germans
speak "colonists German", a combination of German, mixed with local dialect and
Russian words (Dietz 1994, 22; Long 1988, 50).
In the earlier days, prior to the collapse of communism in Central Europe and
the former Soviet Union, most ethnic Germans who immigrated to Germany came
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from Central Europe, so a good share of them, particularly the older generation, could
speak German which helped speed their integration into German society. By the late
1980's the situation changed as more and more Russian-Germans arrived in Germany
who were unable to speak the language. In 1992, for example, of all the ethnic
Germans who arrived at the reception center in Nurnberg and were given language
tests (all those between ages 10 and 60), 93.4% did not pass the test (Dietz 1994, 49).
Russian-Germans arriving now have a better grasp of German than the first of
those to arrive in Germany because stricter laws have been enacted regarding the
language requirements necessary to obtain immigration visas. Since July 1, 1990, in
accordance with Ethnic Germans Admissions Act (Aussiedleraufnahmegesetz)
potential immigrants must be able to fill out their application in German and be able
to pledge allegiance to Germany in the mother tongue.
restrictions became even tougher.

In 1993, immigration

Pursuant to the Post-War Settlement Act

(Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz) of December 22, 1992, all of those who plan to
immigrate to Germany must take a German language-training course in their
countries of origin and pass a rigorous language test before leaving. To facilitate
them, the German government has shipped thousands of textbooks to areas in Russia,
Kazakhstan and the Central Asian Republics where large numbers of Russian
Germans live and has encouraged German-speaking teachers in the CIS to promote
the German language in schools (Info-Dienst March 1996).
The reason behind the stricter laws is that it is much more cost-effective to
have would-be emigrants learn German in the former Soviet Union than to house
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them in transitional shelters for months to years in Germany while they learn the
language.

Figure 28 shows the average number of ethnic Germans enrolled in

language courses in Germany each year since 1990.

Of all the money spent to

integrate ethnic Germans, language and job training are by far the most costly for the
German government. Just since 1993, the government has spent DM 5.76 billion on
language and job retraining (Hilfen fiir Spataussiedler 1996).
The stricter policies are beginning to have an impact on the number of ethnic
Germans coming to Germany. The Federal Ministry announced in April 1997 that
ethnic German migration to Germany in 1996 fell far below the quota of 220,000 to
177,000 (172,000 from Russia and the Soviet successor states), the lowest annual
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number of arrivals since 1987 (Figure 29). The reason, according to the Office for
Ethnic German Inquiries, is that nearly one-third of the ethnic Germans who applied
for immigration visas to Germany failed the required language test and were therefore
denied permission to resettle there (Number of Resettlers ... 1997). The government
has since announced that it plans to allocate more of its yearly budget to assist those
in need of language training.
Both in Germany and in the former Soviet Union, language courses are not
only used to teach the language but because Russian-Germans are "oriented on
collectivization" (Dietz 1994, 28) the concepts of capitalism and democracy are also
incorporated into the program, as well as other aspects of life the immigrants will be
faced with in their new homeland such as "learning to use the mass transit system or
dealing with officialdom (School Addresses Social and Linguistic Needs... 1996, 7)."
Prior to 1993, the language courses were spread out over one year, but because of
budget cuts, the course must now be completed in just six months.
Many Russian-Germans, particularly adults, have a hard time learning the new
language in such a short time, especially since living in the shelters gives them very
little opportunity to study. Women have greater difficulty than men do in learning
German because they often do not get a chance to mingle socially outside the family.
In the patriarchal family structure of Russian-Germans, men take the dominant
position with contact outside the family in the workplace, schools, and in official
matters, while many women stay at home with the kids and other women in the
shelters (Schafer 1995, 41).
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Children seem to adjust the easiest. Initially they are sent to special schools
for ethnic German children (when available) until they are ready to enter regular
schools which usually takes about eight months (Dietz 1994). Younger children often
adapt easier than their older siblings. Teenagers who come to Germany without a
grasp of the language find it difficult to adjust and do not do well in school.
Another integration problem unique to ethnic Germans living in shelters is
that they have a lot of anxiety about learning proper German. So much so, that the
different ethnic groups, such as Russian-Germans, Polish-Germans, etc. live in
isolation amongst themselves in the shelters because they want to be identified with
Germans, not with other immigrants. Often Russian-Germans will refuse to send
their children to schools where Polish-German children attend because they fear their
kids will not learn proper German if they socialize with Polish-German children
(Schafer 1995, 89).
�

In a study conducted by the East European Institute in Munich in the early
1990's, 427 ethnic Germans who arrived in Germany from 1975-1985 were surveyed.
The object was to see if the immigrants had economically integrated or remained
isolated. Of those surveyed, when asked if they have a good command of the German
language (seven to fifteen years after arriving in Germany) 16.2% said they could
speak good German, 31.15% said they had some grasp of the language, 44.9%
responded that their command of German is bad, and 7.3% said they have no
knowledge of� German language (Dietz 1994, 57).
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The Employment Situation for Ethnic Germans
The employment situation is not good for many ethnic Germans. The jobless
rate has soared to a post-World War II high in German recently to 12.2% nationally
and 18.9% in the East German states (Unemployment. .. 1997,4). This is not good
news for ethnic Germans whose unemployment rate has been averaging 24% in
recent years, and in the more densely populated areas, such as in Nordrhein
Westfalen, the rate is much higher. The 24% figure, it should be noted, reflects only
those who have arrived in Germany over the past five years. After five years of
residency in Germany ethnic German employment figures are counted in with the
general population (Info-Dienst 1996).
In addition to the dismal state of Germany's economy at present, there are
several other factors, "ethnic German specific factors", that contribute to the reason
why 98% of all ethnic Germans have a hard time finding a job (Gugel 1994,113)
(writer's translation). One reason, as was already discussed, is that the immigrants
have followed a chain migration path and have chosen to settled in ghetto-like
communities with others from their countries of origin rather than go to other, less
crowded areas of the country where they may have a better chance of finding
employment. Secondly, until recently, most of those in the working-age bracket have
come to Germany without having learned the German language before arriving which
has also seriously hindered their integration into the job market.
Another disadvantage for ethnic Germans is that many have found their job
skills brought with them from their countries of origin are inadequate or unnecessary
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in Germany's job market. In 1995, for example, of the 217,898 ethnic Germans that
arrived in Germany, 116,609 (53%) are wage earners, the other 101,289 persons
belong to the non-wage earner category, such as housewives, children, pensioners,
etc. (Table 5). Of the 116,609 wage earners, 42% worked in the service industry in
their countries of origin. Many of those in the service industry, such as lawyers,
teachers, social workers, etc. cannot find employment in Germany because their
qualifications do not meet western standards.

This is particularly true of recent

arrivals who claim to have had "management" or "sales" experience in their countries
of origin, people who, German employers say, make many blunders (Gugel 1994).
It also seems that in their anxiousness to leave their countries of origin, some
ethnic Germans may have registered themselves as having a particular job skill
without having really been employed professionally in that capacity. For instance, in
1994, of the 118,509 wage-earners who arrived in Germany that year, 13,026 (or
nearly 11% of the total wage-earners) claimed to have been "hairdressers" in their
countries of origin (Info-Dienst 1995).
Industrial workers made up 35% of those who arrived in 1995. If they can
speak German, their chances of finding employment are good, but employers cannot
hire them if they do not know enough German to be able to fill out order-forms, etc.
Mechanics, construction workers, craftsmen, those involved in transportation and
other jobs of a less technical nature also have possibilities of finding employment
soon after arriving in Germany if they can speak the language.
Academics also have a good chance of finding employment, but those
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Table 5
Ethnic Germans Arriving in Germany- 1995:
Wage Earners vs. Non-Wage Earners
Wage Earners

Census

Percent

Agriculture and Forestry

8,288

7

734

1

Industry

40,884

35

Technical

10,603

9

Service Industry

49,274

42

6,826

_6

116,609

100

Mining

Undecided

Non-Wage Earners

Census

Percent

Housewives/househusbands

1,175

1

Pre-school Children

24,375

24

School-aged Children

48,694

48

Pensioners

26,542

26

Other

_ill_

_1

101,289

100

Total Arrivals in 1995

(96 % from the former Soviet Union)

Source: Info-Dienst 1996

217,898
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involved in specific branches of science have a very hard time getting established in
Germany. Because of differences in training, they find their qualifications are not
adequate. Subsequently they have to go through years of retraining before they can
become re-certified in their professions. Many are forced to take jobs well below
their qualification and income levels.
Agricultural workers, who made up 7% of those who arrived in 1995, also
have a hard time finding a job, because they have found their skills are unnecessary in
Germany's agro-tech society. They also have to go through extensive retraining
before they can find employment.
Another factor contributing to high unemployment among the immigrants is
that, as shown in Figure 30, the occupation structure of ethnic German wage earners
is quite different from that of the native German population. For instance, while 8%
of German wage earners were registered as "self-employed" in 1995, Figure 30
shows there are no ethnic Germans represented in this category, reflecting the
differences in the economic structures of Germany and the eastern block countries.
Figure 30 also shows that another 6% of those arriving are 'undecided" about their
profession. This category is not represented in the profile of German wage earners.
Many ethnic Germans arriving in Germany believe their qualifications and
willingness to work will automatically land them a job. However, since Reunification
they face competition not only with east Germans, but also with other ethnic
Germans. The immigrants want to work though; they want to be contributors, and
companies who have had experience in hiring ethnic Germans like them.

One

114
Trade, Comnmications,
Undecided 6 %

41%

Ethnic Germans - 1995

General Population - 1995

Figure 30. Occupation Structure -Ethnic Germans vs. the General Population.
Source:

Info-Dienst 1996; ZahlenkompaB 1995

construction company owner who has employed scores of ethnic Germans claims
they are hard working and punctual. They are also willing to take jobs Germans do
not want, and are willing to work overtime and on weekends; but, the company's
owner said, he prefers to hire Russian-Germans rather than Polish-Germans. Poles,
he says, are more materialistic and think "milk and honey flows in Germany"; they all
want the house and the Mercedes while Russian-Germans are more humble and
willing to settle for less (Malchow 1993, 97) (writer's translation).
Cultural Differences Also Hinder Integration
Because Russian-Germans have lived in cultural isolation for hundreds of
years, their integration into German society is more difficult than with those from
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Central Europe who have only been separated from the German culture since World
War II. From the immigrants' viewpoint, they were raised in German homes in the
Soviet Union, their parents and grandparents spoke German; their upbringing was
German. But when they come to Germany they realize they are not German, but
Russian-German. They arrive wearing peasant-style clothing like babushkas (scarfs)
and ushankas (fur hats) which, along with their thick Russian accents, makes them
different from Germans.
Elderly Russian-Germans immigrate to Germany because they want to hang
on to their cultural identity and religious beliefs.

They fear their children and

grandchildren will become culturally diluted if they stay in the former Soviet Union.
They also fear that the current governments in Russia and the other newly formed
nations of the CIS could change again and things will be as they were before.
Unfortunately, the immigrants also arrive with "unrealistically high
expectations" and believe "all is good" in Germany (Blahusch 1992, 176). They
think that once they get to Germany their lives will automatically improve, and for
some this is true. But for the majority of the immigrants the reality is they will
probably be living in an Obergangswohnheim (transitional shelter) for months to
years. They will have to go through extensive language training and job training and
even then, they may not be able to find work. They also have to face new living
standards and a new economic system. Deprived of western-style consumer goods in
the Soviet Union and its successor states, they immediately want to buy cars, houses
and fulfill other material wishes.

Spending money seems to give them instant
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gratification and as a result debt consultation for ethnic Germans was recognized
early on as an urgent need (Baumeister 1991).
Russian-Germans also experience culture shock. They come to Germany with
200 year old ideologies about nationalism and blood ties and believe Germany is full
of Germans but find Turks, Japanese, Indians, etc. and think it is "all mixed up
(Malchow 1993, 145; Schafer 1995, 77)." They are intimidated by the faced-paced
lifestyle of Germans. They are shocked that young people smoke, drink and live
together without being married. They believe German parents are not strong enough
with their children and say German youngsters are disrespectful to their elders. Many
who come from rural areas find living in cities intimidating and depressing.
Unemployed, they have nothing to do but watch television all day. There are no
gardens to work and no place for their children to play.
In a book entitled Die fremden Deutschen (I'he Foreign Germans), several
ethnic Germans were asked to give their impressions of life in Germany (Malchow
1993). One young man of 35 who brought his wife and three children to Germany
from Russia in the mid-1990's told the interviewer that he found a job in construction
nine months after settling in Germany. He and his wife also receive Kindergeld (a
government allowance) for their children but they still have a difficult time making
ends meet and feel insecure about their future.
The immigrant says it was easy to find a place to live when he was
unemployed, but now that he has a job, he cannot find a place for his family to live.
When he calls about an apartment, the manager (recognizing his Russian accent)
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always asks if he has children and when he says he has three, refuses to rent to him.
He says his parents finally found an apartment, but it was so dirty it took his mother
two months to clean it and then, when the toilet broke, the landlord told his parents
they never should have left Russia.
His mother-in-law is trying to immigrate to Germany but he tells her "all that
glitters is not gold in Germany" and that if she comes, she will have to sleep on the
floor. She says she does not mind she just wants to leave Russia. When she goes to
the market in her village, she sees no more Germans there; all her neighbors have left.
He thinks this is sad.
When he hears on television or when people say to him that too many
Russian-Germans are coming and taking taxpayer money for pensions and welfare
without ever having contributed to the revenue office he tells them yes, that is so, but
there are not that many pensioners coming, and the young people will be paying taxes
too one day. He asks, "What is one to do? We had a hard time too and if you had
lived through what we had to, you would have a Schauze Voll (be fed up) too. Here
we are Aussiedler and there we are Germans. We are not at home here and we were
not at home there (Malchow 1993, 146) (writer's translation)."
The immigrant situation has not been easy on Germans either. Germany is
already densely populated. No one would have thought so many ethnic Germans
would have come to Germany in recent years. Germans thought that each of their
communities could take twenty or so families each year, but not all at once. Germans
are especially angry that so many Russian-Germans are coming to Germany. In a
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survey taken in the early 1990's, it was reported that only 36% of the population think
of Russian-Germans as 'true" Germans and resent having to pay to resettle them in
Germany. Only 17% of the population said they think it is a good idea that Russian
Germans come to Germany (Malcow 1993, 71).

The overwhelming majority

condemn violence against the immigrants, however, and have held mass
demonstrations against it. Many German citizens have worked hard to protect the
immigrants and have donated substantial amounts of money and have given many
hours of their time in caring for them.
Churches are also doing what they can to ease tensions.

In Bayem, for

instance, a model project was begun in 1989/90 by the Catholic Church Commission
geared specifically toward helping children of ethnic German families who are living,
more or less isolated, in transitional shelters. "The separation from the old home,
from relatives and friends in their countries of origin, the difficult living situation, the
lack of German language knowledge, and often the lessening of the social position
has led to problems and tensions between ethnic German children and Germany's
young people (Adler 1995, 56) (writer's translation)."

The project is designed,

therefore, to promote contact between ethnic German and German youngsters and
teenagers by sponsoring sports programs, music, theater and dance events, camping
adventures, etc.

(Figure 31).

Churches also offer consultation to the young

immigrants in personal, social and vocational matters. To promote the furtherance of
a multi-cultural Germany, many youth clubs have also been established with mottoes
such as "Borderless" and "A Colorful Germany: It is so if we use the chance (Adler
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Figure 31. Sports with Ethnic Germans. Copy of advertisement published by the
Bundesministerium fiir Aussiedlerfragen (Office for Ethic German
Inquiries) in Bonn to promote sports programs designed to help integrate
ethnic German children who lived isolated in transitional shelters.
Through sports activities ethnic German children living in the shelters can
have contact, and hopefully make friends, with German children.
Source:

Info-Dienst 1996. Used with permission of the Bundesministerium des
Innern.

1995, 8) (writer's translation)." Churches also hold seminars where issues such as
xenophobia are discussed.
The German government's response to violence against ethnic Germans and
non-German asylum seekers has also been positive.

Authorities have instituted

programs for unemployed youths and programs whose aim it is to prevent xenophobic
behavior (Bee 1994, 22-25). The media also play an important role in the education
process by distributing booklets that demonstrate how the "foreigners" help the
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economy and contribute to the cultural diversity of the country. One such booklet,
entitled Auslander und the Deutsche Wirtschaft (Foreigners and the German
Economy) was written to dispel prejudices against ethnic Germans and asylum
seekers by listing ten propositions that show the positive economic impact they have
on Germany as taxpayers, contributors to social security, investors, business owners,
employees, employers, and consumers (Auslander und die Deutsche Wirtschaft,
1994). Brochures such as Deutsche Aussiedler: JO Fragen - 10 Antworten (Ethnic
Germans: 10 Questions - 10 Answers) and Hi/fen fur Deutsche im Osten Europas:
Warum? (Help for Germans in Eastern Europe: Why?), distributed by the Office of
Ethnic German Inquiries (der Bundesregierung fur Aussiedlerfragen), are used in
schools and to educate the general public in Germany about the country's
commitment to help ethnic Germans in the hopes of giving citizens a more positive
view of the immigrant situation.
The government has also increased efforts to improve police leadership
throughout Germany. Police are sent to sensitivity training where they are introduced
to new cultures through local cultural events of the different ethnic groups (With
Sensitivity Training ... 1995).

The government is also hiring more non-German

police (such as long-time Turkish residents) who they hope can ease tensions between
minority communities (Range 1993).
Amendment to the Place of Residence Allocation Law
On a less positive note, Oskar Lafontaine and his followers in the Social
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Democratic Party still use the ethnic German question in their campaign strategy and
manage to stir up feelings of animosity among the populace toward the immigrants
even though ethnic German immigration has continued to decline since early 1996.
In order to diffuse the growing resentment against ethnic Germans, the government
has once again made its immigration laws more stringent. Pursuant to an amendment
to the 1989 Place of Residence Allocation Law (Wohnortezuwei/Jungsgesetz), all
ethnic Germans arriving after March 1, 1996 must live in designated states based on a
quota system (including in the eastern states) for a period of two years or lose their
entitlements (Info-Dienst June 1996).

The government hopes that by better

distributing the immigrants around the country, the financial burden will be more
evenly dispersed among the states and thereby relieve tensions in the more crowded
areas (Info-Dienst June 1996).
Although ethnic Germans, like all German citizens, are guaranteed freedom
of movement under Article 11.1 of Germany's constitution, Article 11.2 gives
lawmakers the right to amend the law should they feel the necessity to do so. Article
11.1 of the "Charter of Basic Rights" states that "All Germans enjoy freedom of
movement throughout the federal territory (Holbom 1970, 154)." However, Article
11.2 states "This Right may be restricted only by or pursuant to a law and only in
cases in which an adequate basis of existence is lacking and special burdens would
arise to the community as a result thereof or in which the restriction is necessary to
ward off an imminent danger to the existence of the free democratic order of the
Federation, or a Land (state) ... " (Holbom 1970, 154).

When asked how the
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government decides which ethnic Germans will have to settle in the eastern states for
two years, e.g. by a lottery or whatever, an official within the German federal
government told this writer the government has "subtle ways" of persuading them to
go.
On the very day the new Place of Residence Allocation Law went into effect,
Lafontaine angrily denounced the government's action by saying the law is still not
strong enough and once again demanded that the country place limitations on the
number of new arrivals. He is of the opinion, considering higher unemployment and
the problems at the revenue office, that the law should no longer include taking in
220,000 new ethnic Germans each year. Lafontaine thinks that in the future the
number of new immigrants should be based on the economic situation in Germany.
The Home Office responded to Lafontaine by saying that the use of the cash
box will of course be heavy. Ethnic Germans receive, when needed, unemployment
and pensions without ever having performed for this right of inheritance.
Nevertheless, the government argues, this will later level out through the Social
Benefit Policy Fund (Sozialversicherungsbeitrage) as young ethnic Germans find
jobs and contribute to the fund.
The government does agree there are problems that have to be overcome. For
example, in cities where there are large numbers of ethnic Germans, particularly
Russian-Germans, the rate of crime among the young is especially high. Young
people who come from the Soviet Union without a strong grasp of the German
language are "not in good order" when they arrive, and if they come to
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unemployment, end up ''venting their frustration and bottled up energy in acts of
violence and criminality (Ein Schlechter... 1996, 2) (writer's translation)."

The

government is aware that solutions must be found to these problems.
But, the government argues, ethnic Germans are, so says the Basic Law,
German, and as long as that is so, they have a right to immigrate to Germany and
receive their entitlements.

The government also reminds Lafontaine that in his

"divine attribute" as Saarland's president did he himself in 1992, in the grip of the
new asylum regulations, vote for the determined yearly quota of 220,000 per year.
The government also asks which devil is in Lafontaine that would compel him to use
the ethnic German issue as an election war topic. The government insists Germany
will be a land of immigrants and that "whoever is of the opinion that using this
explosive topic as election war ammunition is not only misusing the system, but
possesses an alarming flaw in sensibility and human nature (Ein Schlechter... 1996,
2) (writer's translation)."
1

Ethnic Germans are commonly known in Germany as Aussiedler (out-settlers), Volksdeutsche
(ethnic Germans), Fluchtlinge (refugees), as well as a variety of other names. See Appendix C for a
complete list of terminology used in Germany to describe ethnic Germans.
2

"Chain migration" is a form of "step migration" flow in migration theory (Ravenstein 1885, 1889;
White and Woods 1980). Step migration usually implies movement through a series of places such as
from a village to a larger town or city. However, while step migration is often associated with
migration taking place for economic reasons, chain migration, on the other hand, links flow associated
with kinship ties as in the case of ethnic Germans.
ln systems analysis chain migration is considered part of the positive feedback loop whereby
a change in one variable, in this case an increase in the ethnic German population (A), influences a
change in migration to the same area from B, which in tum influences a change in A (further increase
of ethnic Germans). This type of system, having only positive feedback, is called "morphogenetic"
which means that equilibrium is not maintained, the result being a disproportionate number of ethnic
Germans in certain areas of the country. The German government would like to achieve an
equilibrium in the distribution of ethnic Germans, e.g. by encouraging more of the immigrant
population to settle in the eastern states or in other less crowded areas of the country. With a more
even distribution of ethnic Germans throughout Germany (by the introduction of a variable in the
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negative feedback loop, such as tougher immigrant laws), the system, in theory, would return to a
"morphostatic" state, or condition of dynamic equilibrium.
3

Some of the subsidized housing units were added to house East German arrivals in West Germany in
the early 1990's, but, for practical reasons, after 1991, East Germans were no longer eligible for
subsidies as they were prior to Reunification.
4

Huguenots were persecuted French people who migrated to Brandenburg-Prussia in the 1700's and
brought with them robust economic stimulus. (Some Huguenots also fled to England, Holland or
America.)

CHAPTER V
THE ALTERNATIVE: A DIVIDED HOMELAND
Making Amends
While it may not be good news for Russian-Germans anxious to leave the
former Soviet Union that immigration to Germany has fallen drastically since 1996, it
is a relief for the German government which has been under extreme pressure to limit
the number of ethnic Germans coming to Germany. Less emigration of Russian
Germans is also good news for government leaders in Russia who are concerned that
so much of its ethnic German population is leaving the country.
Although Russian-Germans were treated harshly and unfairly for many years,
smce 1955 when Khruschchev granted them amnesty, the settlers have once again
been regarded by the government as hard-working, industrious, dependable, and well
organized (Klilter 1993; Stumpp 1993). The Soviet propaganda newspaper Neues
Leben called them "heroes of labor (Stumpp 1993, 131)."

The reason is that

politicians are aware that many Russian-Germans are skilled farmers who contribute
much to agricultural production in Russia.
In southwest Siberia, for example, where the majority of wheat is produced
that the government buys to feed the rest of the country east of the Urals, Russian
German farms are prospering while many Russian farms operate at a loss (see Klilter
1993). Russian-Germans also raise or produce many other commodities important to
125
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the economy such as cattle, pigs, sheep, dairy products, etc., and they are renown for
their horse-breeding skills (Stumpp 1993).

One reason they have been so successful

in agriculture is that they have their young people to help on the farms. Since 1955,
when Soviet citizens were given freedom to migrate within the Soviet Union, many
young people left rural areas in search of jobs in larger towns and cities. For young
Russian-Germans this meant giving up their cultural and religious identity which
many were not willing to do. So while elderly Russians were left to take care of their
farms, German settlers had their young people with modem technological skills to
take over farm management. In 1989 around half of all Russian-Germans still lived
in rural villages (Kluter 1993).
Another reason the settlers have been successful, particularly in West Siberia,
is that they have been established in the region for over a century (Klilter 1993). In
the early 1800's, some Volga Germans and German settlers from the Black Sea
region (mostly Mennonites) migrated to southwest Siberia to farm there as was
mentioned in Chapter II. Unlike those who stayed in the Volga region and in other
settlement areas west of the Urals, Siberian Germans were never deported; Germans
were deported to Siberia but never from Siberia. The two main areas of southwest
Siberia where ethnic Germans settled are in Omsk Oblast and in Altay Kray (Figure
32). The first settlement in Omsk was established in 1893. By 1897, 3,315 Germans
lived in Omsk Oblast and by 1926, there were 205 German settlements in the Oblast,
with 34,617 settlers comprising 4.2% of the total population (Deutscher Nationaler
Rayon Asovo/Omsk ... 1996, 4).
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Figure 32. Early German Settlement Areas in Southwest Siberia.
Source:

Karte der ehernaligen und heutigen siedlungsgebiete der Deutschen in der
Sowjetunion (Stumpp 1962); Deutscher Nationaler Rayon Asovo/Omsk
(Bundesministerium des Innem 1996); Geographische Zeitschrift (Klilter
1993).
The oldest German settlement in Altay Kray was also established in 1893. By

the late 1920's, around the town of Halbstadt, there were 57 villages with 13,115
people, 96 percent of whom were Russian-Germans (Klaube and Kohler 1996, 6). In
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1927, the Soviets incorporated the villages and granted them Rayon status. Within the
Rayon, whose founders based its constitution on the Volga Republic's constitution,
German settlers had their own government representatives, and the German language
was given equal status with Russian in schools, commerce, etc. With the rise of
Hitler in the 1930's, the Rayon was dissolved in 1937 but Russian-Germans remained
in the area and were later joined by deportees arriving from other parts of the Soviet
Union during World War II (Klilter 1993; Stumpp 1993).
In southwest Siberia the per capita income of Russian-German villages was
two times higher than in neighboring Russian villages (Klilter 1993). By the 1980's,
it was not uncommon to find Russian-German farms with sizable houses decorated
with impressive flower gardens and having other amenities such as garages, saunas, a
refrigerator, piano, and stone shelters built for their privately-owned farm animals
(Kluter 1993; Stumpp 1993) (Figure 33).
In spite of their success of the past few decades, Russian-Germans continue to
immigrate to Germany. Russian politicians at all levels have tried to keep ''their"
Germans home by offering them incentives to stay, but because of many
complications, efforts thus far have not been very effective in slowing their migration.
From 1989 to the end of 1996, 1,301,131 Russian-Germans migrated to Germany
from Russia and the other countries of the newly formed Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), and hundreds-of thousands more are "sitting on packed
luggage" (Jach 1996, 33) comprising the largest contingent leaving the former Soviet
Union since the reform movement began in the mid-1980's (CIS conference on
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Figure 33. Russian-German Farmhouse in West Siberia (n.d.).
Source:

The German Russians (Stumpp 1993). Used with permission of the
American Historical Society of Germans from Russia.

refugees and migrants 1996). (Roughly half of all emigrants from Russia to non-CIS
countries since 1989 are ethnic Germans. Information is not available regarding the
ethnicity of emigrants leaving the other CIS countries) (International Organization for
Migration 1996, 91) (Tables 6 and 7).)
North-South Migration
Because of massive deportations between 1936 and 1952, a 1959 Soviet
census showed Russian-Germans scattered all over the Soviet Union, but after Soviet
citizens were allowed freedom of movement in 1955 many Russian-Germans who
had been deported to areas in northern Russia set out to join their families in
Kazakhstan and Central Asia and were actually encouraged to do so by the Soviet
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Table 6
Emigration From Russia to Non-CIS Countries, by Country
1989-1996 (thousand persons)
Country

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Germany

20,6

33,8

33,7

62,7

73,0

69,5

79,6

64,4

Israel

22,0

61,0

38,7

22,0

20,4

17,0

15,2

14,3

USA

0,7

2,3

11,0

13,2

14,9

13,8

10,7

12,3

Other

4,3

6,6

4,9

5,2

5,6

5,1

4,8

5,7

88,3 103,7 113,9 105,4 110,3

96,7

Total

47,6 103,7

Table 7
Emigration From Russia to Non-CIS Countries, by Ethnic Group
1993-1996 (percentage)
Ethnic Group

1993

1994

1995

1996

Germans

53.5

51.5

51.3

44.2

Jews

15.8

12.4

12.8

14.3

Russians

24.0

26.4

28.7

33.4

6.7

9.7

7.2

8.1

Others
Total Percent

100

100

100

100

Source: CIS Migration Report (1996). Used with permission of the Technical
Cooperation Centre for Europe and Central Asia, IOM
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government (Stumpp 1993).
Following Stalin's death in 1953, Nikita Khruschchev, the new communist
party chief, wanted to make agriculture more productive so he could move more of
the population from agriculture into the industrial sector. From 1953-1965 under
what was called the "Virgin and Idle Lands" policy millions of hectares of grazing
land in Kazakhstan, southwest Siberia, the Urals, the Volga region, and the north
Caucausus were to be cultivated for growing cereal crops (Olcott 1995, 227).
Khruschchev also wanted to see an increase in livestock production.

His plan

involved importing rural labor from other parts of the Soviet Union.

Russian

Germans were sought after as dependable workers to work in kolkhozes,
construction, etc. so it was not coincidence that Germans, as well as other Soviet
citizens detained in work camps, were finally granted freedom of movement in 1955
as Khruschchev put his plan in motion (Olcott 1995).

"Landless" Russians,

Ukrainians, and Belarussians were also encouraged to migrate to Kazakhstan and
Central Asia (Edwards 1993, 29).
Barely had the new settlers become established in Kazakhstan and Central
Asia however when the Soviets decided to discontinue development there.
Khruschchev' s plan to increase wheat production in the region rarely met its goal.
The Soviets could never supply enough machinery to harvest the grain and much of it
was left to rot in the fields.

Harsh weather conditions also contributed to the

problems the Soviets had in producing vast quantities of wheat in Kazakhstan. After
Khruschchev was removed from office in 1964, the Virgin and Idle Lands policy was
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halted and much of the land cultivated to grow cereal crops was returned to grassland
(Edwards 1993). The region fell into poverty and tensions began to escalate between
the native Islamic people and the settlers. In the early 1980' s, the number of people
living outside their "home republics" or "autonomous regions" was somewhere
between 54 and 65 million according to the United Nations (CIS conference on
refugees and migrants 1996, 3). Of these, 34 million were Russians, Ukrainians and
Belarussians living in the Republics. When the Soviet Union began to disintegrate,
these people suddenly found themselves "faced with an uncertain future" (CIS
conference on refugees and migrants 1996, 3) and the Slavs and others began to leave
in vast numbers, especially after the start of the Afghan War in 1979 (Kliiter 1993).
South-North Migration
Until the mid-1980's nearly all of the settlers who left Kazakhstan and Central
Asia returned to Russia, but Russian-Germans were only a small percentage of those
who migrated during this time.

In 1988, however, as pressure to leave Kazakhstan

and Central Asia intensified, many Russian-Germans also began to flee. Unlike other
Soviet citizens who had settled in the region, Russian-Germans had another option
than to return to Russia.

Exercising their right under Article 116, they could

immigrate to Germany if the Soviets would allow it.

Russian-Germans started

demanding the right to leave the Soviet Union and were at last given permission to
go. Through an arrangement between the Soviet and German governments, Germany
began evacuating Russian-Germans out of the Soviet Union.
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A "Renaissance" in the Volga
At the same time, Russian-Germans living in Russia established an
organization called Wiedergeburt (Renaissance) (Kliiter 1993; Malchow 1993). The
goal of the organization was to attract Russian-Germans leaving Kazakhstan and
Central Asia to the former Volga Republic (as an alternative to migration to
Germany) where around 45,000 Russian-Germans had already resettled after the
1960's. In April of 1990, 38 Volga German families also sent an appeal to the United
Nations asking for the UN's assistance in restoring their "long neglected rights as
human beings", and asked for assistance in "re-establishing a viable, German
speaking environment" where they could preserve their language and their culture
(Kloberdanz 1995, 277).
The Soviet government was willing to negotiate with Russian-Germans over a
gradual re-establishment of the Volga Republic but the German government then
intervened and tried to pressure the Soviet government into immediately re
establishing the Republic by arguing in terms of "compensating for injustices" done
to Russian-Germans (Kliiter 1993, 427). As was discussed in Chapter 3, their efforts
failed.

The Soviet government, negotiating directly with Russian-Germans, then

offered to allow the rebuilding of some of the old German villages in the former
Volga Republic that had been liquidated during World War II. Extensive plans were
made to rebuild villages, including villages that extended outside the former
Republic. According to the plan, the villages would eventually be granted the status
of Okrug (district) and later given Republic status. Russian-dominated villages would
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be excluded (Klliter 1993).
The German government rejected the plan, but did agree to finance the house
building project (Klliter 1993). The reason the German government was ineffective
in its negotiations for the gradual re-establishment of the Volga Republic was that
instead of sending Russian-speaking specialists experienced in negotiating in Soviet
related matters, the government put the Federal Administration Office (or Home
Office) in charge, which in tum established the Office for Ethnic German Inquiries
under the direction of Horst Waffenschmidt. Apparently, rather than going to the
foreign ministry to find diplomats experienced in negotiating with the Soviets,
Waffenschmidt hired the Verein fur das Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA)
(Organization for Germanism Abroad), an outside agency that was founded around
the tum of the century to provide ideological and cultural support for Germans living
outside Germany (Klliter 1993).

It is possible that Waffenschmidt tried to find

Russian-speaking specialists in the foreign ministry to help his newly formed agency,
but it must be considered that in 1989/90 Germany was itself in a state of emergency
due to events in Central and Eastern Europe and the subsequent Reunification of
Germany. Perhaps Russian specialists in the foreign ministry were too busy at the
time to concern themselves with building houses in the former Volga Republic for
Russian-Germans leaving Kazakhstan and the Central Asian Republics.
In any event, the VDA was given a huge budget to hire (German) contractors
to build houses for Russian-Germans arriving in the Volga region from the south.
The VDA started spending money wildly, not just in the Volga area, but wherever
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Russian-Germans lived, including in the Central Asian Republics, even though it was
evident the settlers would not stay there (Kliiter 1993). To make matters worse, the
VDA and its contractors calculated the cost to build the houses by Western standards.
Because the Ruble is worth much less than the Mark, houses that the VDA should
have paid contractors DM 15,000 to build, cost German taxpayers DM 220,000 each,
leaving DM 205,000 per house in profit for the VDA and the contractors who
exploited the organization (Kliiter 1993, 6).
Massive Evacuations From Kazakhstan and the Republics
In the meantime, pressure to leave the Republics intensified and German
migration from Kazakhstan and Central Asia to both Germany and to Russia began to
increase dramatically. Civil war in Tadikistan caused a strong-out-migration so that
today hardly any of the 32,000 known Russian-Germans counted in the 1989 Soviet
census remain there (Die Situation der Deutschen ... 1996). In 1988 conflicts also
erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Other former Soviet Republics such as
Georgia, Moldova, Uzbekistan and Kirgyzia have also had inner-ethnic conflicts
making Russian-Germans anxious about staying in these Republics (CIS conference
on refugees and migrants 1996).
Cultural and economic pressure to leave southern Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan was also intense. Then, when the Republics decided to replace the
Russian language with the national language (Kazakh, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tadjik or
Turkmen) as the official language and required all citizens to learn the new language,
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many more Russian-Germans decided they had had enough. They might as well go
to Germany and learn German (Malchow 1993). At the same time, the economic and
political situation in Russia had also reached the crisis stage so many Russian
Germans began to leave that country as well.

Consequently, from 1989 through

1991, 393,404 Russian-Germans left for Germany from the Soviet Union (Info-Dienst
1996).
The Alternative
Not wanting ''their" Germans to leave Russia, especially those living in West
Siberia (who the government depends on to provide much of the foodstuff for the
industrial cities in the rest of Siberia), the new Russian government negotiated with
its German settlers to re-establish the German National Rayon (GNR) around
Halbstadt in Altay Kray. The German government was not supportive of the Rayon
initiative just like it was not in favor of the gradual re-establishment of the Volga
Republic. In spite of the German government's lack of cooperation, on July 1, 1991,
Boris Yeltsin decreed the autonomous German National Rayon (incorporating sixteen
Russian-German villages around Halbstadt) as "experimentally' re-established with
the Rayon's seat of government headquartered in the town of Halbstadt. Within the
autonomous Rayon, encompassing 1,400 km2 , Russian-Germans once again have
their own elected officials, and the German language has been granted the same status
as Russian in schools, businesses, etc. (Klaube and Kohler 1996, 8).
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Germany's Policy Regarding German Settlements in Russia
Since the Early 1990's
As thousands of Russian-Germans continued to pour into Germany every
month and pressure was building to limit their migration to Germany, government
leaders in Germany began to take more interest in the Rayon concept. Through
negotiations with the Russian government and with the cooperation of Russian
German representatives it was decided that, for the economic benefit of both
countries, authorities would try to channel the migration of Russian-Germans living
in Kazakhstan and Central Asia to West Siberia to replace those who were
immigrating to Germany from that region. To entice would-be emigrants to West
Siberia, the plan included providing them with better living conditions by granting aid
for economic, social and cultural development both within the newly re-established
autonomous Rayon and in other traditional German settlement areas of West Siberia
(Kliiter 1993; Klaube and Kohler 1996).
In the early stages of the negotiations Germany's top priority was to provide
humanitarian assistance and cultural support for Russian-Germans, but the Russian
government would only agree to this if Germany was willing to invest in the economy
of the region. Since 1991, Germany has become the third most active investor in
Russia following the United States and Great Britain, but the policy of the German
government is to concentrate its investments in traditional German settlement areas
such as those in West Siberia, on the Volga, and more recently, around St. Petersburg,
and in Kaliningrad (formerly part of East Prussia) (Rexrodt in Moscow ... 1997).
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From 1990 through 1996 the German federal government spent over one
billion Marks on direct assistance for Russian-Germans in the CIS (Die Situation der
Deutschen ... 1996, 9) (Figure 34). In 1997 the German government plans to spend
another 140 million Marks to assist Russian-Germans in the CIS (Hilfen fiir
Spataussiedleren aus dem Bundeshaushalt 1996). The Russian government is also
contributing. In 1996, for instance, Russia pledged 103 billion Rubles for economic
development in West Siberia alone (Info-Dienst July 1996, 21).
The German government has stated that the development of German "center
of-gravity settlement areas" (siedlungsschwerpunkte) in Russia have a high symbolic
value for demonstrating to Russian-Germans in the CIS that they are not forgotten by
Germany (Info-Dienst March 1996, 20). The settlement areas in Russia have other
important functions too: (a) as regions for permanent German settlements in the
180.
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Russian Federation; (b) as "waiting stations", for example, in West Siberia where
over 100,000 Russian-Germans have been staying to see what develops in Russia; (c)
as transit center-of-gravity areas for immigration to Germany; (d) as places to give
Russian-Germans the opportunity to work together; (e) and as demonstration that
these projects benefit non-German neighbors in the region as well (Info-Dienst
March, 1996, 20) (writer's translation).
Ethnic German Migration to West Siberia Since 1989
Encompassing 675,000 km2 , West Siberia is about two times larger than
Germany. It is also one of the most prosperous regions in all Russia despite the
region's extreme climate. At approximately 50° to 58 ° north latitude, West Siberia's
temperatures range from -16° C to -20 ° C in the winter and from 18 ° C to 25° C in the
summer (which lasts for three weeks in the month of July) (Kliiter 1993, 131). The
1989 Soviet census reported there were 371,399 Russian-Germans in West Siberia;
134,199 in Omsk, 127,731 in Altay, 61,479 in Novosibirsk, 54,254 in Krasnoyarsk,
47,900 in Kemervo and 47,556 in Orenburg (Frick 1996). In 1995, the German
government estimated the population of Russian-Germans in West Siberia at 600,000
(an increase of 38 percent since 1989), many of whom are recent arrivals from
Kazakhstan and Central Asia (Info-Dienst Sept. 1995, 3). The influx of new arrivals
has caused tremendous stress on the infrastructure of the region and the Russian
government is having a difficult time keeping up with population growth in West
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Siberia.

The German government is helping by providing generous econorruc

assistance and credits for improvements to the infrastructure, to build new factories
and create new jobs, to build new houses, and to provide cultural support for Russian
Germans throughout West Siberia.
Halbstadt's Development - 1991 - 1996
The Halbstadt Rayon, located in Altay Kray was the first post-Soviet German
National Rayon (GNR) to be developed in West Siberia. The administrative, cultural
and economic center of Altay is Barnaul, located about 35 km from Halbstadt, the
center of the GNR. Altay Kray is three-fourths as large as Germany and borders on
the south with China and Mongolia, and on the west with Kazakhstan, and lies in a
geographic triangle between Omsk, Novosibirsk and Semipalatinsk (in northern
Kazakhstan) (Deutscher Nationaler Rayon im Altaj-Gebiet 1994, 6) (Figure 35).
Halbstadt Rayon will be celebrating its sixth anniversary as a "self-administrative
corporate body" (selbtsverwaltungkorperschaften) on July 1, 1997 (Klaube and
Kohler 1996; Die Situation der Deutschen ... 1996). According to Lew Korschonov,
governor of the Altay, there are now around 100,000 Russian-Germans in the Kray
with 20,700 living in the Rayon itself (Klaube and Kohler 1996, 8).
The Altay, dominated by agriculture, is primarily used to grow wheat, corn,
maize and sunflowers. Livestock grazing is also prevalent. Because the Altay is the
most important food supplier for the rest of Siberia, Korschonov says the local
government is anxious to see that Russian-Germans remain in the area (Klaube and
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Kohler 1996). The German government is also anxious to see Russian-Germans stay
where they are and between 1991 and 1995 invested 60 million Marks for the
economic and cultural development of the Halbstadt Rayon (Klaube and Kohler
1996), 12).
The first concern for the self-sufficiency of the Rayon was to privatize the
eleven collective farms around Halbstadt. By producing and marketing their own
goods within the Rayon, the region is now able to avoid the shortcomings of the past
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as government-controlled collective farms, such as shortages of goods, the failure of
suppliers to appear, and the failure of payments made to the farms. With new farm
equipment provided by economic aid, the new enterprises have now become
successful enough to be able to fmance their own economic and social infrastructure
by setting aside 15% of their profits from surplus goods sold each year.
In addition to helping the settlers become more self-sufficient and market
oriented by the privatization of collective farms, the German government also
provides all sorts of technical training which will help those looking for jobs in the
region, and will enable those who plan to immigrate to Germany to be better prepared
to fmd employment when they arrive there.

Germany has also invested in the

region's infrastructure by paving main roads, modernizing the telephone system, and
by creating a centralized water system in Halbstadt. Germany has also provided
funds for a new hospital complete with badly needed medical equipment and
supplies, and ambulances. A matter of special concern for the German government is
elderly Russian-Germans who were interned in work camps during World War II and
are ill as a result. The German government is trying to create places in every village
where they can receive care. It should be noted that not all citizens living in the
Rayon are Russian-Germans but it is the policy of the Rayon to allow others, not of
German descent, to also make use of the schools, library, hospital, and so on (Figure
36) (Klaube and Kohler 1996).
Halbstadt has also been endowed with a new building for the Rayon's
representative government in addition to trade agencies, commercial banks, churches,
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Figure 36. Recently Built Hospital and Nursing Home and New Catholic Church
for the Halbstadt Rayon. The new hospital, built with German assistance,
has been equipped with an urgently needed EKG appliance, sterilizer,
ultrasound equipment and other medical supplies (above). Churches,
such as the one shown (below), are also being built around Halbstadt.
Source:

Deutschen Nationaler Rayon irn Altaj-Gebiet (1996). Used with
permission of the Bundesministerium des Innem.
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kindergartens, schools, libraries and day-care centers equipped with cribs, toys, etc.
Hundreds of new houses have also been built around Halbstadt and many older
houses abandoned by emigrants that left for Germany have been modernized and
given to new arrivals from the south (Figure 37).
German investment has also provided for the construction of new factories or
the restoration of outdated factories and has provided new machinery (Figure 38).
Germany is also helping to solve the logistical problems of moving commercial
goods. In Barnaul, for instance, a new assembly plant is being built to install
equipment in trucks to transport easily spoiled and breakable items.
The German government's motto regarding entrepreneurs looking for low
interest loans is "help for those who help themselves (Klaube and Kohler 1996, 12)
(writer's translation)." If one wants to open a bakery, restaurant, butcher shop, retail
shop, or whatever, the funds are available. Several privately-owned and collective
type businesses have already been formed in the GNR (Figure 39).
The Asovo/Omsk District: Another "Experimental" Rayon
In a referendum in October 1991, 82.7% of the people voted for the
establishment of another "experimental" Rayon in the Asovo/Omsk district of Omsk
Oblast incorporating 103 German villages where today over 120,000 Russian
Germans live.

Local citizens call the Rayon "the Island of Hope (Deutscher

Nationaler Rayon Asowo/Omsk... 1996, 2) (writer's translation)."
Omsk Oblast, as in Kray Altay, produces wheat, potatoes and other
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Figure 37. New Housing for Russian-Germans in the Halbstadt Rayon. German
assistance provides for new housing for Russian-Germans (or remodeled
housing), such as those shown in the photographs, built around the
Halbstadt Rayon and in the Asovo/Omsk Rayon to house new arrivals
from Kazakhstan and the Central Asian Republics.
Source:

Deutscher Nationaler Rayon Halbstadt nach filnf Jahren (Klaube and
Kohler 1996); Deutscher Nationaler Rayon im Altaj-Gebiet (1994).
(1994). Used with permission of the Bundesministerium des Innern.
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Figure 38. Dairy Equipment Provided with German Assistance. With financial
assistance from Germany the Halbstadt Rayon receives new farm
equipment and machinery such as the dairy equipment shown here.
With the new equipment and forty employees, the dairy in the town of
Grischkowka now produces around 30 tons of milk, 30 tons of butter
and 60 tons of cheese per month which is sold around the Halbstadt
Rayon.
Source:

Deutscher Nationaler Rayon Halbstadt nach filnf Jahren (Klaube and
Kohler 1996). Used with permission of the Bundesministerium des
Innem, Bonn.

agricultural products, but the Oblast is also an important industrial center, particularly
the city of Omsk. Omsk, along with Kemorovo (also in West Siberia), are two of the
most important chemical industrial cities in West Siberia.

These two cities also

contain 60-80% of West Siberia's military-industrial complexes. Oil and coal are
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Figure 39. Privately-owned Shop in the Halbstadt Rayon. With German assistance
one Russian-German entrepreneur opened this shop in the Halbstadt
Rayon in 1993. The shop sells shoes, clothing, videocassettes, chocolates,
etc. There are now four privately owned shops and three collective
businesses in the Halbstadt Rayon. The owner of this shop worries about
the new competition.
Source:

Deutscher Nationaler Rayon im Altaj-Gebiet in der Russischen
Foderation (1994). Used with permission of the Bundesministerium
des Innern, Bonn.

also important commodities in the region and there are several oil refineries in or near
Omsk (Kliiter 1993).
Unfortunately, West Siberia's industrial cities are very polluted as they are
throughout the former Soviet Union. One of the priorities therefore is to make the
region a healthier and more attractive place to live by installing a new water system
for the Rayon and modernizing factories, etc. Much still needs to be done however
and at exorbitant cost.

148
In addition to assisting with environmental clean up, Germany has invested in
the region's infrastructure similarly to the way it has in the Halbstadt Rayon by
providing funding in the form of credits to the Russian government or by private
sources to pave roads, modernize the telephone system, construct administrative
buildings, trade agencies, commercial banks, schools, a post office, etc.

Other

development projects around Asovo/Omsk include the building of new factories such
as a new baby food plant for the production of dry cereal and fruit juices.

A

manufacturing plant for the production of cellulose-hygiene articles for women,
hospitals, and pharmacies is also being built in Asovo as well as houseware, playtoy
and auto accessory plants. New houses are also being built all around the Omsk
Oblast and "Container Siedlungen" (container dwellings) (small metal housing units
furnished with bunk beds) have been brought in to use as temporary shelters for new
arrivals (Deutscher Nationaler Rayon Asovo/Omsk ... 1996, 8). German assistance is
also providing for job retraining, technical support, etc.
Because it is important to Russian-Germans that they retain their cultural and
linguistic identity with Germany, the German government has also built many
cultural centers (Klubhauser) not just within the Rayons, but all over the CIS where
Russian-Germans live. Figure 40 shows the cities and towns around which most
cultural centers are located in the former Soviet Union. The centers provide a place
where Russian-Germans can go to view German television programs via satellite TV,
read German books, learn the German language, and attend cultural activities. For
those who wish to immigrate to Germany, the cultural centers also provide the six-
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month language courses that Russian-Germans must take (if needed) prior to taking
the language test required for exit-visas.
The VDA's New Role
The VDA has a role, albeit a more traditional role, by assisting the German
government with the promotion of the German language and the organization of
cultural activities in the centers (Figures 41-42).

According to correspondence

received from Hans Frick at the VDA's headquarters in St. Augustin, Germany, since
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1990/91, the agency has been assigned to a series of projects for the cultural benefit
of Russian-Germans. Two projects specifically noted by Herr Frick in his letter are

"Sprachassisten" (Language Assistance) and "Jungjournalisten" (Young Journalists)
(Frick 1996) (writer's translation). Language assistance involves teaching German to
anyone who needs or wants it. Many of those arriving from Kazakhstan and Central
Asia, although they are mostly of German "sturdiness", have assimilated into other
societies that no longer required them to speak the mother tongue (Klaube and
Kohler 1996, 18). Although they are willing to learn or relearn the German language,
they need to be encouraged to do so.

Cultural centers create the environment

Figure 41. Folk Dancing at a German Cultural Center in West Siberia. Cultural
event for Russian-Germans at a German cultural center in the Halbstadt
Rayon in West Siberia.
Source:

Deutschen Nationaler Rayon im Altaj-Gebiet in der Russischen
Foderation (1994). Used with permission of the Bundesministerium des
Innem, Bonn.
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Figure 42. Elderly Russian-Germans Feasting at a German Cultural Center in West
Siberia. These women, recent arrivals from Kazakhstan and Central Asia,
still cling to the old traditions.
Source:

Deutscher Nationaler Rayon Halbstadt nach filnf Jahren (Klaube and
Kohler (1996). Used with permission of the Bundesministerium des
Innem, Bonn.

and therefore the incentive for learning the language (Figure 43).
The VDA's "Young Journalist" program is a pen-pal program designed to link
Russian-German children with youngsters in Germany via letter writing. With the
cooperation of young people in Germany, the program's aim is to help young
Russian-Germans improve their writing style and organization skills (Frick 1996).
The German government says language testing is crucial for those who want
to immigrate to Germany and plans to spend even more of its budget in 1997 to assist
Russian-Germans in the CIS with language training. Some officials have suggested
that a reward system should be established for students of the German language with
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Figure 43. Russian-Germans Studying at Cultural Centers in West Siberia
German cultural centers, such as the ones shown here, provide a
place for would-be emigrants to learn the German language, receive
job training and learn about the German culture before leaving for
Germany.
Source:

Deutscher Nationaler Rayon nach filnf Jahren (Klaube and Kohler 1996).
Used with permission by the Bundesministerium des Innern, Bonn.
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the guiding principle that as the German language ability improves, all the more
sooner will one be bestowed with reception information for resettlement in Germany.
The German government says that would-be emigrants must realize language
knowledge is an essential element for successful integration in Germany. For those
tragic cases involving the ill or infirm, the German government plans to have mobile
language testing all around the CIS to reach those who cannot come to the centers for
testing (Info-Dienst March 1996).
"Action 1000 Partnerships"
The government states that the crisis in West Siberia has not yet reached its
high point, but indicates it will soon be over.

There have already been many

improvements in the region. But there are still many problems that need to be
overcome. The biggest problem around West Siberia now is the rapid growth and the
fluctuations in the number of people. By 1993, in Halbstadt alone, over 500 new
houses were built, but because so many are now arriving from Kazakhstan and
Central Asia, there is still a housing shortage. There is also a job shortage. The
German National Rayons are also attracting many non-Germans, further adding to the
strain on the infrastructure, job market and the housing situation (Klaube and Kohler
1996).
To encourage more investment m German settlement areas, the German
government initiated a plan in 1996 called "Action 1000 Partnerships." In a press
release issued by The Office for Ethnic German Inquiries (der Bundesregierung fur
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Aussiedlerfragen) in March 1996, several examples of Russian-German partnerships
were listed with the motto "Gute Beispiele konnen Schule machen" ("good examples
school proficiency") (Info-Dienst March 1996, 22-23) (writer's translation). These
are a few of the examples noted: (a) Business partnerships Uoint-ventures) between
German businesses and Russian partners such as in construction and environmental
clean-up; (b) school partnerships between Germany and Russia; (c) partnerships
between youth organizations in both countries; (d) partnership building organizations
like the Rotary Club of Germany with the Rotary Club of Russia; (e) partnership of
Russian-Germans in Germany with the German Rayons in West Siberia; (f)
partnership between the German Red Cross and the Russian Red Cross; and (g)
partnerships between churches such as the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Hanover
with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Omsk.
Kaliningrad Oblast: Maybe Not Such a Good Idea
Since the early 1990's the German government has also been encouraging
Russian-Germans to resettle in the Kaliningrad Oblast which is located on the Baltic
Sea in an area that is separated from the rest of the Russian Federation (Figure 44).
The Russian government is reluctant about German settlement in the Kaliningrad
Oblast, however, because currently Kaliningrad provides the only port, other than the
one at St. Petersburg, that allows access to the Baltic Sea for the Russian navy and
merchant fleet. Germany, along with Lithuania and Poland, could conceivably
"lay claim" to the Kaliningrad Oblast (Russian Observer... 1997, 1).

Lithuanian
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MapInfo 1997.

nationalists already consider the Oblast to be Lithuanian territory even though the
majority of it never belonged to the country. According to OMRI, a Russian news
service, Lithuania recently informed NATO that the country "should demand the
withdrawal of Russian troops from the Oblast and initiate preparations to integrate the
region into Lithuania while supporting ethnic Lithuanians and granting them
Lithuanian citizenship (Russian Observer. .. 1997, 1)." The Lithuanian government
has also suggested they would like to turn the Oblast into an independent state called
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"Borussia (Russian Observer... 1997, 1)."
Meanwhile, Germany is encouraging Russian-Germans from other parts of the
former Soviet Union to resettle in the Oblast. Much of Kaliningrad was once part of
East Prussia but became part of the Soviet Union after World War II.
The German government's argument for being in the area, besides the fact
that it was once part of Germany, is that there are already ethnic Germans living there
who are desperate and in urgent need of help. The German government reports it has
been providing humanitarian aid and seedlings for family farms in the Kaliningrad
area (Die Situation der Deutschen... 1996). OMRI, on the other hand, more recently
reported that Germany is now the second largest investor following Poland and is
buying a lot of real estate in the Oblast (Russian Observer... 1997, 1) (Figure 45).
Three new commercial ports are under construction in Leningrad Oblast
(north of Kaliningrad) as part of Russia's effort to reduce dependence on ports in
neighboring Baltic countries such as in Kaliningrad Oblast.

The first new port,

located at Batereinaya Bay 47 miles from St. Petersburg on the Gulf of Finland, will
begin operation at the end of 1998. Two other ports being developed in the region
will be at Ust-Luga (78 miles southwest of St. Petersburg) and Primorsk (70 miles
northwest of St. Petersburg) (Brennan 1997, 4).
St. Petersburg/Leningrad: A "Model Center" for Ethnic Germans
The German government is also encouraging would-be emigrants to settle in
the St. Petersburg area where Russian-Germans have historic ties dating back to the
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Figure 45. New German-Russian Cultural Center on the Outskirts ofK.aliningrad.
The center provides a place to learn the German language as well as
computer courses. The Kaliningrad center, which also presents German
films, dance groups, a chorus, etc. is open to all local citizens, not just
ethnic Germans.
Source:

Programm zu Unterstutzung der deutschen Minderheit in Ru.Bland. Used
with permission of the Bundesministerium des Innern, Bonn.

seventeenth century when they were invited there by Peter the Great. The project to
relocate more Russian-Germans in St. Petersburg and to promote their acceptance in
the community is being managed by the newly formed "Russian-German
Commission" which is comprised of representatives of the Russian Ministry for
Nationality Inquires, regional politicians of the administrative districts of Leningrad
and the city of St. Petersburg, Russian-German representatives, the state government
of Baden-Wilrttemburg and the German federal government (Die Situation der
Deutschen ... 1996, 12).
A German cultural center has been established m a "fossil" church to
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accommodate new arrivals from other parts of the CIS (Programm zur Unterstiltzung
... n.d.) (Figure 46). To convey the idea of a community effort in the area around St.
Petersburg, both Germans and non-Germans are welcomed at the center where people
can learn the German language, attend theater and dance events, watch movies, etc.
The center also provides clubs for young people and offer concerts and other leisure
time activities for teenagers. The Commission hopes the center in St. Petersburg will
become a "model center" for the cultural development of Russian-Germans by
promoting the co-existence of Germans and non-Germans in the area (Die Situation
der Deutschen... 1996, 12; Programm zur Unterstiltzung ... n.d.).
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Figure 46. German Cultural Center in St. Petersburg. Located in downtown St.
Petersburg, this "fossil" church was used to house an indoor swimming
pool during the communist era but has recently been converted to a
German cultural center made possible by a joint effort between the
German and Russian governments.
Source:

Programm zu Unterstiltzung der deutschen Minderheit in Ru.Bland (n.d.).
Used with permission of the Bundesministerium des Innern, Bonn.
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A New Town for Russian-Germans
Another area of Russia where Germany has more recently agreed to provide
extensive aid for the creation of a Russian-German community is around the city of
Bryansk, located near Russia's western border southwest of Moscow.

The city,

which already has an international airport, could become an important transportation
hub for moving freight. The German government has agreed to provide credits for
building an entire town to house 5,000 - 10,000 Russian-Germans who would
probably go into farming or industrial work in the Bryansk area.

One possible

location for the German settlement is the town of Unecha which has an abandoned
factory site that may become an assembly plant for Philips TV sets. Other plans in
the area include a possible Mercedes-jeep assembly factory, and possible investment
by the German government for modernizing a well-known horse-breeding farm so it
can better compete with horse farms in other countries (Bykovsky 1997).
A Homeland on the Volga: A Long Way Off
Alas, in 1992 the German government finally aligned itself with the Russian
government on the gradual re-establishment of the Volga Republic (Klilter 1993).
The Volga region is now the largest recipient of German assistance in the Russian
Federation.

A "step-by-step" restoration of the Volga Republic agreement was

reached on March 23, 1993, although with "mixed feelings", this time on the Russian
side. An April 2, 1996 press release from the Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI) in
Bonn, stated that there are now around 200,000 Russian-Germans living in the Volga
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region.

The governor of the region has asked Germany to continue providing

assistance to further the economic development in the newly established Russian
German communities to which the German government responded by allocating 14
million Marks in 1996 for the purpose of building new cultural centers, promoting the
German language and for job retraining (Info-Dienst April 1996, 8). New churches
are also being built in Saratov, made possible by a joint effort between the
Evangelical churches of Berlin, Brandenburg, and the German federal government
(Info-Dienst April 1996).
Russian-Germans: Still on the Move
According to estimates reported by the German government in April 1996
there could be as many as two million ethnic Germans still living in the former Soviet
Union. Around 900,000 Russian-Germans were estimated to be living in the Russian
Federation, (650,000 in West Siberia and 200,000 in the Volga region). Another
650,000 were reported to be living in Kazakhstan (Die Situation der Deutschen .. _.
1996). The Soviet census reported there were 2,038,603 living in the former Soviet
Union in 1989.

Between 1989 and the end of 1996 1,391,131 Russian-Germans

migrated from the former Soviet Union to Germany. If the 1989 census were correct,
there should only be around 636,000 left in the former Soviet Union, yet the German
government estimates there could be as many as two million (Table 8).
It is next to impossible to determine the exact number of Russian-Germans
and their whereabouts in the former Soviet Union at this time. First, more Russian-
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Table 8
Estimated Population of Russian-Germans in the Former Soviet Union - 1996

Country of Origin

1989 Soviet Census

1996 Estimate by the
German Government

Kazakstan

957,518

650,000

Russian Federation

842,295

900,000

Kirgyzia

101,309

30,000

Uzbekistan

39,809

40,000

Ukraine

37,849

40,000

Tadzhikistan

32,671

Unavailable
9,000

Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania)

9,307

Moldova

7,335

Unavailable

Turkmenistan

4,434

Unavailable

Belarus

3,517

Unavailable

Georgia

1,546

2,000

Azerbaijan

748

Unavailable

Armenia

265

Unavailable

2,038,603

1,671,000

Arrived in Germany from the Former Soviet Union 1989-1996 - 1,391,131

Source: Die Situation der Deutschen in den Staaten Ostmittel-Ost- und Siido
osteuropas (Bundesregierung fur Aussiedlerfragen 1996).
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Germans are "coming to their nationality" each month, so the number continues to
rise (Die Situation der Deutschen ... 1996, 9) (writer's translation).

For example,

if an ethnic German woman married a non-German man, chances are they would
have registered their children as non-Germans in the 1989 Soviet census. If the
family should decide to immigrate to Germany, the wife could simply change the
ethnic status of her children and register them with the immigration office as ethnic
Germans if she can prove her German ethnicity. As a spouse of an ethnic German,
her husband also becomes eligible for immigration to Germany. Therefore, what was
counted as one ethnic German (the wife) in the 1989 census, suddenly becomes three
or four or five or six ethnic Germans, depending on the number of children in the
family. According to German law, grandchildren would also be considered eligible
but because of revisions to the immigration law in Germany in December 1992, only
those born before January 1, 1993 would now be able to immigrate to Germany and
receive entitlements as ethnic Germans.
Another reason it is not easy to determine the exact number of Russian
Germans still in the CIS and their whereabouts is that the migration is still ongoing.
Most Russian-Germans who were living in Tadikistan, Turkmenistan, and some of
the other Central Asian Republics have already gone to Germany or have migrated
north to Kazakhstan, or the Russian Federation. For example, according to the 1989
Soviet census there were 39,809 Russian-Germans living in Uzbekistan (Frick 1996).
Between 1989 and the end of 1996 around 32,000 Russian-Germans migrated to
Germany from Uzbekistan (Info-Dienst August 1996; Jahrestatistik Aussiedler 1996)
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which would, in theory, leave a balance of roughly 7,800 in the republic (although it
is not known how many of the remaining 7,800 original Uzbek Russian-Germans
may have migrated to Russia since 1989). The 1996 estimate places the number of
Russian-Germans still in Uzbekistan at 40,000 which means that some might be
recent arrivals from the other republics, or those who decided to reveal their German
ethnicity since the 1989 Soviet census (Table 9 and Figure 47).
Similarly, the 1989 Soviet census reported 957,518 Russian-Germans living in
Kazakhstan (Frick 1996). Between 1992-1996, 558,460 Russian-Germans migrated
to Germany from Kazakhstan (Info-Dienst 1996; Jahrstatistik Aussiedler 1996). The
number of Russian-German migrants from Kazakhstan to Germany from 1989-1991
is not available, although it can be assumed that Kazakh Russian-Germans made up a
good share of the 393,404 arrivals in Germany from the Soviet Union during those
years also. At least 100,000 (probably more) of Kazakhstan's Russian-Germans have
also migrated to Russia. This would mean that nearly all of those counted in the 1989
census have already left Kazakhstan, yet it was reported in 1996 that there are still an
estimated 650,000 Russian-Germans in Kazakhstan which again can be attributed to
the rise in those claiming German ethnicity, and attributed to the arrival ofRussian
Germans migrating from the Central Asian Republics.
The Future for Ethnic Germans in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
The new Kazakh government, like the Russian government, has stated time
and again that they wish "their" Germans would stay. Kazakh officials admit that the
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Table 9
Ethnic German Population in Kazakhstan According to the 1989 Soviet Census

City

Tselinograd (today Aqmola)

1989 Soviet Census

),stt,,

>1{\

123,694

Karaganda

123,299

Kustanay

110,397

Pavlodar

95,342

Kokchetav

81,985

Dzhambul

70,150

Alma-Ata

61,277

Chimkent

44,526

Semipalatinsk

44,113

Other

202,735
957,518

Source: Verein :fiir <las Deutschtum im Ausland (Personal correspondence from
Hans Frick 1996).
mass departure of Russian-Germans would be a considerable loss for the economy of
the country (Die Situation der Deutschen ... 1996). Germany's policy regarding
Kazakhstan's Russian-Germans, until the early 1990's, was to assist all those who
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RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Omsk

• Saratov

•

•Novosibirs
Halbstadt

Orenburg

KAZAKHSTAN

ola

tlmi,atatinsk

KAZAKHSTAN

Ethnic Germans
.124,000

IRAQ

IRAN

•

88,000

•

44,000

Figure 47. Cities in Kazakhstan With Substantial Ethnic German Population
(According to the 1989 Soviet Census).
Source:

Verein filr <las Deutschtum im Ausland (Personal correspondence
from Hans Frick 1996).

wished to immigrate to Germany. But since the mid-1990's German and Kazakh
officials have been working together to try to encourage Russian-Germans to stay
where they are. The two countries formed the "Germany-Kazakhstan Government
Commission" that has met yearly to negotiate on how to improve the economic,
social, and cultural situation of Russian-Germans in Kazakhstan (Die Situation der
Deutschen... 1996, 13). The German government has agreed to finance projects in
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the country such as oil extraction plants. German is also providing funding to build
granaries, dairies, slaughter houses, butcher shops, bakeries, etc. throughout the
northern region of Kazakhstan, especially in the territories of Kustanay, North
Kazakhstan, Pavlodar and Sernipalat insk where large numbers of Russian-Germans
live. In addition, the German government has offered an extensive humanitarian aid
package to Kazakhstan concentrating on building hospitals, supplying medical
equipment and instruments, and providing medical assistance for elderly and sick
people who were interned in work camps during World War II. Several cultural
centers have also been established in Russian-German settlement areas.
In exchange for assistance from the German -government, the Kazakh
government has pledged to support the economic and cultural development of the
country's ethnic German population and has assured them of their right to retain their
cultural identity as ethnic Germans.

The agreement also contains the right for

Kazkkhstan's Russian-Germans who have already migrated to Germany to return to
Kazakhstan if they want to. German business leaders were also present at the signing
of the agreement. Kazakhstan's president said at the meeting that he hopes German
businesses will be active in the region (Germany Kazakhstan Sign Agreement. ..
1996).
Despite efforts to keep them from leaving the country, Russian-Germans
continue to leave Kazakhstan by the tens of thousands. First, Kazakhstan's Russian
Germans, as with other ethnic Germans, are being pulled to Germany by relatives and
friends who have already settled there.

167
There are also several push factors.

Many Russian-Germans are leaving

Kazakhstan because they were forced to go there during the Stalin era. Once they
were given permission to go to Germany in the late 1980's, the natural inclination for
many was to flee the region.
Kazakhstan's rise in self-determination as an Islamic nation since the late
1980's has also been a factor contributing to Russian-German emigration from the
country. Adding to the tension in the region is that there is high unemployment and
inflation. Since Kazakhstan gained economic independence from the Soviet Union
many of its industries, which were linked to industries in other parts of the Soviet
Union, are no longer functional. In 1989, the country had inherited a "decaying but
powerful" industrial and manufacturing base (Olcott 1995, 272).

Decaying because

most industry was not geared toward the manufacturing of commercial goods but
rather toward the Soviet military. The country produced phosphate, rolled metal,
radio cables, aircraft wiring, etc. Kazakhstan also had 50 military installations that
produced nuclear reactor fuel, uranium ore, heavy machine guns, anti-ship missiles,
torpedoes, biologic weapons, intercontinental ballistic missile support equipment,
tactical missile launchers, artillery and armored vehicles for the Soviet military
(Olcott 1995, 272).
The new Kazakh government is receptive to capitalism and has been actively
seeking investors to start up new industries but all of this takes time.

Western

investors have found it very difficult to get established in the region and are nervous
about investing in a country that is economically unstable. In the meantime many
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people remain unemployed.
Another reason many Russian-Germans are anxious to leave Kazakhstan is
because Semipalatinsk Oblast (in northern Kazakhstan) where many Russian
Germans and other minorities were resettled during the Stalin era, is plagued with
severe environmental problems.

The Oblast was victimized by the Soviets who

frequently used the area as a nuclear test site. In all, nearly 500 nuclear tests occurred
there between 1949 and 1989 ( 116 explosions in the atmosphere, the rest
underground)

(Edwards 1993, 36; Escalona 1992).

Scientists report that many

people living near the test site have developed weaker immune systems, referred to as
"Semipalatinsk AIDS (Escalona 1992, 43)." High rates of cancerous tumors and
leukemia, neuro-psychological disorders, impotency and other health problems have
also been found in persons subjected to high doses of radiation poisoning in the
region.

There has also been a 150 percent increase in birth defects in villages

downwind from the test sites. "The people were rabbits for experiments" the new
Ecology Minister of Kazakhstan was quoted as saying. "It was a crime, ... it was
facism (Edwards 1993, 36)."
Close to 500,000 people are believed to have been directly exposed to
radiation poisoning before the testing was stopped in 1989 (Escalona 1992, 43).
Another 100,000 have already died of radiation induced cancers.

Altay Kray,

downwind from the Semipalatinsk test site just over the border in West Siberia, has
also been badly affected (Escalona 1992, 43; CIS conference on refugees and
migrants 1996).
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Russian-German migration to Germany from Uzbekistan also remains strong
with about 4,000 leaving per year, the result of also having been forcefully deported
there in earlier decades, and the result of the rise in nationalism and ethnic conflict.
The politics of the German government have been oriented, as elsewhere in
the CIS since the mid-l 990's, on the principle of encouraging Russian-Germans to
stay in Uzbekistan. As a result of a series of meetings between the German and
Uzbek governments in 1991-1993, Russian-Germans in Uzbekistan have been
provided with a large humanitarian aid package. In 1996, another agreement was
reached between the two governments for the establishment of four German cultural
centers in Uzbekistan.

The Uzbek government has also agreed to allow Uzbek

Russian-Germans who have already left the country to return if they so desire (Die
Situation der Deutschen ... 1996).
Black Sea Germans Return to the Ukraine
German officials are also negotiating with the Ukrainian government to
resettle Germans, who were deported from the area in 1941, around Odessa in the
Black Sea region. There are presently around 40,000 ethnic Germans living in the
Ukraine.

To date, the German government has provided humanitarian assistance,

cultural facilities, and housing.

German assistance has also provided for

improvements in the electric, gas and water systems of this traditional ethnic German
settlement area (Die Situation der Deutschen ... 1996, 14).

170
'Russian-Germans Threaten to Flee the Former Soviet Union
Whether or not the re-establishment of German National Rayons will be
successful in keeping Russian-Germans in Russia in the long-term is unclear. Both
the German and Russian governments have a "wait and see" attitude. Some Russian
Germans might be content to stay in Russia if they could be assured of economic,
cultural and religious freedom. Others have no desire to leave, but around 700,000
Russian-Germans still in Russia are already on the wait list for immigration to
Germany. Distrust of the government, the struggling Russian economy, the lack of
jobs and housing, polluted air and water, extremely cold temperatures in West
Siberia, and family ties in Germany are just some of the reasons Russian-Germans are
anxious to leave. Many Russian-Germans who have returned to the Volga region
believe their autonomous Republic will never become re-established and are also
losing their patience. Others, fearful that if they do not go to Germany now, they may
not be able to in the future. The political situation in Germany could change if
Lafontaine and his allies in the SPD take power.

The radical SPD faction has

repeatedly called for limitations on the number of Russian-Germans coming to
Germany and if they come to power, the door to Germany for Russian-Germans
might be slammed shut.
In a discussion in Germany between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Russian
Germans following the enactment of the Place of Residence Allocation Law in March
1996, Kohl was asked about the possibility that Germany may limit the number of
Russian-Germans arriving in Germany.

Kohl "unambiguously" stated that he is
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against imposing limits on Russian-German immigration in spite of pressure to do so.
Russian-Germans at the meeting stated that they would flee the CIS if they get the
impression the door to Germany will close (Info-Dienst April 1996, 8).

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
In 1949, partly a result of German nationalism and partly out of concern for
former German nationals and other German-speaking people detained in Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union, the West German government made a promise
to ethnic Germans and their descendants. The government promised that they would
be granted automatic citizenship in Germany upon request should the day come when
they would be allowed to leave the countries in which they were being held. For
decades ethnic Germans have trusted that Germany would honor its commitment.
The West German government made its promise under Article 116 of the
country's post-war constitution because it felt obligated to help millions of former
German nationals and other German-speaking people trapped in Central Europe who
were suffering as a result of their German heritage. The right to citizenship was also
extended to Russian-Germans, not so much because of their Germaneness as with
those from Central Europe, but for other reasons. Some Russian-Germans managed to
flee to Germany during World War II. They were granted German citizenship during
the war but were later rounded up by the Soviets and shipped back to the Soviet
Union where they were held against their will. The German government maintained
172
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that they were German citizens and therefore included the right for them to return to
Germany under Article 116 as well. For humanitarian reasons the West German
government also extended the right to German citizenship to all Russian-Germans
and their descendants and not just to those who were granted German citizenship
during the war.
Many Russian-Germans, especially the older generation who remember the
horrors of the Stalin days, are adamant about leaving the newly formed countries
emerging from the ruins of the former Soviet Union because they distrust their
governments and cannot forgive the way they were treated by the Soviets. Russian
Germans are descendants of Germans who migrated to Russia in the seventeenth
century because they were invited to do so and because they were fleeing oppression
in Germany at the time. They became very successful and contributed greatly to the
increase in agricultural production, which in turn made it possible for more citizens to
enter the industrial sector of the economy. The settlers were quiet, hard-working
people who just wanted to live in peace in their new homeland, but their success led
many Russians to be jealous and suspicious of them. The rise of nationalism in
Germany prior to World War I was further justification for the Russian government to
treat its German settlers with contempt. It was during this time that some Russian
Germans fled Russia and settled in the New World but the majority chose to stay,
thinking they could prove their loyalty to their adopted homeland.
The situation continued to worsen for Russian-Germans who opted not to
leave Russia. They were accused of treason during World War I and again during
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World War II although it has never been proven that they were disloyal. Perhaps if
they had assimilated into Russian society rather than retain their cultural identity with
Germany, the situation would have turned out differently. But early Soviet policy
encouraged minorities to retain their ethnic ties until the Stalin era when, one by one,
their rights were revoked.
Eventually the settlers lost everything for which they had worked. They were
uprooted from their homes and deported to concentration camps in isolated regions
where they were forced to remain for a decade after World War II ended. Although
they were finally allowed (conditional) freedom of movement within the Soviet
Union, the majority were forced to remain against their will until the Soviet Union
began to collapse in the late 1980's when they were at last granted the right to freely
emigrate.
Gorbachev's policies of Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (reconstruction)
in the mid-l 980's gave Russian-Germans, as well as millions of other Soviet citizens,
a chance to air their grievances without fear of reprisal. The Soviets also began to
relax their strict emigration policies.

Some Russian-Germans demanded the re

establishment of the Volga Republic and, exercising their new right to emigrate,
threatened to leave the Soviet Union if their demands were not met.

The West

German government intervened on their behalf but was unsuccessful in persuading
the Soviets to re-establish the former Republic.

As nationalism and self

determination reverberated throughout the Soviet Union, old grievances erupted into
all-out conflict in some areas.

The situation was extremely tense, especially in
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southern Russia, Kazakhstan, and throughout Central Asia.

Fearing the situation

might worsen, and fearing the Soviets might change their minds and not let them go,
many Russian-Germans began applying for emigration visas setting off a chain
reaction of migrants to West Germany.
At the same time, countries m Central Europe were having their own
democratic revolutions and by November 1989 West Germans were suddenly faced
with the daunting task of absorbing the former DDR and its millions of citizens. With
the opening of borders by Germany's neighbors to the east, ethnic Germans and
asylum seekers from all over Central Europe also began arriving in West Germany by
the hundreds of thousands.
The collapse of the Berlin Wall, which signified the end of the communist era
in Europe and the end of a divided Germany, was a very emotional time for most
German citizens.

The whole country was caught up in the euphoria of a united

Germany and the idea that the German people could all come together again under the
Federal Republic, including not just East Germans but also ethnic Germans who had
lived behind the Iron Curtain for decades.
For many years o
f llowing World War II, Article 116 proved beneficial both to
West Germany and to ethnic Germans who managed to flee Central Europe and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War days, and, as one in four Germans can claim
ethnicity in Central or Eastern Europe, it was an issue of conscience to assist those
who had been left behind. But public opinion quickly changed when the realization
set in as to the exorbitant cost of Reunification and the difficult challenge for
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Germany in the years ahead. The country now had 16.5 million East Germans to
integrate into the West German economy.

Consequently, the arrival of ethnic

Germans was suddenly viewed by many as a liability, especially since it seemed there
was no end in sight to the number of ethnic Germans (particularly Russian-Germans)
who might come to Germany.

Under extreme political pressure, the government

took measures to slow the migration of ethnic Germans to Germany by introducing a
series of new immigration restrictions. The country was not trying to stop the flow of
migration altogether; after all, Germany had made a promise to ethnic Germans to let
them come to Germany. But out of economic and political necessity, the migration to
Germany had to be made manageable.
Until the Ethnic Germans Admissions Act of July 1990 was implemented the
majority of ethnic German immigrants arriving in Germany came from Central
Europe, but after the new law came into effect the migration shifted and more began
arriving from the o
f rmer Soviet Union. This is because the new law made it more
difficult for Polish-Germans, and others from Central Europe who could easily come
over the border to Germany, by requiring that they stay in their countries of origin
while their applications are being processed rather than come to Germany as tourists
(or coming illegally) and then applying for citizenship. The government also worked
out a deal with Poland to keep Polish-Germans there by offering a hefty financial
assistance package to Poland and by offering Polish-Germans dual citizenship.
Germany's leaders also hoped to persuade some Russian-Germans to stay in
the Soviet Union by offering them financial assistance and humanitarian aid and by
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intervening in their behalf to re-establish their homeland in the former Volga
Republic.

Some critics suggest Germany did not act quickly enough to assist

Russian-Germans and that if the government had been successful in negotiating with
the Soviets in the early stages, there would not be so many Russian-Germans coming
to Germany today. However, the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern
Europe took government leaders by surprise and officials were bogged down with
many serious issues and not just the migration of ethnic Germans.
Even though the Ethnic Germans Admissions Act was effective in slowing
the overall migration of ethnic Germans, as more and more Russian-Germans poured
into Germany, taxpayers became infuriated. East Germans were angry because they
felt the money should be going to help them. West Germans were angry because
their standard of living was decreasing and their taxes were increasing, and most all
Germans, including other ethnic Germans, viewed the new immigrants as a threat to
the job and housing markets.

Asylum seekers arriving in Germany also became

scapegoats and blamed for Germany's economic problems.

Both ethnic Germans

and asylum seekers were discriminated against by some and the country experienced
a surge in violence against foreigners, particularly in the east German states.
The ethnic German question became an explosive issue among politicians,
especially after it was reported in 1992 that there were far more ethnic Germans in the
former Soviet Union and Central Europe than was previously thought. While the
Social Democrats would like to keep ethnic Germans out, the Christian Democratic
Union believes they should be allowed the "right to return."

Both sides have
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compelling arguments. Why, the Social Democrats ask, should the country give
ethnic Germans, especially Russian-Germans, the right to vote and entitlements such
as old-age pensions, etc. upon arrival in Germany when long-time Turkish guest
workers and asylum seekers are not granted the same privileges.
On the other hand, those in favor of the "right to return" for ethnic Germans,
remind the opposition that Germany is obligated to assist those who want to come to
Germany because the constitution promised them the right to German citizenship in
1949 and the immigrants expect the promise to be kept. Ethnic Germans themselves
also had to remind the German people that if it were not for Germany's aggressive
policies in the 1930's and 1940's they never would have suffered so. But the Social
Democrats continued to pressure the opposition and in late 1992 the parliament
modified its immigration policy once again. The government announced that the
return of ethnic Germans was solely a "late consequence of World War II" and no
longer made sense. The Post-War Settlement Act of December 1992, an amendment
to the Federal Expellee Law of 1953, redefmes who is eligible for citizenship in
Germany by stating that only ethnic Germans born before January 1, 1993 may now
eligible for citizenship in Germany. The amendment fmally gave the migration of
ethnic Germans a sense of closure, which is a relief for German taxpayers, and for
state and local governments in charge of integrating the immigrants into society.
The German government cannot solely be blamed for changing the rules
regarding its decades-old promise of the "right to return" for ethnic Germans and
their descendants.

Part of the problem is due to the actions of the immigrants

179
themselves. By settling in closely-knit communities rather than going to areas of the
country that are less populated, they have contributed to high unemployment in some
areas and have caused a strain on the housing market, particularly in the western
industrial states. Living in ghettos also hinders the integration of ethnic Germans
because they mingle among themselves and do not socialize with the general public.
The migration of ethnic Germans to Germany does have some positive aspects
however. The majority of those arriving in Germany are young people, and since
Germany's native population has been decreasing since the 1970's, young ethnic
Germans could offset a labor shortage in the future. Further, after the collapse of the
Berlin Wall, many of the former East Germany's young people fled for the west
leaving a deficit of workers in the eastern states. As a result, ethnic Germans are now
viewed positively both as laborers and as taxpayers in the eastern states.
The language barrier is another reason the German government felt the
necessity to make the country's immigration laws more stringent. While most ethnic
Germans think of themselves as German, the majority of those arriving in Germany in
the early 1990's (predominantly from the former Soviet Union) could not speak the
language making it very difficult and costly to integrate them into society. To
alleviate this problem, in 1992 the government also included as part of the Post-War
Settlement Act that ethnic Germans must take a six-month language course and pass a
language test prior to coming to Germany. The new language requirement has been
effective in preparing would-be emigrants before their arrival in Germany. But for
those who came in the early 1990's the language barrier remains problematic and the
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government continues to spend a great deal of money on language training and on
providing for the immigrants while they learn the language.
Another obstacle to the successful integration of ethnic Germans into
Germany's economy is that many of the immigrants cannot find employment.
Factory workers, agricultural workers, and miners are over-represented and face
competition with East Germans, guest workers and other ethnic Germans for jobs.
Around 6 % of those in the working-age category have no job skills at all, and some
seem to have misrepresented themselves as having particular skills. Even those with
vocational skills have a hard time finding employment in Germany. Because of
differences in training their qualifications do not meet western standards. However,
since the government had a chance to organize, it has done much to assist ethnic
Germans by extensively promoting on-the-job training programs to help them get a
new start.

The German government has also initiated job-training programs for

ethnic Germans in Russia and elsewhere to better prepare them before arriving in
Germany.
Also contributing to the integration problem are the many cultural differences,
not only between ethnic Germans and the German population, but also among the
ethnic German minorities themselves. Consequently, each group has to be treated
differently.

Previous studies conducted in Germany on the integration of ethnic

Germans shows that it takes three generations for them to become fully assimilated.
Russian-Germans are especially difficult to integrate because, unlike those from
Central Europe, Russian-Germans have had no close ties with their homeland for over
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two hundreds years.
The annual number of ethnic Germans arriving in Germany has continued to
decrease since 1996 because of additional restrictions making it more difficult for
them to come to Germany.

In 1996, the number of ethnic Germans arriving in

Germany fell to 177,000 (172,000 from the former Soviet Union), or around 43,000
less than the allotted quota of 220,000. (In 1997 it is expected that immigration to
Germany will fall even further to around 140,000 or less.) Although the migration of
ethnic Germans continues to decrease, the majority of German citizens would like to
see the migration to Germany stopped completely.
In an effort to negate growing resentment toward the immigrants, in March of
1996, the German government modified the 1989 Place of Residence Allocation Law.
The 1989 law, designed to relieve pressure on some of the more overcrowded areas,
required that new arrivals settle in certain transitional shelters (all of which were in
the west German states) based on a quota system. The 1996 amendment requires that
a certain percentage of all new arrivals must now settle in the eastern states for at
least two years or lose their entitlements. The new law has had a positive effect on
the distribution of ethnic Germans in Germany as more are now settling in the eastern
states.

The government hopes that by persuading some ethnic Germans to settle in

the eastern states it will relieve the burden on some of the more crowded states in the
west. It can be assumed that as more settle in the eastern states, they will serve as a
pull factor for other ethnic German immigrants to settle there.
Policy changes in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union have also
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attributed to the decrease in Russian-German migration to Germany in recent years.
After decades of treating its ethnic German population harshly and unfairly, the
Russian government now would like them to stay in Russia and has worked in
cooperation with the German government and with Russian-Germans themselves to
encourage would-be emigrants not to leave. The Russian government is particularly
anxious to see its ethnic German population stay in West Siberia because the region
grows food for the rest of Siberia. There have already been severe food shortages in
Siberia and the loss of many of the region's s skilled agriculturists is only aggravating
the problem. But much of the Russian-German population living in the region still
wants to leave. Life is not easy in West Siberia. Harsh weather conditions most of
the year and the region's remoteness makes living there extremely difficult and takes
a toll on one's physical and psychological well being.

Further, many Russian

Germans have relatives and friends already living in Germany and would like to join
them. To replace those immigrating to Germany from the region the Russian and
German governments have encouraged other Russian-Germans from Kazakhstan and
Central Asia to migrate to West Siberia rather than go to Germany.
The infusion of hard currency from Germany and the joint cooperation
between the two governments to re-establish German National Rayons in West
Siberia have been positive factors in keeping some Russian-Germans in West Siberia.
Improvements to the infrastructure along with the addition of new factories, hospitals,
housing, schools, commercial banks, retail shops, etc. has boosted the local economy
and provides many opportunities for ambitious young people who have opted to stay

183
in West Siberia. German investment in the region benefits other citizens in the area
as well, not just the Russian-German population.
German cultural centers are also beneficial because they provide a place for
Russian-Germans to re-establish long-lost connections with the German culture and
provide German language training. Learning the language not only helps would-be
emigrants prepare for their arrival in Germany, but for those who plan to stay in
Russia, learning the German language makes it easier for Russian-Germans to
establish business relations with German business people who are interested in
investing in the region.
For those who do not want to live in West Siberia, there are other areas of the
Russian Federation where ethnic Germans are being encouraged to settle such as
around St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad Oblast and other pockets of European Russia
where ethnic Germans traditionally settled. Tens of thousands of Russian-Germans
have also resettled in the Volga region. While the re-establishment of the former
Autonomous Republic of Volga Germans probably will not be fully realized for some
years to come, German investment in the region is strong and there are many
opportunities for Russian-Germans there as well.

Some Russian-Germans ( and

Ukrainian-Germans) who were deported from the Black Sea region during World
War II are also returning to their homelands in the southern Russia and Ukraine.
One problem for ethnic Germans returning to their original settlement areas in
European Russia and the Ukraine is that they still face discrimination. Russians and
r
Ukrainians experienced extensive casualties defending their teritory
when the Nazis
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invaded the Soviet Union during World War II.

Consequently, many people still

harbor a great deal of ill will toward anyone "German." Whether local citizens will
put the past behind them and accept ethnic Germans into the community will
probably depend on how much money Germany is willing to invest in these regions
and whether or not local citizens will also benefit from German investments.
Kazakhstan is also sorry to see its Germans go and is working in cooperation
with the German government and with Russian-Germans to keep at least some of its
Russian-German population in the newly formed country. Economic instability, high
unemployment and severe environmental problems are all push factors causing many
of the Russian-German population to leave the country in spite of efforts to persuade
them to stay.
That Russian-Germans want the assurance the door to Germany will remain
open means they still do not feel secure about staying in the former Soviet Union
even though there have been improvements in the area of human rights and their
standard of living in recent years.

A major crisis in the Russian Federation or

Kazakhstan could set off a panic situation and possibly trigger an exodus to Germany
of the estimated 1-2 million Russian-Germans still remaining in the former Soviet
Union.
Suggestions for Further Study
The intent of this thesis was to investigate the contemporary migration of
Russian-Germans and to provide an overview of the situation.

As this thesis is
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primarily an overview, the possibilities for future study regarding Russian-Germans
are wide open and the suggestions noted below are only a few of the areas in which
further research is needed.
The "right to return" for ethnic Germans was accepted in Germany until the
late 1980's, but since Reunification the immigration of ethnic Germans, particularly
Russian-Germans, has been viewed negatively as a drain on the economy. However,
this viewpoint could shift again depending on how quickly the new Germany can
rebound from the integration of the East German states into the West German
economy, and depending on whether the German government can persuade more
Russian-Germans ( and other ethnic Germans) to settle in the eastern states and
thereby relieve pressure on the already over-crowded western states.

The study of

legal developments in Germany directly affecting ethnic Germans would make an
interesting topic for those involved in political or migration geography and for those
interested in human rights issues.
There have been and will continue to be many studies in Germany regarding
the possibilities and difficulties of integrating Russian-Germans ( and other ethnic
Germans). However, this issue deserves attention by American researchers as well
because Germany is one of America's most avid trading partners in Western Europe
and we should be aware of important events that affect the country both politically
and economically.
Further, Germany is not only one of our most important trading partners in
Western Europe, but is also one of America's biggest competitors in the Russian
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market, and one of the most successful. One of the reasons for their success may be
because there are hundreds of thousands of Russian-Germans living in Russia who
are learning to speak German and culturally identify with Germany. Many Russian
Germans are now working in cooperation with German business people to establish
joint ventures (partnerships) in Russia. This certainly gives the Germans an edge
over American businesses, many of which are floundering, as they try to get their foot
in the door in the growing Russian market economy.

Germany's success in the

Russian market and its link to ethnic Germans in Russia would make an interesting
subject for further investigation in the field of economic or business geography.
In addition to the migratory movement of Russian-Germans, it has already
been mentioned that there are also many other former Soviet citizens on the move,
(although the majority of them are migrating within the former Soviet Republics as
opposed to an international migration as with Russian-Germans). Because of forced
migrations during the Stalin era and because of the rise of nationalism in the former
Soviet Republics, there are millions of people migrating from one republic to another
as they return to their ancestral homelands. As mass migrations are known be one of
the major causes of instability, the movement of people occurring in the former
Soviet Union today should continue to be a subject of intensive investigation.
Regarding the internal migration of Russian-Germans specifically, there are
many other areas that also warrant investigation.

For those interested in

environmental issues, one area of research might be to investigate the seriousness of
soil and water contamination in Northern Kazakhstan and West Siberia due to fall-out
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from nuclear testing done by the Soviets up to the late 1980's in Semipalatinsk. Are
the German National Rayons, such as Halbstadt or Omsk/Asovo in highly affected
areas, and if so, what is being done about it?
A great deal of research also needs to be done regarding Russian-Germans
who have resettled in the former Volga Republic, the Black Sea region and other
areas of European Russia. One reason would be to determine if local citizens are
accepting them or if Russian-Germans are facing discrimination because of old
grievances. Do the Russians in the communities look at the injection of German
capital in the area as a positive action or as a threat? The development of an entire
town for Russian-Germans near Bryansk on Russia's southwestern border could also
be an interesting topic.
Kaliningrad Oblast 1s another area that should be a subject of further
investigation. As Germany, Poland and Lithuania could all "lay claim" to the Oblast,
and as it is home to one of the most important ports in the Baltic, the region is worth
scrutiny as a potential hot spot. Some Russians seem to be concerned that Russian
Germans are resettling in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Also, as Lithuanians have recently
stated to NATO that they would like to incorporate the Oblast into Lithuanian
territory, it is not known how they feel about the return of Russian-Germans to the
region.
Extensive research also needs to be done to determine the number of Russian
Germans still in the former Soviet Union and their whereabouts. At this time, the
number of Russian-Germans is nearly impossible to determine because, as was
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explained in Chapter Five, the migration is still ongoing. Further, more and more
Russian-Germans continue to re-claim their German ethnicity making it difficult to
At the present time, the German

count them with any degree of accuracy.
government is only able to provide estimates.

As the migration is now winding

down, and as more Russian-Germans settle permanently in Germany or certain areas
of the Russian Federation, it will become easier to track them and finally put and end
to the mystery of how many former Soviet citizens are of German ethnicity.
More research is also needed regarding the spatial distribution of Russian
Germans in Kazakhstan and the possible development of a German autonomous
region in the northeastern part of the country.

How successful the Kazakh

government will be in persuading some Russian-Germans to stay in the country is
unclear. The effects on local economies in Kazakhstan due to strong out-migration of
Russian-Germans from the country would also be an interesting topic.
Finally, judging by the reaction this writer has had from various people with
whom I have discussed my research, there seems to be an interest in Russian
Germans and their migration to Germany.

I believe that the story of Russian

Germans, beginning with their migration to Russia in the seventeenth century, is
worthy of a documentary or perhaps a movie.

There have already been

documentaries produced in Germany about Russian-Germans and at least one historic
movie entitled Fluchtlinge (Refugees), produced in Germany in the 1930's (involving
a group of Volga Germans who had been deported to Central Asia during the Stalin
era but managed to escape the Soviet Union to China with the help of soldiers
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stationed on the Chinese/Soviet border). However, to my knowledge, there have not
been any documentaries or movies produced in the English language about Russian
Germans.
A confidential interview with one ethnic German woman who described her
ordeal of fleeing to Germany as the Soviets advanced through Central Europe during
World War II sent chills up my spine. As she was only ten years old when she and
her siblings (orphaned during the war) were forced to flee their homeland, I was
amazed with what remarkable detail she could remember this terrifying experience.
Her story, which in itself could be the basis of a biography or a novel, is only one of
thousands of stories yet to be uncovered.

I
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Asylum Seekers Arriving in the EU - 1991-1993

Country

1991

1992

1993

Belgium

15,318

17,754

22,309

Denmark

4,609

11,450

6,121

46,784

27,586

16,507

256,112

438,191

322,599

2,672

1.950

827

44,745

24,610

22,350

50

35

65

23,317

2,650

1,075

Luxemburg

150

3,429

381

Netherlands

21,616

17,618

35,399

240

439

2,091

Spain

8,139

12,650

5,778

Total

423,752

558,362

435,502

60%

78%

74%

France
Germany*
Greece
Great Britain
Ireland
Italy

Portugal

% Arriving in Germany

*The number of asylum seekers arriving in Germany in 1989 was 121,318
and in 1990 was 193,063
Source: Info-Dienst (Aug. 1994; Oct. 1994)
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1993 Amendment to Article 16
Article 16 of Germany's Basic Law, written m 1949, simply states that,
"persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum if, that is,
they are recognized by the authorities as being truly in need of asylum (Foreigners ...
1994, l)."

As a result of Germany's loosely written asylum law, the country was

obliged to grant any asylum seeker a preliminary right to stay while his or her case
was pending. This also meant the government had to provide for the person during
this time which was often for several years, especially after 1988 when the number of
asylum seekers rose so dramatically and a huge backlog of cases piles up.
During the l 970's an average of 15,600 persons applied for asylum in West
Germany per year. From 1980 through 1988 the average number of asylum seekers
rose to around 64,000 armually. In 1989/90 while East and West Germany were
undergoing Reunification, the numbers applying for asylum were 121,318 and
193,063 respectively. In 1991 there were another 423,752 applicants for asylum and
by 1992 the number soared to 558,362. (Refer to Appendix A). In all, 1,731,997
asylum seekers arrived in Germany from 1989 through 1993, the majority of whom
were arriving from Romania, rump Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Turkey. Outside of Europe, the largest groups of asylum seekers came from Algeria
and Vietnam (Foreigners ... 1994).
What concerned Germany the most, and the reason the government amended
Article 16 in 1993, was that many of the people applying for asylum in the late
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1980's and early 1990's had no legitimate claim to it; they were not escaping political
persecution but rather were coming to Germany solely for economic reasons.
Consequently, on July 1, 1993, "after years of wrangling among political parties and
in the face of steeply increasing numbers of asylum seekers coupled with rising
violence against them" Germany finally amended Article 16 (Foreigners ... 1994, 2).
The new legislation still retains the constitutional guarantee of protection against
political persecution but excludes those coming to the country for economic reasons.
The new amendment also speeds up administrative procedures and set up a two-tier
system of "safe third states" around Germany and "safe states of origin
(Foreigners ... 1994, 3)" "Safe third states are the EU member states in which the
application of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and the European
Human Rights Convention is guaranteed (Foreigners ... 1994, 3)." In addition to the
EU members, they include Finland, Norway, Austria, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the Czech Republic (Foreigners... 1994,3; das neue Asylrecht, 9). If an asylum
seeker enters Germany from any of these countries they can be immediately rejected.
If an asylum seeker comes from a "safe state of origin", countries deemed by the
government as stable and that observe human rights, the asylum seeker will also be
rejected.

These countries include Bulgaria, Gambia, Ghana, Poland, Romania,

Senegal, the Slovak Republic and Hungary (Foreigners... 1994; das neue Asylrecht,
10).
An asylum seeker can also be rejected if his or her claim is considered
"manifestly

unsound" which

includes

any claim

that

is unsubstantiated
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(Foreigners ... 1994,3).

Other grounds for rejection include providing false

information about one's identity or nationality. (Not rejected from seeking temporary
asylum in Germany after the amendment to Article 16 went into effect are a large
number of refugees (Fluctlinge) who had also sought refuge in Germany in the early
1990's. Refugees are persons who have not yet applied for asylum, or are not eligible
for asylum, such as war refugees from the former Yugoslavia. In 1992 there were 1.5
million refugees living in Germany, 400,000 of who were from the former
Yugoslavia. Others came from Romania, Iran, Hungary, Sri Lanka and the former
Soviet Union.

Refugees, especially war refugees, are under no pressure to leave

Germany (Foreigners in Germany ... 1994, 3-4).)
After the new legislation went into effect in July 1993, the number of asylum
seekers dropped sharply. In 1993, the total number of application was 322,842, a
26.4 percent decrease from 1992. In the first half of 1993, before the law came into
effect, the number of applicants was 224,342, but in the second half of the year was
only 98,500. By 1994 the number had dropped to 71,532 (<las Bundesministerium
des Innern, August 1995). In the first four months of 1997, 36,952 persons applied
for asylum in Germany (Weniger Aussiedler. .. 1997, 6).
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Terminology Commonly Used in Germany to Describe Ethnic Germans

German Word

Literal Translation

Definition

Asylbewerber

Asylum seeker

Usually refers to non-German
asylum seekers but sometimes
used to describe ethnic Germans

Auslandsdeutscher

Foreign German

Ethnic German

Aussiedler

Out-settler

Refers strictly to ethnic Germans

Deutschstiimmigen
Sowjetburger

German Soviet citizen

Soviet (or Russian) German

Die Fremden Deutsche (the) foreign Germans

Ethnic Germans

Einwanderer

Immigrant

Immigrant

Fluctlinge

Refugee

Usually refers to non-German
refugees but sometimes used to
describe ethnic Germans

Heimatvertriebener

Home-Expellees

Expellees who left their home
lands in Central Europe before
January 1, 1993

RujJlanddeutsche

Russian-German

Russian-German

Spiitaussiedler

Late out-settler

Refers strictly to ethnic Germans
arriving in Germany after the
amendment to the Post-War
Settlement Act of 12.31.92
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Sowjetdeutsche

Soviet German

Soviet (or Russian)
German

Sowjetzonenflilctlinge Soviet-z.one refugee

Former German national
(Staatsangehorige) or ethnic
German (Volkzugehorige)
who escaped from the Soviet
zone of East Berlin before
July 1, 1990

Staatsangehorige

of German nationality

Refers to former German
nationals living in territory
lost by Germany during World
War II

Obersiedler

Over-settler

Usually refers to East Germans
but sometimes used to describe
ethnic Germans, particularly
those from Central Europe

Umsiedler

Resettler, evacuee

Resettler, evacuee

Vertriebene

Expellee

Ethnic German expellees

Volksdeutsche

Ethnic German

Ethnic German

Volkszugehorige

of German ethnicity

Ethnic Germans usually
identified by German folk
cultural traits or characteristics
such as religion, language, etc.

Source: Bundesgesetzblatt 1993; Blahusch 1992 (and gathered
from many other sources too numerous to mention)
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